May’s presidential election in the Philippines will set the trajectory of the country’s foreign policy for the next six years. For Manila, China remains a core policy concern, given the lingering maritime and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. As the election approaches, there has been talk of potential foreign election interference and a “ Manchurian candidate ”. The five major presidential contenders include Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jnr, former senator and son of the late strongman Ferdinand Marcos, Vice-President Leni Robredo, Manila Mayor Isko Moreno, Senator Panfilo Lacson and Senator Manny Pacquiao, the former world boxing champion. Based on a December 2021 poll by Pulse Asia, Marcos has a commanding lead of 33 per cent over second-place Robredo. Looking at the potential China policy of the candidates, Marcos, Moreno and Lacson have all exhibited pragmatic tendencies by expressing an openness to joint development with China in the South China Sea. Robredo is also willing to engage with China, like Vietnam. However, she says that for joint development to happen, China must explicitly acknowledge the 2016 arbitral award which nullified its claims in the South China Sea. Joint development is just one aspect of bilateral relations with China, so the candidates’ stance on how they intend to manage other China-related issues and, by extension, broader Philippine foreign policy is also important. These include the fishing rights of Philippine fishermen , China’s military posturing and maritime law enforcement operations in the South China Sea, Chinese official development assistance and investments , and the alliance with the United States and defence cooperation with other security partners. Under President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines has become an active member of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, including the Digital Silk Road and the Health Silk Road. China’s charm offensive of loans and investments has been widely dismissed as all talk, given that much of the billions in aid China initially pledged has yet to materialise . However, while not without controversy, some major projects in the Philippines have commenced, and some are set to begin, this year. These include three priority bridge projects in Metro Manila, the Kaliwa Dam , the Chico River pump irrigation, Davao City coastal road and others. Moreover, trade and tourism with China rose under Duterte. And Chinese-approved investment from 2016 to 2020 reached US$3.2 billion. Scepticism in Philippines about Duterte’s support for Chinese projects By contrast, the total approved Chinese investment under the previous administration of Benigno Aquino III was only US$1.2 billion. This surge of investment under Duterte saw China elevated to the second-largest investor in the country in 2019 and 2020. According to the National Economic and Development Authority, cumulative assistance from China and the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as of 2020 were valued at US$620 million and US$958 million respectively. If a political ally of Duterte such as Marcos wins the election, engagement with China is likely to remain unchanged. Even so, it remains to be seen whether the new president will use the same kind of belligerent and anti-US language as Duterte. Meanwhile, given the uncertainties brought about by electoral cycles, domestic politics and personal approaches to foreign policy, victory for an opposition candidate could result in Chinese projects being cancelled or investigated. This was the case when Aquino took over from his predecessor Gloria Arroyo, as well as in Malaysia and Sri Lanka when Mahathir Mohamad and Maithripala Sirisena took charge respectively. However, it is important to note that even during the Aquino administration, the Philippines welcomed certain Chinese schemes including the Angat Dam and Agno River irrigation projects. The Philippines also became a member of the AIIB during that time. Common to the Aquino and Duterte administrations is the weight of statements issued at the highest level with regard to China. As a result, they have characterised the prevailing political climate. While Acquino was assertive on Philippines claims in the South China Sea, Duterte was more conciliatory, seeking to reset ties. As with all elections, the presidential candidates’ chances of victory will hinge on many factors, including their charisma and popularity, political machinery, campaign performance and electoral platforms. Duterte’s tenure has shown that political capital does not automatically translate into domestic support for foreign policy or a vote of confidence for China. External strategic issues, particularly the state of US-China relations , will remain crucial for the Philippines as both powers seek to offset each other’s economic and political influence in third countries. This geopolitical competition is expected to deepen and manifest itself in regional hotspots such as the South China Sea and Taiwan. This coincides with the pivot of major European powers towards the Indo-Pacific, creating additional pressure for regional security and economic alignments. Philippine presidential hopefuls wade into South China Sea dispute That said, the Philippines’ China policy will arguably be shaped by the president’s personal approach towards Beijing, China’s behaviour in the South China Sea and the United States’ intent to work with regional allies and partners in managing its geopolitical contest with China. The Philippines will grow used to the fact its relationship with China is a love-hate one, even as the US – its major ally – is reshaping its own relations with China. Washington has expressed a willingness to cooperate with Beijing on climate change and nuclear proliferation while seeking to chart a path with “guardrails” amid “ extreme competition ”. However, should a confrontation between the Philippines and China – armed or otherwise – break out in the South China Sea and lead to a loss of life, the China-India border clash in Ladakh in 2020 may be a good indicator of what might befall diplomatic and economic relations between them. Aaron Jed Rabena is a research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress in Manila and a member of the Philippine Council for Foreign Relations