Japan’s defence pact with Australia reflects its shifting military posture as concerns over China grow

Tokyo is building up its military capabilities in a way it has not done for 75 years. US allies are, meanwhile, deepening ties with each other and forging new defence relationships

Christian Le Miere

Published: 8:45am, 19 Jan 2022

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The signing of the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) between Japan and Australia this month was historic. It was the first time in more than 60 years that Tokyo signed a treaty that would allow foreign forces to access its territory.

Although the agreement is a far cry from permitting the stationing of Australian forces on Japanese territory, it does lay out the intricate rules governing the conduct and presence of visiting troops, from the validity of identification documents to the taxes and duties they must pay.

In essence, it streamlines the process of allowing Australian vessels, aircraft, vehicles and troops into Japan (and vice versa) and makes it easier for the two countries to engage in joint exercises and military cooperation.

The agreement is the latest step in Japan’s decades-long process of “normalising” its military posture. But it also underlines that the US post-war alliance system in East Asia is expanding and its sinews are thickening.

Japan’s “normalisation” began just after the Cold War. The country’s military, the deliberately-named Self-Defence Forces (SDF), has long been constrained by the post-war constitution, which forbids the maintenance of offensive military capabilities.

But with the fall of the Soviet Union and growing concerns in Tokyo first over North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities and latterly over China’s rise, that purely defensive posture has begun to change, with shifts in the country’s legislation, deployments, procurement policies, budgeting and alliances.

Japan’s first overseas deployment since the end of the Second World War was in 1991, when it sent minesweepers to the Gulf. Since then, a series of legislative changes and shifts in the government’s interpretation of the constitution have led to an increasingly frequent and supportive role.

Initially, any overseas deployment by the SDF was constrained to non-combat theatres, with Japanese troops only able to defend themselves. Now, the SDF are legally allowed to defend foreign nationals and support combat operations.

Indeed, Japan’s overseas deployments have become so regular that in 2011 the country opened its first overseas base since 1945, in Djibouti. The base has facilitated the use of maritime patrol aircraft and various naval vessels in the Indian Ocean ever since.

02:52

Japan and US deepen military ties in bid to counter China, North Korea

Meanwhile, the country’s procurement and budget policies have slowly evolved. In 2009, Tokyo commissioned the Hyuga-class helicopter carrier, its first post-war aircraft carrier.

More recently, the government signed off on a plan to adapt the country’s newer Izumo-class helicopter carriers for the deployment of fixed-wing aircraft, the first use of such naval aviation capabilities since imperial Japanese carriers roamed the Pacific.

The country’s defence budget has also been increasing. Back in 1976, Japan had a stated policy not to increase its defence budget above 1 per cent of its GDP. But annual increases since 2012 have made that historical policy disappear.

Will Japan’s defence moves heighten tensions in the Taiwan Strait?

Even before the RAA with Australia, then, Japan’s defence posture was steadily becoming more outward-facing, more offensive and more “normal”. As the agreement with Australia demonstrates, that process coincided with a shift in alliances.

During the Cold War, the US-led alliance system in East Asia was generally classified as a “hub-and-spokes” system, with the US serving as a hub for its many bilateral allies, or “spokes”. In recent years, however, the US has encouraged a “spoke-to-spoke” system, resulting in new multilateral groupings such as the Quad and bilateral cooperation like the RAA.

These changes are accelerating under Japan’s new prime minister, Fumio Kishida. In his first months in power, he not only brought forward some of the country’s defence budget from 2022 to 2021 to accelerate spending, but also indicated that he may push for the procurement of clearly offensive weapons like land-attack cruise missiles.

Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, seen at a press conference on January 11, has intensified plans to make the country a traditional military power once more since taking office last year. Photo: Jiji Press/AFP

What this means for China is a more complicated security environment in the region. Japan is just across the sea from China and boasts the world’s third-largest economy and one of East Asia’s strongest militaries. It is now building up its capabilities in a way it has not done for 75 years. Meanwhile, US allies are deepening their ties to each other and forging new defence relationships.

This does not mean that conflict is imminent or that Japan is arming for an overtly offensive strategy. But it does mean that China’s neighbours are wary of the country’s belligerent behaviour and committing themselves more robustly to their own and each other’s defence.

It is becoming increasingly likely that any contingency over, for instance, Taiwan could now involve not only the US, but also allies such as Japan and Australia. Overall, for Beijing, the neighbourhood is looking a little less friendly.

Christian Le Miere is a foreign policy adviser and founder of Arcipel, a strategic consultancy