Hong Kong democracy: Beijing has dashed decades of hopes with radical reforms

Democratic development in Hong Kong could have been China’s greatest achievement in the city. How would Hong Kong have evolved if Beijing had permitted universal suffrage for the chief executive election as early as 2007?
The recent electoral reforms, which leave little, if any, room for the opposition, mean we will never know

Cliff Buddle

Published: 8:15am, 1 Apr 2021

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The requirement that electoral reform in Hong Kong must take place gradually has been used to justify holding back democratic development for years. But there is nothing incremental about the radical changes imposed by Beijing on Tuesday. The system has been transformed.

Rather than making progress by ushering in greater democracy, the changes take us back in time. They are designed to ensure the central government’s supporters in the city win elections and dominate political institutions. There will be little, if any, room for the opposition. This is what is meant by “patriots” governing Hong Kong.

Full details of the reforms were not revealed until after they had been set in stone, with the National People’s Congress Standing Committee approving the relevant constitutional changes.

Now, they will be implemented hastily. Numerous amendments to local laws are expected to be approved by a compliant legislature as early as next month. The first elections will take place later this year.

The new system goes even further than expected in creating barriers to entry for any democrat bold enough to stand for election. Nothing has been left to chance.

02:34

China’s top legislative body passes sweeping Hong Kong electoral reforms

This is, tragically, the end of hopes dating back almost 40 years that Hong Kong could become a part of China where people can freely vote for candidates of their choosing and stand in elections for the chief executive and Legislative Council.

Officials say the drastic move is a necessary response to the months of often-violent anti-government protests in 2019. The reforms have been presented in terms of protecting national security. Support given by members of the opposition to civil unrest and anti-China sentiment, as well as their reaching out to foreign governments and disruption to proceedings in Legco, alarmed Beijing and prompted its intervention.

But the sweeping national security law passed last year had already outlawed conduct of this kind. There have been mass arrests of democrat politicians. Radical candidates in elections have been disqualified from standing since 2016. It is difficult to see how an anti-China extremist in league with foreign powers could possibly have been elected even before the reforms.

The changes appear to be designed to remove or restrict any part of the election system in which democrats – radical or moderate – have enjoyed a measure of success. Over the years, the opposition has increasingly made inroads into a system already designed to limit their influence.

The democrats won more than a quarter of the seats on the Election Committee in 2016, enough to field a candidate or maybe influence the choice of chief executive. That will not be possible following the reforms.

Former pan-democrat lawmakers pose for a photo with staff of the Legislative Council Secretariat on November 27, 2020, following the democrats’ en masse resignation. Photo: Dickson Lee

The committee has been expanded to 1,500 members, with the creation of a new sector composed of Beijing loyalists. The 117 seats reserved for district councillors – most would have been held by the democrats – have been removed. There will no longer be voting by individuals in the professional sub-sectors of the committee. Again, this will make it more difficult for opposition candidates to secure seats.

The impact on the legislature, expanded to 90 seats, will be even greater. The opposition has long enjoyed success in the directly-elected constituencies. Those seats will now be cut back from 35 to 20, the smallest proportion since the first post-handover election in 1998. Ten constituencies will each elect two lawmakers. This, given the fairly equal political divide in Hong Kong, means the democrats are likely to win 10 of those seats at most.

As Beijing overhauls Hong Kong’s electoral system, is the city reaping what it sowed?

The biggest share of seats in Legco – 40 seats – will be chosen by the Election Committee. The remaining 30 will come from small functional constituencies which have also been revamped in a way that will make it harder for opposition candidates to win.

All election candidates will need at least two nominations from each sector of the Election Committee. This is an extremely high threshold. It is difficult to see even the most moderate democrats reaching it. Probably a token few will be allowed.

On top of all this, a new vetting committee, comprising senior government officials, will screen out candidates deemed not to be sufficiently “patriotic”. That committee will act on information provided by the national security police. And, in a surprise development, a state leader will act as a “chief convenor” to oversee elections. Precisely what this means is not yet clear.

Where does all this leave Hong Kong? Officials deliberately overlook the fact that the democrats enjoy the support of at least half of the city’s population. They won 55 per cent of the vote in the last direct polls, the district council elections, in 2019. What is the point of voting if the candidates you support are excluded? The reforms risk effectively disenfranchising more than 50 per cent of electors.

Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor posed the question, “How should one judge democracy?” There is a simple answer to that, to be found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Whatever form the election system takes, it should embrace universal and equal suffrage and guarantee the free expression of the will of the voters. It should – subject to reasonable restrictions – allow all citizens to stand and participate in public affairs. The reforms take Hong Kong’s system much further away from that objective.

The development of a democratic system in Hong Kong could have been China’s greatest achievement with regard to the city. Many will blame the democrats for rejecting a limited form of universal suffrage for the chief executive election offered in 2014 and embarking on a more radical course.

But how would Hong Kong have evolved if Beijing had permitted universal suffrage at the first available opportunity under the Basic Law in 2007, when protests were peaceful and no one imagined there would ever be an independence movement.

The city’s democratic dream might then have been realised. Perhaps it would have led to better governance, more inclusive policies, and the resolving of long-standing problems such as the wealth gap and the housing crisis. Maybe not. Now, we will never know.

Cliff Buddle is the Post’s editor of special projects