In December, China outlined new national security rules on foreign direct investment and agreed on an investment treaty with the European Union. On New Year’s Eve, Hainan announced a list of hitherto closed business sectors that would be opened up to foreign investment. These developments are neither nationalistic nor protectionist, showing that China can ensure national security while maintaining an open economy. After all, its one-party political system is actualised more by a keen sense of its exceptional history than Leninist ideology. Since Chinese President Xi Jinping took office, his administration has taken significant steps to improve the country. For example, it abolished the 2,000-year-old salt tax system, a symbolic crossing of the Rubicon in economy policy. And Beijing has established diplomatic relations with the Vatican after coming to an agreement on the appointment of bishops. The new national security rules on FDI seek to replace guanxi -based approval processes with a professional system. Guanxi , the system of personal connections, is to the modern economy what barter was to trade – both are inadequate. Guanxi rules certainly harm China’s rise and its ability to lead, especially the developing world, to avoid an international rat race down the bottom. The lack of good legal and other professionals is a real obstacle to an open economy and against the country’s interests. National security is dynamic. As multinational companies enter China, they will infringe on existing businesses. Those affected may seek out protection on national security grounds. China, like more developed economies, has groups whose vested interests can override national security. Most recently, for example, in the war of words surrounding the sexual harassment trial of a Beijing celebrity, national security was flagged as a concern. Such frivolous application of the concept, especially if applied to FDI, could cause many problems. Many people only see China through the prism of ideological animosity; they vilify Beijing and call for the removal of certain officials, a misplaced hope. President Xi will stay in office. Hatred of the Communist Party is childish. In Hong Kong, many liberal-minded people harbour the deluded hope that the American far right can help us, instead of giving Beijing credit for garnering consensus to develop the economy and, more recently, to hold off Covid-19. China, in turn, must be confident enough to tone down bellicose rhetoric . Even nationalistic tabloid editor Hu Xijin argued that young people be allowed more access to information and freedom of expression. Computer chips, guns and space exploration cannot transform an ancient empire into modern greatness, without a deep of understanding human beings. And in this era of globalisation, no country is sovereign in isolation. What happens in China has an impact on other nations. If outside forces respect China’s sensitivities and cease unnecessary insults, China can reform better. Meanwhile, China should not take the spiteful approach and refuse to carry out needed reforms because they were suggested by perceived enemies. For the new national security rules to work well, China needs to upgrade its legal system over the next 10 years under President Xi, to build up confidence and expertise when dealing with the West. The West should trust its own diversity and resilience and need not see China as a threat. China has its own problems; the Communist Party’s membership is larger than the population of most nations. Only long-term economic and social policies can change China, not abruptly altering its political course, which would only lead to unintended consequences. Will Xi Jinping start issuing regular pardons as US presidents do? Indeed, last week’s appointment of political philosopher Li Shulei as deputy head of the Central Party School, effectively the top job there, signals changes to the bureaucracy may come, if the West stops threatening to ostracise China and overthrow its functioning government, blindly browbeating the country without a plan for engagement. When engaging with China, explaining how one’s own society goes through many of the same problems would be a nice icebreaker. Some see China as an enemy and caricature Xi as a strongman dangerous to Western civilisation; recently there were reports that US President Donald Trump was briefed by his national security adviser on unconfirmed intelligence that China had been paying bounties for US troops in Afghanistan. But in reality there is little reason to doubt Xi’s statesman credentials. Nor is there any reason to assume he will hand over his massive political clout to a strongman successor, when he retires, and risk his own legacy. China will surely become more open in the next decade, but it will have to be its own political master. For all the good intentions and euphoria at the end of the Cold War, the US did not succeed in turning Russia into anything desirable. Let’s end with a story from Chinese history. In early antiquity, there were two northern Chinese states, Lu and Qi, which later heavily featured in the Confucius chronicles. The Lu state preferred to elevate blood relations, while the Qi prized ability when appointing officials. The Lu lasted longer, but was always under external threat because of its internal weakness. The Qi became one of the leading early states in China and dominated Chinese late antiquity, but its ruling dynasties suffered repeated usurpations. We should all think about that. Dong Lei is a non-practising solicitor in Hong Kong and is the principal at AB Highwood Consultants