Germany’s new foreign minister, Green party co-leader Annalena Baerbock , recently prescribed a course of “ dialogue and toughness ” for China. German tabloid BILD applauded her with an almost satirical headline: “Baerbock makes dictators tremble”. Why should they? Still, if Baerbock keeps her promise and tries to be tough on Beijing by making moral accusations and putting forward so-called self-evident truths, it would be an excellent opportunity to set a few things straight. Those who demand freedom of the press should first take a closer look at Germany’s peculiar, one-sided reporting on China. Many of my colleagues have pointed out the orientalism that took hold in German media when the pandemic broke out – an othering of the virus that prevented an effective early response to the outbreak by Western countries. The coverage prompted the renowned sinologist Wolfgang Kubin to pen an uncharacteristically personal, passionate article commiserating the hostile hermeneutics of his once favourite German newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), which for a while now has been devoted to dubious espionage stories about Chinese agents operating out of Confucius Institutes. Kubin pointed out the not unimportant detail that only a few of the FAZ’s foreign journalists are proficient in Chinese. ZDF reporter Ulf Röller, whom I met during my quarantine in Qingdao, ruefully admitted the same thing to me: too few German reporters understand what is being said or written here, including him. Unfortunately, such self-awareness is rare among writers. If Baerbock wishes to talk about a rivalry between “authoritarian forces” and “liberal democracies”, citing Zhang Zhan and Peng Shuai , two popular talking points in the West, China could likewise bring up the actions of German authorities in the Murat Kurnaz case, or their questionable role as an aide and abettor of the United States in the war against terror. Should Baerbock note that the Belt and Road Initiative consists “not only of niceties”, China could tell her that she is right, it doesn’t – it is also a highly successful attempt to counter the “nice” containment policy pursued by the US. And if she claims that the project is a form of “power politics”, a hint at Germany’s own “Struck Doctrine” – that is, former defence minister Peter Struck’s famous declaration in 2004 that German security is being defended in the Hindu Kush, a mountain range thousands of miles away – might be appropriate. Unlike the Hindu Kush, Xinjiang is a part of China – and, if lost, could actually become a serious threat to its security. Thanks to China’s anti-terror strategy in this province, not a single attack has been carried out by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) since 2015. And while it is the value-laden US, not China, that is responsible for thousands of civilian deaths through its anti-terror campaigns, it made sure nevertheless to revoke its designation of ETIM as a terrorist organisation in October 2020; after more than 15 years, American experts suddenly changed their minds. If Baerbock were to talk about a “competition of systems”, one could indulge in a reference to the oh-so-superior democracy that forgoes any long-term planning in favour of a team that changes every four years, including mid-pandemic, with no one wanting to take responsibility in the transitional period. Or to the Western obsession with a moral ideology known in China as baizuo (白左), which ensured that instead of the Green party leadership going to the more experienced Robert Habeck – unfortunately a man – a woman was nominated as candidate for chancellor. In other words, competence was not the decisive factor. China could bring up the fact that the German government’s disastrous handling of the pandemic has now made compulsory vaccinations necessary, an item not on the agenda in China – if that’s not ironic, I don’t know what is. A nod to the financial scandal in which the newly-elected Chancellor of Germany is currently embroiled would conclude the colourful round of friendly references nicely. One thing is clear: anyone who stands in front of a microphone and announces a dialogue is not holding one. Only two can play this game. And anyone who announces that she will be tough is manoeuvring herself into a highly problematic position which will render impossible the very thing that should characterise politics: flexibility. While a policy of harshness may appeal to a certain anti-Chinese clientele, to the US and to the Western media, it is an irrational approach that does not seek to solve political problems but to invoke principles and enforce decision-making bottlenecks. For the sake of peace, the US must understand China better It seems Baerbock is on the way to becoming a fundi, or “fundamentalist”, to borrow the term used to describe those Greens who opposed her wing of realos , or “realists”. My guess is that Baerbock will sooner or later have to face reality. Then she can position herself again in front of the microphones of the world. Hopefully with a more pragmatic and less fundamental approach. After all, it was pragmatism in overcoming party divisions that got Baerbock and the Greens where they are now. Taking the same steps to overcome the current global divide is anything but a dishonourable task. If this does not amount to a values-driven foreign policy, then I don’t know what could. Markus Heidingsfelder is an associate professor in the Division of Humanities & Social Sciences at United International College, Zhuhai