Why a military offensive against Ukraine was always Russia’s Plan B

To stop Nato’s eastward expansion, Putin has been prepared to risk international condemnation and possible domestic repercussions
His rationale of the need to protect the country’s security also has the support of a sizeable number of the Russian people

Danil Bochkov

Published: 1:00am, 26 Feb 2022

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February 25 is likely to usher in a change in the post-1945 world order, with national security being prioritised over sovereign rights and non-interference. Despite earlier reassurances of non-aggression, Moscow launched an offensive against Ukraine, citing domestic security concerns.

The move was lambasted internationally with the Group of 7 calling it an “unprovoked and completely unjustified attack” and the European Union concerned about “the darkest hours” since World War II. There will be broader implications for Euro-Atlantic security and the global order will be more unbalanced, emboldening states to pursue coercion.

But there is nothing sudden about Russia’s move. Earlier in the week, I tweeted that “Russia will have to intervene militarily sooner or later”, following its recognition of the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine, which effectively dismantled any diplomatic off-ramps for Ukraine to peacefully withdraw.

Prior to that, the Russian parliament voted to ask President Vladimir Putin to recognise the regions. It was followed by the two regions’ announcements of mass evacuations of civilians.

The view that Putin is acting on his strongman ambitions or, as US President Joe Biden put it, to recreate the Soviet empire, seems too simplistic. Neither an ego trip nor imperial ambitions could be a convincing explanation for such a risky endeavour that could have serious domestic and international repercussions.

History teaches that regimes fall out of favour with citizens when they fail to maintain peace. The Soviet campaign in Afghanistan and the American war in Vietnam are just a few examples. Putin would have had a stronger inducement than mere narcissism.

John Mearsheimer wrote in 2014 that the Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault originating from its “misbegotten policy” of turning Ukraine into a Western stronghold, while Jeffrey Sachs has called “American intransigence” on Nato enlargement “misguided and risky”. In each of his three televised addresses so far, Putin has stressed that Moscow would not tolerate Nato’s eastward enlargement, threatening Russia and subsequently his own rule, deemed autocratic in the West.

In retrospect, it seems clear that the military option was always Plan B. Russia’s “red line” was Ukraine joining Nato, which Putin said would allow a missile to reach Russia in as little as five minutes. In fact, this is already possible from Estonia.

However, the more important motive might be to prevent Nato from launching a full-scale ground operation along Russia’s border with Ukraine, which is the largest part of the Russian westward frontier.

Ukraine’s ambassador to Japan Sergiy Korsunsky walks past a map showing Russia and Ukraine as he arrives for a news conference in Tokyo on January 26. Photo: Reuters

Russia was juggling offence and negotiation, though also betting on Ukraine to blink first in the face of the massive build-up. As recently as February 14, Moscow signalled its readiness to continue negotiations with the West. Four days later, it announced a partial withdrawal of troops. However, neither move worked. Washington unwearyingly advocated for Nato’s “open door policy” and kept pushing on with sanctions.

Another concern, cited by Putin, was the US’ ongoing weaponisation of Ukraine. As The Wall Street Journal reported, since January, the US has dispatched eight cargo planes with 650 tons of arms and equipment to Ukraine; since 2014 Washington has provided US$2.7 billion in aid to Kyiv.

The turning point came on February 19, when President Volodymyr Zelensky threatened to renounce Ukraine’s non-nuclear status. Russia believes that Zelensky is incapable of controlling Ukraine’s volunteer battalions and is wary of nuclear technology falling into their hands.

The grand narrative driving Putin’s vision for Russia and Ukraine

The final straw for Putin came the next day, after a futile call with French President Emmanuel Macron convinced him a compromise would not be possible.

With the US ruling out sending troops to Ukraine and the EU failing to agree on its policy towards Russia, Moscow also got more leeway. Although sanctions were imposed on Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has developed rhetorical resistance to this cudgel over the years. Thus, when the West imposed more sanctions following Russia’s recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk, former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev said that “it would be difficult” but that the tension “would subside anyway”.

The recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk became possible due to Russia’s proactive approach. This Donbas region of eastern Ukraine has seen conflict for eight years, and Moscow has issued 800,000 Russian passports to locals, with 400,000 applications still being processed. This effectively turned a sizeable chunk of the region’s population of around 3.5 million into Russian citizens.

People ride a subway carriage in Moscow on February 24. A poll by the independent Levada-Center showed 66 per cent of Russians blaming the US and Ukraine for escalation of the crisis in Donbas. Photo: AP

And Putin’s rationale resonates with the electorate. According to Russian state opinion pollster VTsIOM, 73 per cent of Russians support the recognition of the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, while the independent Levada-Center puts the figure at 45 per cent. Last year, another Levada-Center survey showed 66 per cent of Russians blaming the US and Ukraine for escalation of the crisis in Donbas.

Hence, a wave of patriotism could help the Kremlin shape the public mood in the run-up to Russia’s 2024 presidential election. After Crimea rejoined Russia in 2014, the pro-Putin United Russia party overwhelmingly dominated the 2016 legislative election.

If the Kremlin’s ultimate aim in Ukraine, as it has stated, is “denazification”, this means that it intends to topple the current government in Kyiv and reshuffle the political landscape. With Zelensky ordering the general mobilisation of the population and showing no sign that he is stepping down, the clash is likely to intensify, with the possibility of more bloodshed and casualties.

02:48

Up to 5 million people could be displaced by Russian invasion of Ukraine, says US

The US and its allies have responded with “severe” sanctions aimed at crippling the Russian economy and cutting it out of global trade. Already, the pandemic-stricken Russian economy is suffering inflation of 8.4 per cent, a six-year high.

Russia’s ties with the West have been torn asunder. And now it faces a more monolithic West with an reanimated Nato, just a few years after Macron called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization “brain-dead”. Even the long-standing proponent of practical cooperation with Moscow, Berlin, has mothballed the Nord Stream 2 project and started to look into diversifying from Russian energy supplies.

And even though China is walking a tightrope between the US, Russia and Ukraine, Putin’s “old friend”, Xi Jinping, may have to be even more prudent now. Beijing must have been perplexed to learn that just days after the Chinese supported the Minsk Agreements as a way out of the Ukraine crisis, Moscow effectively scrapped them by recognising Donetsk and Luhansk.

Danil Bochkov is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council