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Illustration: Craig Stephens
Opinion
Mohamed Zeeshan
Mohamed Zeeshan

Despite their warm relations, China and Russia aren’t yet a match made in heaven

  • For all the talk of bonhomie and cooperation, several sources of tension remain between the two countries
  • Russia’s threats over Ukraine and activities in Central Asia risk instability in areas where China has significant economic interests
In the chaos surrounding the stand-off over Ukraine, last week’s extraordinary summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping stands out. Putin visited the Winter Olympics in Beijing last week and became the first world leader to meet Xi in person since the start of the pandemic.
The stage was ostensibly set by the Olympics, but the unspoken context was geopolitics. The United States and its allies had announced a diplomatic boycott of the Games over Beijing’s alleged human rights violations. Meanwhile, Putin endorsed China’s role as host of the Games and met Xi at a time when Russia faces the threat of further sanctions from the West over Ukraine.

In response to these troubles, Putin and Xi rolled out an unprecedented 5,000-word joint statement, covering all of their common complaints against the West. Russia reaffirmed its support for the “One China” policy while China opposed the further enlargement of Nato, one of Putin’s primary demands surrounding Ukraine.

Xi’s endorsement of Putin’s position on Ukraine is a watershed moment for Chinese foreign policy. China did not endorse Russia’s war in Georgia in 2008 or recognise its annexation of Crimea in 2014. But as Xi expands his global ambitions, Putin appears to be a natural ally.

Both of them have long been suspicious of US-led security coalitions, Putin of Nato in Europe and Xi of the Quad and the Aukus agreement in Asia. Both Russia and China have been targeted by Western sanctions over abuses of democracy and human rights.

02:30

Xi meets with Putin ahead of Beijing Winter Olympics opening ceremony

Xi meets with Putin ahead of Beijing Winter Olympics opening ceremony
The joint statement articulated these concerns vividly. In the same paragraph where it denounced Nato expansion, the statement also criticised “the formation of closed bloc structures and opposing camps in the Asia-Pacific region” – language that mirrors Beijing’s frequent opposition to the Quad and other American initiatives.
On democracy and human rights, the statement devoted lengthy paragraphs to defending China and Russia while decrying the “abuse of democratic values and interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states”. Spooked by the West over these disputes, Moscow and Beijing have deepened their relationship along multiple lines in recent years.
From 2016 to 2020, as much as 77 per cent of China’s total arms imports came from Russia. That period also saw Russian arms exports to China swell up by 49 per cent compared to the previous five-year period, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Russia is also China’s third-largest supplier of natural gas – a market that will prove to be valuable insurance for Putin amid tensions with Europe. Last year, Russia exported more than 16 billion cubic metres of gas to China through its Power of Siberia pipeline, and new deals were unveiled to further increase exports when Putin met Xi last week.

02:22

China and Russia turn on gas pipeline ‘Power of Siberia’ as they forge stronger energy ties

China and Russia turn on gas pipeline ‘Power of Siberia’ as they forge stronger energy ties
The crisis in Ukraine also presents its own opportunities for China. The looming threat of a Russian invasion will keep the West distracted and its resources strained, leaving it less bandwidth to deal with China in Asia.
In addition, if Beijing comes to Moscow’s aid in the event of sanctions from the West, it would give Beijing one more bargaining chip over the West. It would be a far more potent bargaining chip than China’s traditional influence over North Korea.

Yet, despite all these opportunities, Russia’s bonhomie with China might not quite be an alliance made in heaven. While China continues to rely on its economic capabilities for global influence, Russia’s relevance in global geopolitics is driven by its military power. That means Moscow might be more willing to take economic risks and create political instability around the world than would be in Beijing’s interests.

This threat already looms large in Ukraine. Ever since China rolled out the Belt and Road Initiative, Ukraine has been an integral gateway into Europe for Beijing, ushering in infrastructure deals between the two countries which aligned with Ukraine’s Big Construction initiative. In 2018, Beijing even opened a trade and investment centre in Kyiv to drive engagement.

Meanwhile, agricultural trade between the two countries grew by 33 per cent in the first half of 2021 compared to the same period in 2020, with Ukraine accounting for more than 80 per cent of China’s corn imports. War would most certainly jeopardise Beijing’s plans to leverage Ukraine as an entry point into Europe.

Likewise, Putin’s military adventures in Central Asia have been at cross purposes with China’s need for stability. Last month, as the spectre of Russian influence loomed large over the region, Xi told its leaders that China will “firmly support them safeguarding sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity”.

In Kazakhstan, where Moscow recently oversaw violent crackdowns on disgruntled citizens, Chinese investment amounted to almost US$30 billion through to the end of 2019. More than 1,000 Chinese companies are operating in the country.

Moscow does not share many of these concerns with Beijing, given its weaker economic ties with most parts of the world. By contrast, Russia’s foreign policy has thrived more recently in countries where instability is the norm. In Africa, for instance, private military contractors connected to the Kremlin have raised revenue and Russian influence by serving as mercenaries.

As it considers what to do over Ukraine, the West ought to be mindful of this strategic incongruence between China and Russia if it wants to keep Xi from empowering Putin’s militaristic designs. The key could well be to increase economic cooperation with China, with the goal of raising the economic cost to Beijing of conflict and instability in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and elsewhere.

Mohamed Zeeshan is a foreign affairs columnist and the author of “Flying Blind: India’s Quest for Global Leadership”

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