A pandemic, trade war and crimps on global supply chains or not, East Asia is still humming. The region remains the world’s most vibrant economic space. It was the case before Covid-19 and Trumpism, and it will be in the future. The United States and Europe are major economic stakeholders in East Asia without being part of it. But will Washington further risk its considerable stake with more political posturing? The 15-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, initiated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, took effect on January 1 with China at the centre of the world’s largest trade bloc. China has also formally applied to join the 11-member Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership which the US led before quitting under former president Donald Trump. These groupings complement existing trade pacts between China and its regional partners. But US President Joe Biden ’s “new economic framework” is conspicuous by its absence after more than a year of his administration. Washington’s latest approach is an alliance of democracies to compete against China. There are doubts over that prospect while greater strides are evident in politico-military initiatives such as the Quad and the Aukus agreement. Prioritising military approaches over economics jars with a region invested in peace, stability and prosperity. East Asia’s business is business, with a collective repudiation of conflict regardless of cause or justification. US-China competition might be inevitable, but bruising rivalry and physical confrontation are not. Attempts to flex that rivalry in such competition will prove to be a costly failure. There is no regional market for conflict, and even keen allies on paper will not measure up on the ground or in regional waters. Hubris encourages wishful thinking that will prove injurious and costly in hindsight. There can be no limited confrontation between major, nuclear-armed powers with no face to lose if escalation is swift. The damage will be indiscriminate and difficult to calibrate. How US, China and Asean are fine-tuning their South China Sea strategies US military prowess is not what it was. It now relies on accurate assessments of China’s advancing military capacity and the unflinching commitment of its allies, neither of which can be assured. China has home-ground advantage while the US has a history of impermanence and messy retreats. The purpose of deterring Chinese aggression is certainly welcome, but not the prospect of failure and backfire, given US unilateral tendencies, the implications of domestic political partisanship and uncertain commitment in prolonged, distant conflicts. It is also impolitic to overplay the democratic argument in East Asia. Washington’s laissez-faire capitalist model might be challenged by China’s state capitalism, but hoisting ideological colours will not fly in the region. Today’s China is not interested in exporting its ideology . A developing East Asia is loath to replay Cold War divisiveness. Besides, this region is home to a wide range of industrial policies, public-private partnerships and state-led enterprises. A US-defined free-market, democratic alliance triggers consternation in the region, while promoting it smacks of intrusiveness. East Asian nations are pragmatic and go with whatever works best, irrespective of ideological labels. Economic integration is understood as sinking or swimming with the economic interests of behemoths such as China and the US. Any strategy risking US interests by targeting China’s would be unhelpful and unwelcome. Yet, a second-year Biden administration is still stuck in Trump’s trade war and decoupling mode, bereft of new thinking on China or the region. Bipartisan agreement in Congress on the need to contain or constrain China suggests there will be no change. Preparations for this year’s midterm elections amid Biden’s low approval ratings confirm this. An urgent reset is needed – if not in US-China relation s, then at least in evaluating the interests of all regional stakeholders. Broadening economic options in East Asia without strings would be ideal. Challenging Beijing’s South China Sea claims without also challenging Taipei’s equally disputed claims lacks consistency and credibility. Moreover, vast US-China differences over trade, technology, currency and politics transcend intraregional disputes. Today’s impasse demands thinking and acting outside the box of immediate political expediencies. Is the US, still the premier world economic power, capable of creative and timely policy innovation? Ratcheting up the trade war or decoupling while heading towards physical confrontation saps East Asia’s vitality and confidence, to the detriment of all. The US should bank on its status as the leading economic power rather than the leading military power to offer the region constructive, marketable ideas. Bill Clinton’s Democrats won an election with “It’s the economy, stupid.” Barack Obama used the TPP to set the terms of world trade instead of China. But he presumed the global trading order had to be carved out by one or the other great power rather than built in partnership through stakeholder consultation. Going forward, what should a new economic framework look like? First, countries must be free to choose whichever framework they prefer or to mix and match elements from different frameworks. There must be no Cold War bipolarity, zero-sum mentality or pressure to enlist as asset or ally. Second, commercial competition between frameworks must not be politicised. Differences in US-China relation s must not restrict or sour the regional business environment. Third, a road map to end superpower rivalry must include clear steps to boost inclusive sustainable growth and regional resilience. Nothing less will work. Everything else must gel with these or nothing worthwhile will result. There is little room for optimism. Bunn Nagara is a consultant on Asian strategy and Honorary Fellow of the Perak Academy