An inevitable end to Hong Kong’s democratic experiment
- Beijing’s overhaul of the local election system is ruthless, but given the intransigence and fanaticism of the opposition and anti-government movement shown in 2019, it has no other choice if Hong Kong is to remain governable
The central government giveth and the central government taketh away. The arduous electoral reforms that took Hong Kong two decades to achieve are now being reversed between the “two sessions”.
The new principles have been laid down, though the details await the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) to promulgate.
Electoral reforms since 1997 had meant the opposition could aim to achieve a majority by occupying more than half of the 70 seats in the Legislative Council. This hope was what drove their disastrous so-called 35-plus primary, which was deemed illegal under the national security law leading to 47 defendants, many of them prominent opposition figures, being charged.
A major change will make strategies such as “the 35-plus” inoperable. First, the number of Legco seats will expand from 70 to 90 seats.
Five geographical seats will be cancelled, along with the five so-called superseats, which have been classified as functional constituencies but are in fact directly elected by all eligible Hong Kong voters.
This means 10 directly elected seats will be taken out of the picture. Another 30 seats will be created, to be filled by selected members of an expanded Election Committee for the chief executive.
Instead of the current 1,200 committee members, there will be 1,500.
The new 300 members will comprise Hong Kong representatives on the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and Hong Kong members of mainland Chinese groups such as the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, and the All-China Women’s Federation. These are, obviously, guaranteed to be Beijing loyalists.
The 117 seats on the committee currently reserved for district council representatives will be redistributed. That will rid the latter’s influence in electing the chief executive after the opposition and anti-government groups took over 17 of 18 district councils in the landslide elections of 2019.
Intriguingly, the so-called five steps required to launch electoral reforms, which technically mean the formal process to amend Annexes I and II of the Basic Law, have been sidestepped. These used to involve back-and-forths between the Hong Kong and central governments, the NPCSC, and a de facto consultative role for the opposition.
Now, it’s just one step on the say-so of the NPCSC to amending the two annexes on the methods of election for Legco and the chief executive.
While it’s sad Hong Kong has come to this, the intransigence and fanaticism of the anti-government movement and the opposition have left Beijing without any choice.
