How China can benefit from joining US, Russia in nuclear arms talks

Engaging in arms limitation talks is a chance to show Beijing’s commitment to nuclear restraint, a global public good that would be universally supported
Being part of the conversation would also allow China to press for more stringent restraints on both the US and Russian nuclear arsenals

Christian Le Miere

Published: 1:00am, 9 Jul, 2021

Why you can trust SCMP

The discovery last week of 119 probable missile silo sites under construction in western China has rung alarm bells in Washington. US military personnel and analysts were already raising eyebrows over China’s modernisation of its nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

But even with these new silos and various other programmes, China’s nuclear arsenal will remain a fraction that of the United States and Russia. In fact, the silos appear to be part of a process of China guaranteeing that its nuclear deterrence is effective against larger, more sophisticated rivals.

Nevertheless, despite the disparity in nuclear arsenals, Beijing should change its policy on strategic arms limitation negotiations. Until now, these have been entirely bilateral between the US and Russia. For China, there are various benefits to entering into these negotiations for what would undoubtedly be a public good.

The silos were spotted by satellite imagery. They are thought by analysts to be either for a significant expansion in the number of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) China can field – currently about 100, according to the latest US Department of Defence report on China’s military capabilities – or to offer Beijing the ability to obfuscate the location of its missiles by moving them between silos.

Whatever the reason for the silo construction, one thing is clear: China continues on its ambitious programme of expanding and improving its nuclear arsenal.

01:52

The top secret mine that fuelled China’s nuclear program

In 2015, Beijing reorganised its military. It transformed the Second Artillery Corps, which managed and operated China’s missiles and warheads, into the PLA Rocket Force, upgrading it to a full military service.

The same year, China introduced the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile to complete the second leg of its nuclear triad – the name given to the combination of land, sea and air-launched nuclear-capable weapons. Although China has air-launched nuclear weapons, it still lacks a strategic bomber that would enable it to strike globally with these weapons.

Also in 2015, the Pentagon reported for the first time that China had deployed multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV) on its ballistic missiles, a technology that makes it harder to stop Chinese nuclear warheads from getting through missile defence shields. By 2017, China also fielded the DF-41, its latest road-mobile ICBM and China’s longest-range missile.

All of these developments were aimed at doing one thing: ensuring China had a secure second-strike capability. Nuclear deterrence is not much use if your enemy knows they can take out your nuclear weapons with a pre-emptive strike. China, which has until recent years relied on a small number of silo-based missiles, clearly feared this might be the case.

00:52

China’s DF-26 ballistic missile drill sends ‘clear message’ to the U.S.

By diversifying its delivery vehicles, including submarine-launched missiles that are difficult to track, increasing the warheads per missile with MIRV technology and developing road-mobile missiles that are also more challenging to locate and destroy, Beijing appears to have improved its second-strike capability.

China also maintains a relatively small nuclear arsenal – with between 300 and 350 warheads, akin to the United Kingdom and France. This compares to more than 5,000 for the US and 6,000 for Russia. Even if the US Defence Intelligence Agency’s 2019 estimate that China will more than double its arsenal by 2029 is correct, China’s total warheads would still pale in comparison to those of the US and Russia.

Still, there is value to China shifting its policy on strategic arms limitation talks with these two nuclear superpowers. Until now, the only substantial treaties dedicated to arms limitations have been bilateral between the US and the Soviet Union or Russia. China has studiously avoided and rejected any involvement in the process.

Now, Washington is keen to ensure Beijing is part of that conversation. As it sees its competition with China develop into a rivalry and watches China’s military and nuclear development, the US wants to avoid any nuclear arms race in the long run and keep China’s nuclear capabilities in check. This would entail not just agreeing to the number of warheads and launchers, but also some form of verification of those capabilities.

01:57

China steps up pace in new nuclear arms race with US and Russia

Not surprisingly, Beijing has been less than eager to limit its arsenal or submit to any form of verification. But there appears to be mostly upside for China in doing so. Engaging in arms limitation talks is a chance to demonstrate Beijing’s commitment to nuclear restraint, a global public good that would be universally supported.

Moreover, being part of the conversation would allow China to press for more stringent restraints on both the US and Russian nuclear arsenals. As an outsider, Beijing has no influence on the size and sophistication of the two largest nuclear arsenals in the world. By opening negotiations, it would have a say on how these two powers maintain their nuclear deterrent.

Entering these negotiations would also demonstrate goodwill towards the US at a time when Beijing is keen to temper friction between the two. Nuclear non-proliferation, much like climate change, is a key area for potential collaboration.

It might not be currently likely that Beijing will choose to open negotiations with the US. But over time, with the evident benefits becoming clearer and as China becomes more confident in its own nuclear deterrent, non-proliferation efforts could be an easy win for Sino-US cooperation.

Christian Le Miere is a foreign policy adviser and founder of Arcipel, a strategic consultancy