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Illustration: Craig Stephens
Opinion
Opinion
by Christian Le Miere
Opinion
by Christian Le Miere

How China’s defence law changes pave the way for greater global military influence

  • By providing legal support for future overseas adventurism, the law underlines Beijing’s intent to be a more activist military power and expands the reasons it might project its power abroad – a change that could shake up global politics

Just as much of the world celebrated the dawning of 2021 and bade good riddance to the much-maligned 2020, China quietly updated key legislation that could change world events.

On January 1, an amended National Defence Law came into effect after having been approved by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee. The seemingly technical, legalistic change would normally be unremarkable, but the amendments that were included could have profound effects on China’s legal standing and willingness to deploy its military overseas.

By providing legal support for China’s future overseas adventurism, the law both underlines Beijing’s intent to be a more activist military power and expands the reasons it might project its power overseas. As such, the little-reported amended law might be the most significant event in global politics for years.

Some amendments continue the themes in domestic politics seen in recent years. They include establishing Xi Jinping Thought as a guiding principle, centralising decision-making around President Xi Jinping and prioritising the party over the state.
For the latter, the new law shifts the balance of responsibility for certain actions from the State Council – currently headed by Premier Li Keqiang, an ally of former President Hu Jintao – to the Central Military Commission, with Xi as its chair. This commission is now the lead agency in organising and implementing national defence mobilisation.

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The growth of Chinese military power over the past four decades

The growth of Chinese military power over the past four decades

Of course, there has been little doubt that it is the party organs, and the general secretary in particular, that make decisions over military deployments, mobilisation and utilisation. Nevertheless, these amendments now add de jure confirmation of the minimal role played by the state.

More significant in the new law is the change to “military activities carried out by the state”. Previously, the activities the law applied to were largely a broad description of effectively protecting the homeland, including to “guard and resist aggression” and “safeguard the sovereignty, unification, territorial integrity and security of our country”.

Now, with the addition of just three words, this description has expanded to incorporate far more expansive activities.

One of these words is “disruption”, a vague term that could include anything from protests in Hong Kong, Tibet or Xinjiang to unrest over socioeconomic conditions. Of even greater international import, though, was the inclusion of the phrase defending “development interests”. This phrase suggests China now considers all of its investments and economic activity, domestic and overseas, to be worthy of protection by military force.

This is a substantial legal change and reflects long-term trends in China’s military capabilities and defence posture. From the creation of the modern state in 1949, Beijing was primarily worried about protection of the country’s territory and unity from foreign powers.

Its largest military engagements were to protect the country’s borders, such as in clashes with India and the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1969; its claim to territorial sovereignty with clashes against Vietnam in the South China Sea in 1974 and 1988; or to support foreign allies in the Korean war from 1951 and the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979.

Now, the new defence law theoretically enables China to deploy overseas in support of its economic interests. Given the country’s stellar growth during the past four decades and substantial increase in overseas investments as part of its “go out” policy since the turn of the century, these interests are varied and global.

It is easy to imagine, for instance, Chinese troops being deployed to Pakistan to protect its Belt and Road Initiative investments as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor from attack by Baloch separatists, or Chinese vessels escorting ships in the Persian Gulf as regional tensions rise.

The People’s Liberation Army could be deployed to a South Pacific island state that has descended into ungoverned unrest to secure mining interests and Chinese citizens.

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New video shows clash between Indian and Chinese troops on border

New video shows clash between Indian and Chinese troops on border
China has already become more active globally in its military deployments. It has maintained a three-ship flotilla in the Indian Ocean since 2009, evacuated its citizens from conflict zones in Libya and Yemen in 2011 and 2015, and opened its first overseas base in Djibouti in 2017. This new defence law provides legal justification for these deployments and provides grounds for a wider range of deployments in the future.
These operations have occurred as China has steadily increased its power projection capabilities, building and commissioning its first aircraft carrier, amphibious assault vessels, cruisers and large transport aircraft in the past 10 years.

With the ability to transport, protect and deploy forces overseas, including into hostile environments, Beijing now has a broader array of options for overseas military operations, from evacuations to deterrence, stabilisation and even contested landings.

This is not to say that China is about to become a global policeman in the guise of the United States. China has been a security free-rider for decades, with its last major military conflict being more than 40 years ago in 1979. It is unlikely to end the benefits of this situation in the short term.

The new defence law certainly suggests a greater willingness to deploy overseas in support of a wider range of missions, though. The post-Cold-War era of just a single superpower willing and able to deploy its military far from its shores might have just ended as the new year began.

Christian Le Miere is a foreign policy adviser and founder of Arcipel, a strategic consultancy

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