“It’s a new day for America. It’s a new day for the world,” declared Antony Blinken on his confirmation as the 71st US secretary of state. Just hours into his tenure, the American diplomatic chief held phone conversations with his counterparts from Mexico and Canada, as well as key Asian allies such as South Korea and Japan. But it was Blinken’s conversations with Southeast Asian nations that were particularly telling, signalling the overall tenor of the Biden administration’s strategy in Asia. And it’s in Southeast Asia, the new theatre of superpower rivalry, where the Biden administration’s foreign policy mettle will be tested like nowhere else. Blinken will face major hurdles, namely prickly allies, wavering strategic partners, and an increasingly dominant China, which has brought tangible economic benefits to its Southeast Asian neighbours. During his call with Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Blinken “ reaffirmed that a strong US-Philippine alliance is vital to a free and open Indo-Pacific region” and “stressed the importance of the Mutual Defence Treaty for the security of both nations”, said the US State Department. Echoing the former US administration’s tough policy on China, he “underscored that the United States rejects China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea to the extent they exceed the maritime zones that China is permitted to claim under international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention”. By and large, we are likely to witness more policy continuity rather than a departure from the previous administration. In fact, not only has Biden adopted a more strident position on China in the past year amid a more hawkish turn among Democrats, his “big four” cabinet picks have signalled a refined version of the Trumpian strategy in Asia. During his confirmation hearing, Blinken said he believed that “president Trump was right in taking a tougher approach to China” and that “the basic principle was the right one, and I think that’s actually helpful to our foreign policy”. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, meanwhile, has said the US should reinforce freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. As for Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin , he has described China as “the most significant threat going forward because China is ascending”, a s opposed to other strategic adversaries such as Russia. Southeast Asia cannot afford another great power rivalry Even Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, a usually affable technocrat, has accused China of “abusive, unfair and illegal practices” and warned that the US is “prepared to use the full array of tools”, including financial sanctions, against the Chinese. Where the Biden administration will differ, however, is in tactics, particularly in terms of reliance on regional allies and strategic partners to constrain China’s ambitions. But in Southeast Asia, US officials will face three main challenges. First, the future of the Philippine-US alliance is uncertain, especially after Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s decision last February to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement with the US due to differences over human rights issues, although he has since agreed to put the termination on hold. However, Blinken will have only until May to forestall the permanent abrogation of the defence deal, which facilitates the large-scale entry of American troops for joint drills and war games in the Philippines. To complicate matters, Democratic legislators and progressive elements within the Biden administration are likely to push for tougher sanctions against Philippine officials such as Duterte, whose war on drugs is being probed by the International Criminal Court . Biden can offer Kim’s North Korea a denuclearisation deal he can’t refuse As a result, the Biden administration may struggle to build a stable relationship with the Philippine government, unless a more US-friendly president comes to power in the 2022 election. Second, the Biden administration will also face scepticism from regional partners, which are unsure about the future of American foreign policy. Not only is Biden facing immense challenges at home, including unprecedented public health and economic crises, there are also questions about whether he will seek re-election in 2024, given his advanced age . In fact, there are lingering concerns over the return of Trumpian populism in the future, if not Trump’s own return to power. Thus, key Southeastern Asian countries such as Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia may prefer to hedge their bets by preserving friendly ties with both superpowers, instead of siding with the US against China. And finally, prospects for Biden’s regional economic diplomacy are also unclear. This is important precisely because a key element of leadership in places such as Southeast Asia is providing tangible benefits such as trade and investment, something at which China has become increasingly adept. The Biden administration is likely to scale back Trump’s trade war with China, and forge a tech alliance with like-minded powers in Asia and Europe. Following the recent conclusion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement, Biden signalled his commitment to international trade so that China isn’t “the only game in town” . But any attempt to resuscitate the Obama-era Trans-Pacific Partnership or advance a new version of the deal will face stiff opposition at home, including among economic populists in both the Democratic and Republican parties. As Blinken himself admitted shortly after his confirmation: “A lot has changed. The world has changed … We’ve never been in a moment quite like this before. ” This is especially true in Southeast Asia. Richard Heydarian is a Manila-based academic and author of “Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China and the Struggle for Western Pacific” and the forthcoming “Duterte’s Rise”