China’s reported hypersonic missile test is not a ‘Sputnik moment’, but is still cause for concern

The test, should reports be accurate, is neither of drastically new technology nor does it showcase capabilities the US does not possess or has not already considered
Nevertheless, that China is developing such systems indicates it is seeking ways to circumvent and defeat the US’ missile defence system

Published: 1:30am, 21 Oct 2021

Cold War nostalgia is very fashionable, it seems. Most worryingly, perhaps, a bilateral nuclear arms race is again under way, which requires deeper examination.

The Financial Times on October 17 reported on a new military capability China had tested – a hypersonic orbital nuclear delivery system. According to the report, “the Chinese military launched a rocket that carried a hypersonic glide vehicle which flew through low-orbit space before cruising down towards its target”.

Such a system, which could strike a target anywhere on the globe, could be used for both a nuclear strike and deterrence.

Although China later said the report was inaccurate, and that the launched object was not a missile but a spacecraft, Beijing has been developing this technology for some time.

The media response has been unsurprisingly alarmist. The managing editor of Politico said the news had “all the elements of a Sputnik moment”. But the test is neither a Sputnik moment, nor something to be glibly dismissed.

A “Sputnik moment” usually refers to an event in which a rival shows a new capability that underlines a technology gap – originally this was the launch of Sputnik 1, the world’s first Earth-orbiting satellite, by the Soviet Union in 1957, some four months before the US was able to do the same.

A technician puts the finishing touches to Sputnik 1, the world’s first artificial satellite, in October 1957. The Soviet Union’s launch of the satellite marked both the beginning of space exploration and the start of the space race between Moscow and Washington. Photo: AFP / Nasa

But China’s recent test, should the reports be accurate, is neither of drastically new technology nor does it show capabilities that the US does not possess or has not considered previously.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union developed a “fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS)” that was effectively the very same idea – an intercontinental ballistic missile would be launched into an orbital plane, before releasing a nuclear warhead that would deorbit and guide itself to the target.

The idea of the technology was to deliver nuclear payloads on different flight paths to the one that its regular ICBMs would take over the Arctic. By entering a low-Earth orbit, the FOBS was able to have effectively no range limit and could instead fly over the Antarctic, evading much of the US’ ground-based missile defence systems that had been built to defend attacks from the north.

Moscow built 18 silos to house these missiles, standing up its first unit in 1969. But the technology was soon overtaken in its utility by submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which were equally flexible and arguably stealthier. By 1983, all FOBS missiles had been deactivated.

China’s recent test is a more advanced version of this system – using a hypersonic glide vehicle, as the re-entry vehicle allows for faster warhead delivery while keeping the same benefits of extended range and varied flight paths. But these are not technologies beyond the US’ grasp, nor are they impossible to defend against.

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While China’s hypersonic orbital system complicates US missile defence, the US is not just reliant on its ground-based network of early warning radars and interceptors to detect and stop such systems.

Nowadays, a network of space-based infrared satellites are able to detect the immense heat created by these systems, while seaborne radars (and allies’ capabilities) provide a global detection system. These capabilities are already used to attempt to detect submarine-launched ballistic missiles, a technology that China has possessed for years.

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What’s more, the speeds at which hypersonic missiles travel (greater than Mach 5) are already matched by ballistic missile technology that has been around for decades.

A hypersonic glide vehicle is harder to detect than a missile on a ballistic trajectory, but its atmospheric flight path also creates its own problems around drag, heat and manoeuvrability.

Flight trajectory of ballistic missiles vs hypersonic boost-glide weapons. Photo: Congressional Research Service Reports

Russia, China and the US have all been developing hypersonic capabilities over the past decade. Russia’s Avangard boost-glide system entered service in 2019; China publicly displayed its DF-ZF boost-glide system in the same year.

The US does not yet field a similar system but it has tested both hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles; the latter is slower but has better guidance.

Experimental models have been tested for more than 10 years. That the US does not yet field a similar system does not mean it lacks the technological know-how to do so, but merely that the benefits have not yet proven sufficient to invest more fully in it.

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But, at the same time, the reported recent Chinese test should not be dismissed without concern. The fact that China is developing such systems shows it is seeking ways to circumvent and defeat the US’ missile defence system.

Combined with significant improvements in China’s nuclear capability, with investment in vast new fields of silos, new ICBMs and nuclear warhead design, it is clear that Beijing is focused on ensuring its nuclear deterrent is more capable and reliable.

The test should thus be seen more as an indication of China’s intent rather than its superior technology. By developing such systems, Beijing is demonstrating that a new nuclear competition is forming, with hundreds of billions of dollars likely to be spent by both sides on both offensive and defensive systems.

Christian Le Miere is a foreign policy adviser and founder of Arcipel, a strategic consultancy