“Speak softly, and carry a big stick – you will go far,” said US president Teddy Roosevelt, who oversaw America’s transformation into what some see as a global empire a century ago. US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin, who oversees the world’s mightiest military, did exactly the same on his maiden visit to Southeast Asia . As the first African-American Pentagon chief, he charmed his guests with a refreshing display of humility, openly acknowledging democratic challenges at home, especially the recent uptick in anti-Asian racism . In a major departure from Trump-era unilateralism, Austin also emphasised the importance of “integrated deterrence”, namely, US reliance on a network of allies and partners to combat shared threats. And in a major diplomatic victory, his visit to the Philippines culminated in the restoration of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which allows a large American military presence in the Philippines. Seen as broadly successful by regional observers, Austin’s visit has also raised expectations of more concrete initiatives by Washington soon. To remain competitive against a resurgent China, the Biden administration will have to double down not only on its trade and military footprint, but also on its vaccine diplomacy amid a raging pandemic. Austin’s Southeast Asian tour, which took him to Singapore and the capitals of Vietnam and the Philippines, couldn’t have come at a more critical juncture. Throughout the year, Southeast Asian policymakers and pundits had fretted about a lack of meaningful engagement by the Biden administration. Why Biden has been a disappointment to Southeast Asia US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who visited major European and Asian capitals in his first months in office, did not manage a summit with Asean until last month . It certainly doesn’t help when top Biden officials announce that they want to address “some of most important issues of our time” with fellow Quadrilateral Security Dialogue powers such as India. Recognising Southeast Asia’s indispensability to its Indo-Pacific strategy, the Biden administration has turbocharged its diplomacy across Southeast Asia. Blinken’s mid-July summit with the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations was belated but cordial, and he talked about Asean’s centrality to managing major crises in the neighbourhood, from the post-coup Myanmar mayhem to the South China Sea disputes . Myanmar coup and South China Sea disputes are deepening Asean’s irrelevance Amid a Covid-19 surge in the region, Blinken also emphasised Washington’s commitment to deploying millions of US-made vaccines to Southeast Asia, including Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia. Southeast Asian diplomats characterised the exchanges as “very civil” and hailed the two-hour meeting as a reflection of the Biden administration’s “refreshed commitment” to Asean. Meanwhile, Biden’s top national security and trade officials worked on a new Asian trade pact , which would primarily focus on digital commerce and data protection. Prospective Southeast Asian members include Malaysia and Singapore, which has extensive bilateral digital trade with other major US allies in the Indo-Pacific. Austin’s visit to Singapore, the regional hub, and to the frontline states of Vietnam and Philippines, two key Beijing rivals in the South China Sea, simply built on the recent momentum in Washington’s regional diplomacy. During his lecture at the Fullerton Forum in Singapore, Austin laid out the Biden administration’s regional defence strategy. The soft-spoken, former four-star general aptly projected a more humble superpower by criticising the anti-Asian racism at home as “unacceptable” and “un-American”. He tried to reassure his mostly Asian audience that American democracy will eventually “self-correct”, because “we’re better than that”. He also made it clear the Biden administration is intent on “pursuing a constructive, stable relationship with China”, rather than recklessly inviting conflict and confrontation. But he also vowed to stand by allies against what he described as China’s “aggression”, while touting the importance of an “integrated deterrence”. The US defence chief held cordial meetings with leaders of Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines throughout the week. In his greatest diplomatic achievement, Austin, with his humble and reassuring disposition, seemingly won over Filipino president Rodrigo Duterte, who suddenly decided to restore the VFA following a year of intensive negotiations amid disagreements over human rights issues. It’s not clear what concessions the US may have offered, if any. But the Biden administration’s donation of millions of Covid-19 vaccines and approval of a potential multibillion-dollar fighter jet deal may have helped. Notwithstanding Austin’s diplomatic coup, Washington still has a long way to go in re-securing its traditional primacy in the region. Firstly, the Pentagon has yet to upgrade its defence cooperation with treaty allies such as the Philippines or fully optimise military cooperation with new strategic partners such as Vietnam. As important as the VFA is, the Biden administration has yet to secure the Philippines’ full implementation of the 2014 Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement, specifically designed to enhance maritime security cooperation in the South China Sea. Despite the recent normalisation of ties with Hanoi, a former enemy, the US has yet to export major military hardware to mostly Russian-armed Vietnam. Robust defence cooperation with key Southeast Asian countries is crucial to the Pentagon’s broader “integrated deterrence” plans, and the efficacy of the newly launched Pacific Deterrence Initiative , against China. On the economic front, a digital trade pact alone would not be nearly enough to help the battered economies in Southeast Asia, which still broadly rely on traditional trade linkages and high-quality investments. And it’s unclear whether the Biden administration can convince nearly enough countries to join any overtly anti-China trade pact, given Beijing’s economic primacy in the region. What’s clear is that regional leadership in the 21st century will require more than just a big stick or soft speaking – it will require a comprehensive strategy to effectively compete with China. Richard Heydarian is a Manila-based academic and author of “Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China and the Struggle for the Western Pacific” and the forthcoming “Duterte’s Rise”