Advertisement
Advertisement
Illustration:Craig Stephens
Opinion
Zha Daojiong
Zha Daojiong

Myanmar coup: China’s careful response a delicate balancing act

  • Working with and through Asean is a step in the right direction as Beijing navigates the sensitivity around its investments in Myanmar while respecting Myanmar’s autonomy
What should China do about Myanmar amid media reports of Myanmese resistance to the dramatic February 1 coup? In theory, Myanmar being a neighbour means its domestic developments are more consequential to China than many other major countries’ and hence deserves much attention.

In reality, Myanmar barely features in Chinese discussions about its environment and the relationships it should nurture.

Part of this lack of attention can be attributed to China’s foreign ministry, which innovatively nestled its response to Myanmar’s military takeover within Asean’s response.
This position was reaffirmed at Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent meetings in Fujian with his counterparts from four Association of Southeast Asian Nations members. The choice is praiseworthy as relations between China and Myanmar are complex.

03:04

Myanmar workers flee after Chinese-funded factories torched

Myanmar workers flee after Chinese-funded factories torched

Another possible explanation is that China’s plate of foreign policy issues is so full that addressing change in Myanmar either gets lost in public attention or receives a low priority.

But amid reports of a Covid-19 outbreak in the southwestern Chinese town of Ruili, a major crossing point for migrant workers and traders from Muse in Myanmar, China’s pandemic control can benefit from a Myanmar government less distracted by social protests and with more resources to spare on public health.

Acquaintances who have travelled through northern Myanmar tell of a drastic fall in health surveillance after the change of guard in the country’s capital.

Myanmar’s border towns, such as Muse, have so far not been as affected by the protests as the larger cities in the south.

Still, for Muse’s residents, access to better health-care services, even without a pandemic, is handier in Ruili across the border than in the closest locality of Lashio, a day-long bus ride away. The sooner Myanmar returns to normalcy, the better it is for China’s public health coordination.

A man receives nucleic acid testing for Covid-19 in Mengmao township in Ruili city, Yunnan province, on March 31. A recent surge of Covid-19 cases in Ruili, bordering on Myanmar, has led authorities to launch an aggressive campaign to vaccinate all 300,000 residents of the city. Photo: Xinhua via AP

As China continues to work with and through Asean in handling the Myanmar situation, it must be mindful of a few points.

First, China must bear in mind that Myanmar’s elites, civilian and military alike, demand respect for their autonomy in designing and executing governance.

The world’s attention to Myanmar fluctuates often around major changes in its governing party. It is often forgotten, however, that Myanmar has made unique contributions to the norms of state-to-state interaction.

For example, Burmese diplomat U Thant served as the third secretary-general of the United Nations from 1961-1971. And at the 1955 Bandung Conference between Asian and African states, the Burmese delegation helped spearhead the adoption of the doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” to guide post-colonial interactions between countries.

Second, no matter what government forms in Myanmar, China must learn from recent experiences – such as reaching an agreement with whichever party is in power without due regard that any major investment arrangement between the two governments can be reinterpreted by sociopolitical forces in the country.

Kachin people protest against the Myitsone Dam project in Waingmaw, Kachin state, Myanmar, on April 22, 2019. Construction of the dam has been suspended since 2011, but protests were held in April 2019 ahead of Aung San Suu Kyi’s trip to Beijing, sparked by fears that the project would be revived. Photo: EPA-EFE
Already, a restoration of the Myitsone Dam project, suspended since 2011, is suspected to be a deal in the pipeline between Myanmar’s new military establishment and Beijing.

For the ordinary people of Myanmar, energy shortage remains a challenge and given the country’s natural resources – it exports natural gas and oil to China and Thailand – hydroelectricity is an option.

The terms of the Myitsone Dam contract, which China originally discussed with the previous junta, can be renegotiated as well. But there is no justification for that project to be a prerequisite of the evolution of ties between the two governments one way or another.

Why are Myanmar’s anti-coup protesters angry at China?

The key to navigating the complex and frequently explosive sociopolitical dynamics associated with such large-scale development investment projects is to open them up to review and funding by multinational actors.

Third, China’s researchers and negotiators must take a lesson from the burning of Chinese-invested facilities in Yangon in mid-March, by being sensitive to competing narratives about how the two neighbours ought to relate to each other.

02:06

Three-finger salutes seen at Myanmar funerals as deaths from military crackdowns surpass 500

Three-finger salutes seen at Myanmar funerals as deaths from military crackdowns surpass 500
Investment is based on benefits to employment and revenue generation in Myanmar’s society, not for the sake of making the country a “corridor” for China, with the Belt and Road Initiative being the most recent framing.

Chinese investment in Myanmar, likewise foreign investment in China, is nothing more than a manifestation of market changes in the regional and global chains of production.

Fourth, with the United States suspending Myanmar’s preferential access to American markets under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), China and Asean should consider bridging gaps between their approach and that of the US, and by extension the broader Western world.
The GSP is a unilateral policy instrument, to be sure. But drastic reduction or loss of access to its export markets is hardly conducive to the country’s narrowing of income gaps. With economic sanctions, it is the poor and needy who suffer the most.

In short, working with and through Asean in relating to today’s Myanmar is a step in the right direction for Chinese diplomacy. It is also an opportunity for China to continue to be cognisant of the necessity to navigate sentimental intricacies in relating to a neighbour that will not move away.

Zha Daojiong is a professor in the School of International Studies and Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development at Peking University

2