India, Russia have more than weapons to celebrate after Putin’s state visit

Despite India’s steady drift into the US orbit, Russia remains a vital relationship for New Delhi as it seeks arms sales and strategic balance
Agreements on trade, investment and security cooperation in addition to arms deals show the relationship still has room for growth

Sumit Ganguly

Published: 2:26pm, 16 Dec 2021

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Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded a successful state visit to India last week in conjunction with the first “two-plus-two” dialogue involving the defence and foreign ministers of the two states. The visit was of no trivial significance owing to several compelling reasons.

While still dependent on Russia for weaponry and spare parts for its arsenal, India has sought to diversify its sources of weapons acquisitions in the past two decades. To that end, it has purchased a range of military equipment from the United States and France.

These arms sales have not gone unnoticed in Moscow, even as it has successfully negotiated a US$5.4 billion deal with New Delhi to supply the highly sophisticated S-400 missile defence system. That agreement, despite significant American misgivings, is being finalised. Additionally, the two sides completed another weapons deal involving the manufacture of 600,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles for the Indian Army.

Apart from expanding weapons sales, Putin’s visit was designed to serve another critical diplomatic purpose. Moscow is increasingly concerned about India’s growing interest in forging a strategic partnership with the US and in particular its participation in the Quad, a strategic arrangement involving India, the US, Australia and Japan. The principal, if unstated, goal of the grouping is to counter the growing assertiveness of China in Asia.

The matter of India’s participation in the Quad no doubt figured in the bilateral discussions. However, it is unlikely India will distance itself from the Quad for one very compelling reason. Its relations with China, despite multiple attempts at reconciliation, have dramatically deteriorated since the Doklam crisis of 2017.

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Matters have grown worse since the skirmish between Indian Army personnel and People’s Liberation Army forces in the Galwan Valley in the disputed region of Ladakh last year. Both sides have enhanced their vigilance along the disputed Himalayan border since then, bolstering their military capabilities and starting to improve infrastructure along their respective frontiers.

Even as India has sought to enhance its deterrence capabilities, it is more than aware it is no match for China when it comes to another confrontation along the border, especially if it escalates into a wider conflict. As such, it has little choice but to engage in what scholars of international relations refer to as “external balancing”, or turning to a more powerful state to bolster its own capabilities.

That said, Delhi still remains wary of placing all its strategic eggs in one basket for at least four critical reasons. First, a not insignificant section of the Indian foreign and security policy elite still harbours residual distrust of the US from the days of the Cold War and beyond. While these misgivings have dissipated in the past several decades, they have not entirely been set aside.

Second, in a related vein, many in Delhi fear the US cannot always be counted on to provide India with high technology military hardware without preconditions. Moscow, on the other hand, has few such qualms and stands ready to transfer almost any military equipment India seeks – for a price.

Third, despite India all but abandoning its long-moribund doctrine of non-alignment, a degree of prickly independence still permeates its strategic culture. Consequently, its elites are still wary of becoming too dependent on the US.

India’s US-Russia balancing act makes for an uneasy Quad alliance

Finally, a degree of Cold War nostalgia about the Soviet Union’s critical role in India’s security calculus still animates a segment of Delhi’s foreign and security communities. Accordingly, they remain loath to wholly dispense with what they deem to be a tried-and-true strategic relationship with Russia, the principal successor state to the Soviet Union. All four factors, in tandem, ensure Delhi continues to hold a candle for Moscow.

The strategic relationship is also important for Moscow for several reasons that are almost equally critical. At the outset, it ensures Russia has a reliable and substantial market for its weapons industries. This is far from a trivial consideration because unlike during the Cold War, when the arms transfer relationship was based upon barter or rupee-rouble transactions, today it is based on hard currency sales.

Apart from this transactional element of the partnership, Moscow is also keen on ensuring Delhi does not drift too far into the American orbit.

A rocket launches from an S-400 missile system at the Ashuluk military base in southern Russia during military drills on September 22, 2020. Photo: AFP

Finally, it is reasonable to surmise that Putin is also keen on reassuring his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, that the Indo-Russian relationship is not about to atrophy despite Russia’s growing closeness to China, India’s principal long-term adversary.

Given these converging and overlapping interests, it is reasonable to argue that Putin’s visit to Delhi was consequential for both parties.

Apart from the arms deals, the two sides agreed to boost annual trade to US$30 billion by 2025, signed some 28 investment pacts and agreed they could not allow Afghanistan to once again emerge as a safe haven for terrorists. The weeks and months ahead will certainly bear watching.

Sumit Ganguly is a distinguished professor of political science and Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilisations at Indiana University, Bloomington

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