Despite their warm relations, China and Russia aren’t yet a match made in heaven
- For all the talk of bonhomie and cooperation, several sources of tension remain between the two countries
- Russia’s threats over Ukraine and activities in Central Asia risk instability in areas where China has significant economic interests
In response to these troubles, Putin and Xi rolled out an unprecedented 5,000-word joint statement, covering all of their common complaints against the West. Russia reaffirmed its support for the “One China” policy while China opposed the further enlargement of Nato, one of Putin’s primary demands surrounding Ukraine.
Both of them have long been suspicious of US-led security coalitions, Putin of Nato in Europe and Xi of the Quad and the Aukus agreement in Asia. Both Russia and China have been targeted by Western sanctions over abuses of democracy and human rights.
Russia is also China’s third-largest supplier of natural gas – a market that will prove to be valuable insurance for Putin amid tensions with Europe. Last year, Russia exported more than 16 billion cubic metres of gas to China through its Power of Siberia pipeline, and new deals were unveiled to further increase exports when Putin met Xi last week.
Yet, despite all these opportunities, Russia’s bonhomie with China might not quite be an alliance made in heaven. While China continues to rely on its economic capabilities for global influence, Russia’s relevance in global geopolitics is driven by its military power. That means Moscow might be more willing to take economic risks and create political instability around the world than would be in Beijing’s interests.
This threat already looms large in Ukraine. Ever since China rolled out the Belt and Road Initiative, Ukraine has been an integral gateway into Europe for Beijing, ushering in infrastructure deals between the two countries which aligned with Ukraine’s Big Construction initiative. In 2018, Beijing even opened a trade and investment centre in Kyiv to drive engagement.
Likewise, Putin’s military adventures in Central Asia have been at cross purposes with China’s need for stability. Last month, as the spectre of Russian influence loomed large over the region, Xi told its leaders that China will “firmly support them safeguarding sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity”.
Moscow does not share many of these concerns with Beijing, given its weaker economic ties with most parts of the world. By contrast, Russia’s foreign policy has thrived more recently in countries where instability is the norm. In Africa, for instance, private military contractors connected to the Kremlin have raised revenue and Russian influence by serving as mercenaries.
As it considers what to do over Ukraine, the West ought to be mindful of this strategic incongruence between China and Russia if it wants to keep Xi from empowering Putin’s militaristic designs. The key could well be to increase economic cooperation with China, with the goal of raising the economic cost to Beijing of conflict and instability in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and elsewhere.
Mohamed Zeeshan is a foreign affairs columnist and the author of “Flying Blind: India’s Quest for Global Leadership”