Lithuania’s decision over a
de facto Taiwan embassy is part of a broader strategy to disrupt the substance of the European Union’s China policy as well as the very power structures that undergird relations between the two. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis aims to break what he calls the “troika format”, where France and Germany set the terms of engagement for the rest of Europe.
While analysts focus on the impact of Lithuania’s falling out with Beijing, the real measure of its success will be whether it can bring about inclusive new mechanisms for engagement with China that give voice to Europe’s smaller countries.
By being the first in Europe to approve a “Taiwanese” de facto embassy and passing a resolution in May denouncing China’s actions in
Xinjiang as “genocide” before
other European parliaments did so, Lithuania is leading the push for Europe to adopt a “values-based foreign policy” on China. It is creating space for smaller countries to determine what that policy should look like.
As a first mover on these issues, Lithuania is writing the playbook for a growing club of eastern European countries looking to lean away from China and towards Taiwan. Before the embassy decision, Lithuania sent 20,000 vaccines to Taiwan in June, after which
the Czech Republic and Slovakia announced donations in July.
Reports emerged last week suggesting Poland is next in line. If more Taiwanese embassies follow these vaccine batches, this unlikely eastern bloc could start a
domino effect that could threaten adherence to the one-China policy across Europe.
The David-and-Goliath optics work in Lithuania’s favour, too. If a small Baltic state of 2.8 million people can stand up to China, larger European countries caught sitting on their hands risk looking faint-hearted.
The same applies for the EU. In triggering China’s punitive response to the Taiwanese embassy, Lithuania has put more distance between Brussels and Beijing, with the EU saying China’s recall of its ambassador to Lithuania was regrettable and would “inevitably have an impact on overall EU-China relations”.
Timing has been critical. As EU-China relations go from bad to worse in the wake of the suspended
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment deal, analysts see Lithuania as riding the momentum of Europe’s broader awakening to the China challenge that has accelerated since Brussels designated Beijing a “
systemic rival” in 2019.
Beyond reforming China policy itself, though, Lithuania wants to rewrite the rules of engagement with Beijing and the intra-European power structures that underlie them by upending and replacing existing diplomatic mechanisms.
In May, Lithuania became the first country to exit
the “17+1” forum – the main channel through which Beijing exerts influence in eastern and central Europe – calling on others to abandon the “divisive” grouping. This reveals its deeper unhappiness with the asymmetries of China diplomacy in Europe. Both the forum, which serves Chinese interests, and the Sino-Franco-German troika – where Paris and Berlin negotiate directly with Beijing – leave smaller European states on the sidelines.
Sacrificing
European unity in talking to China means smaller states are under-represented. This explains Lithuania’s proposed alternative of the “27+1” – a summit with President Xi Jinping involving all 27 EU leaders, preceded by a strategic discussion on China between European countries.
Lithuania’s approach would unify EU engagement with China by giving the bloc a platform through which to generate consensus on policy. It would also democratise it by including input from all members equally in the process of reaching that consensus.
This vision requires buy-in from the rest of the bloc, though, and the European Council has yet to comment on Lithuania’s proposal despite Lithuania sending an official letter to council president Charles Michel about the matter. Yet,
overt solidarity with Lithuania this week and a pledge by the United States for closer coordination with the EU on China could give the proposal enough weight at the transatlantic level to push it towards the top of Brussels’ China policy inbox.
Despite the speed at which it has moved in recent months, Lithuania is playing a long game. If it succeeds in levelling the playing field of China policy, the diplomatic credibility Lithuania would earn from pioneering restructured EU-China mechanisms would give the Baltic state outsized influence in formulating Europe’s newly emerging policy towards China well into the future.
Liam Gibson is a Taipei-based freelance geopolitical analyst and the founder of Policy People
