Why Asean-China relations will remain cordial, but not close

As the global geopolitical focus shifts to Asia, Asean takes on greater salience for the major powers, particularly China
While China and Asean have pledged in their recent meeting to take their partnership to ‘new heights’, given China’s actions in the region, Asean’s wariness is understandable

C. Uday Bhaskar

Published: 4:15am, 16 Jun, 2021

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China hosted the foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations at a meeting in Chongqing on June 7-8 to mark the 30th anniversary of dialogue relations between the two sides. Given the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the region, China offered Asean its support by way of the supply and joint production of vaccines.

Further, the joint statement issued said both parties would “advance Asean-China Strategic Partnership to new heights by forging closer cooperation”. The subtext of this document and its larger geopolitical context merit scrutiny.

Bilateral interaction between Asean and China began in July 1991 when China was invited to the 24th Asean ministerial meeting in Malaysia. At the time, Asean comprised six nations.

Since its inception in August 1967, Asean has had a special relevance for the major powers. During the Cold War decades, the United States and the former Soviet Union had their own strategic objectives in relation to Southeast Asia and the nascent five-member Asean was nurtured by the US-led West as part of a containment strategy.

However, the end of the Cold War led to a radical rearrangement of regional geopolitics and, from 1991 onwards, China has emerged as an important interlocutor for Asean. Asean now has 10 members and has sought to maintain a delicate political and diplomatic balance when faced with major power rivalries.

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In the last decade, the global geopolitical focus has shifted to Asia, and the Indo-Pacific has acquired a strategic contour. This has further accentuated the salience of Asean for the major powers and China in particular.

Beijing, which is currently preparing for the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party in July, is coping with many challenges. The geopolitical tension with the US that began with president Donald Trump has been endorsed by the Biden team. The US-led Quad summit in March and the bill passed by the US Senate on investment in technological alternatives to counter China is part of the new competition that is gaining traction.

Concurrently, China under President Xi Jinping has also pursued creeping maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea and muscular territorial consolidation in relation to India. The South China Sea has become a subregion of discord with some member-states, such as Vietnam, Philippines and most recently Malaysia, feeling the heat of Chinese intimidation.

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China has sought to assuage Asean’s concerns over the South China Sea by agreeing to negotiate a code of conduct – mooted as far back as 2002 – and the manner in which this issue has been addressed in the Chongqing statement is part of the subtext.

Clearly most Asean members are unhappy with Beijing’s belligerence in the South China Sea but are unable to arrive at a common position on this matter, much less lodge a clear protest.

That 19 years later, the code of conduct is still being negotiated is instructive. The June 8 statement notes that both parties “reaffirm our continued commitment to fully and effectively implement the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in its entirety, including strengthening practical maritime cooperation to build mutual trust and confidence”.

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There is an ironic twist in the Chongqing statement. Beijing has agreed to “uphold the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea, exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability, and pursue the peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea]”.

However, from an Asean perspective, Beijing has violated all these elements.

For example, in 2016, Beijing rejected the international tribunal award derived from the provisions of UNCLOS in favour of the Philippines, which had taken the South China Sea dispute to the Hague.

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Asean is pivotal in the larger construct of the Indo-Pacific and all the major powers – the US, China, Japan and India – have robust ties with the collective. However, this region is China’s backyard and Beijing would like to ensure that the region acknowledges Chinese primacy.

Hence, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi referred to “Asian values” while welcoming his guests at Chongqing.

Wang also reminded his guests that bilateral trade had grown to US$684 billion; this will further increase if the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership is implemented. But some Asean members remain wary about the tightness of the Chinese embrace.

China has a complex interpretation of its “strategic” partnerships with other countries; currently Russia and Pakistan enjoy the highest degree of trust and cooperation. How the China-Asean strategic partnership will be taken to “new heights”, as envisioned in the Chongqing document, will be shaped considerably by the outcome of US President Joe Biden’s meeting with his Russian counterpart on Wednesday.

The texture of the US-Russia-China triangle will temper the options Asean can explore to retain its own autonomy and political-diplomatic locus in the post-pandemic decade. For now, a subdued Asean-China cordiality will prevail.

Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar is director of the Society for Policy Studies (SPS), an independent think tank based in New Delhi