The dust appears to be settling on the drastic shake-up of Hong Kong’s electoral system, with the announcement of local legislation on Tuesday to implement Beijing’s plan for an overhaul. While the revamp will effectively give the central government near-absolute control over Hong Kong’s political structure, Beijing also risks bearing the brunt of responsibility for failures of the city’s governance. Under the “one country, two systems” formula, Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy and Beijing is supposed to play the role of the final arbiter in any dispute between various interested parties in Hong Kong. In the first few years after Hong Kong’s return to Chinese rule, Beijing was confident that the city would be able to chart its own course and granted a relatively free hand to then chief executive Tung Chee-hwa to govern the city. Back then, to highlight the central government’s determination to steer away from Hong Kong’s politics, Beijing officials even told the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), the flagship of the pro-establishment camp that regularly visited Beijing before the 1997 handover, to stop organising official trips. The DAB leadership only visited the mainland in the party’s capacity shortly after the July 2003 protest that saw 500,000 Hongkongers take to the streets over a proposed national security bill. The legislation was ultimately shelved amid the resistance. The DAB was renamed the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong after merging with the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance in 2005. This year’s electoral overhaul signifies a landmark change in Beijing’s role, as it transforms from an umpire to a player taking a direct hand in Hong Kong affairs. Its decision last month to revamp the city’s elections to ensure only “patriots” can rule the city will see the number of Legislative Council seats expanded from 70 to 90, while skewing the odds in favour of the pro-establishment camp by stipulating that 40 lawmakers will now be selected by the powerful Election Committee from among its own members. Only 20 seats will be filled by direct elections in the city’s geographical constituencies, down from 35 under the previous system. Another 30 legislators will come from functional constituencies, which mostly represent various industries. The 1,200-strong Election Committee, previously only responsible for choosing the city’s leader, will be expanded by 300 members to further cement the pro-establishment camp’s dominance in the body. The committee will have at least two-thirds of its seats chosen by mainland-affiliated bodies, mainland enterprises in the city, or groups that have other ties with the mainland, including 110 to be filled by Hong Kong members of “relevant national organisations”. Never mind the politics, Hongkongers: get vaccinated Beijing’s heavy presence in the Election Committee and influence in contests for a substantial number of seats in Legco could be a double-edged sword. While it could prevent most opposition politicians from becoming lawmakers, Beijing could land itself in hot water as it could get both credit and blame for governance in Hong Kong. From now on, conflict between Hong Kong people and the city government could easily escalate and draw in Beijing. Hongkongers unhappy with policies introduced by the local government might also blame Beijing, which is now in the driver’s seat. Finger-pointing may ensue over livelihood issues, instead of being confined to political matters. With the revamped electoral system in place, Beijing will be forced to be directly involved in the local politics of Hong Kong – whether it likes it or not. It could find itself having to micromanage co-ordination among pro-establishment hopefuls in Legco elections, particularly who should be given the green light to contest geographical seats or be selected by the Election Committee. In an article published in 2015 in China Law Review , mainland scholar Cheng Jie, then Tsinghua University law professor and now an associate professor of law at the University of British Columbia in Canada, warned precisely against such a change in strategy towards Hong Kong. Writing in the magazine affiliated with the Ministry of Justice, Cheng cautioned against the danger of the central government taking part directly in Hong Kong politics as it would undermine its moral position. Beijing’s decision to cast off its restraints can be traced back to the mass protest in 2003. The broad-based resentment illustrated by the protest brought an end to the central government’s low-key policy towards Hong Kong. Harmony during Donald Tsang Yam-kuen’s tenure as chief executive from 2005 to 2012 briefly set Beijing’s mind at ease. But central officials were again alarmed in 2014, by the Occupy protests which paralysed parts of the city for 79 days . The increasingly violent anti-government protests in 2019 saw Beijing’s patience wear thin and convinced it that it had to take matters into its own hands. The political unrest was sparked by the now-withdrawn extradition bill that would have allowed fugitives to be sent to the mainland and other jurisdictions with which the city had no such arrangement. Sources close to the central government said it began viewing Hong Kong as the weak link in national security, and felt a loophole had to be plugged. It imposed the sweeping national security law tailor-made for Hong Kong last June, and was no longer content to wait for the city’s lawmakers to pass their own legislation. That marked the start of its now direct tutelage of Hong Kong. Gary Cheung is a senior writer at the Post