“China’s investment in diplomacy falls, as its global ambitions rise”, the Post reported on December 12 . However, a reduction in China’s diplomatic resources is not the sole or even main challenge for China’s foreign policy. An increase in diplomatic resources alone will not solve the challenges facing China, whether from increasing competition with the United States, growing suspicion from the West in general or increasing scrutiny facing the Belt and Road Initiative . The real crux of the matter is for China to find a pragmatic foreign policy that balances the need to allay concerns of other countries and at the same time secure China’s interests. At present, certain actions by China might secure its short-term goals but at the cost of potentially creating a more antagonistic long-term international environment to China. For example, the more aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy has not only ruffled feathers abroad but provided a justification for Washington to label Beijing the new threat to the liberal democratic world. Another would be the growing scope of bans by Washington on technological transfer to China as the US fears such technology will be used to further authoritarianism in China and globally. In particular, there is a debate among US international relations scholars and policymakers about China’s foreign policy intentions. The question is whether it is a Leninist revisionist power, aiming to overturn liberal democratic international norms, or a defensive power striving to protect its political system from external intervention. Whichever the case, such debates illustrate the reality that China’s foreign policy is perceived by an increasing number of external actors as muddled and incoherent. The danger here is that if China cannot articulate a convincing and credible set of foreign policy goals that can be accepted by other state actors, then those actors will define one for China which might not be to Beijing’s liking. In an ideal world, China needs another Zhou Enlai . He was modern China’s first foreign minister and an exceptionally capable, charismatic figure who understood the power of the shared common pain of colonialism. Zhou used that shared pain to win over sceptical developing countries at the 1955 Bandung Conference. He proposed the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” – mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence – as the core principles of the non-aligned movement. By doing so, Zhou cemented a clear, concise set of Chinese foreign policy goals understood and agreed to in the developing world. A contemporary Zhou could identify shared interests that resonate with most international state actors and win over their scepticism, whether from developed or developing countries. Of course, one can challenge the feasibility of finding another person of Zhou’s calibre. To frame this more realistically, the foreign ministry needs to identify a core group of promising diplomats in qualification, ability and experience. It must provide them with more room and flexibility to implement orders from above but also provide advice and feedback in shaping foreign policy goals based on their interaction with foreign state actors and understanding their views. Rather than the current purely top-down approach, Chinese diplomacy can adopt a bottom-up approach to adapt, mould and shift foreign policy goals based on real perception and needs of China as well as other state actors. How end of Soviet Union still weighs on Chinese leaders’ minds Most importantly, China should add, or at least consider the possibility of adding, an addendum to its bedrock five principles of peaceful coexistence. It should be one that specifically addresses the contemporary issues of the world and also is self-aware about the impact of China’s rise. For example, what does it mean to peacefully coexist in the modern, post-Cold War world? It can start by addressing common global issues that require more than one state or one collection of states to tackle, such as climate change . China can state that peaceful coexistence obliges it to identify, cooperate and offer solutions to tackling such global issues. It can also state clearly that China will not seek to overthrow the political regimes of other nation-states. This can help assure other states of China’s benign intentions that any form of ideological competition with the US will not spill into wholesale acts of communist world revolution, differentiating itself clearly from past hegemons like the Soviet Union. To achieve that aim, China can also state that it will not engage in – or at the very least limit the scope and application of – false online misinformation campaigns to undermine the regime security of other states. Its attempts at propagating “fake news” on Facebook and Twitter to date have been noticeably more clumsy and ineffective than Russia’s, being easily detectable and deleted by social media sites and enjoying little to no credibility among external audiences. Journalists sceptical at Hong Kong’s idea for tackling fake news. Here’s why Since the utility of China’s misinformation campaigns is limited at best, if not outright counterproductive to its own foreign policy goals, there is little cost to ceasing or limiting such activities. There is no doubt it will be difficult for China to contemplate any such addendum to its core principles. But neither was it easy for Zhou to articulate and win acceptance at Bandung of the five principles in the face of Cold War hostility from Washington. Yet, Zhou managed to do so in spite of such adversities. The only question is whether China has the political will to demonstrate its intentions to the world by being pragmatic and responsive to the concerns of other nation-states. Zhou had the realistic foresight to achieve that by framing the five principles as free of Maoist ideology and highlighting the shared pain of colonialism. Similarly, China can today be more attuned to the concerns of the global community despite the challenges from Sino-US competition. Dr Winston Fung is a research fellow in international development and Hong Kong affairs at the Hong Kong Policy Research Institute