Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – a flagrant violation of international law that has resulted in a humanitarian disaster – has nailed shut the coffin of the post-1989 “liberal” international order. The model was already on its deathbed, having been mortally wounded by the geopolitical conflict between China and the United States, and the backlash against hyper globalisation. Any hopes for its resuscitation have now been dealt a final blow. The global order we are leaving behind rested on the premise that the world could rely on economic interests – mostly of large corporations, banks and investors based in the US and western Europe – to spread prosperity and mitigate conflict. As middle and rising powers such as Russia and China became richer, they would become more like “the West”, and the imperatives of geopolitical competition would give way to the search for gains from trade. While free-market economists supplied the old order’s founding narrative, geopolitical “realists” will shape the coming order. And the picture they paint is not pretty: a world of zero-sum great-power competition where the quest for national security, inevitable uncertainty about adversaries’ motives, and the absence of a global rule enforcer lead to conflict rather than cooperation. In such a world, the dominant question facing the West is how to contain Russia and China. Is it possible to drive a wedge between them? Or should the West accommodate Russia’s goals in Europe to form a common front against the more potent economic and technological challenge posed by China? All other matters, including trade, investment, climate change, global poverty and public health, become subordinate to these questions. It would be terrible if this were the only alternative to the unfulfilled expectations of liberal internationalism. Luckily, it is not. It is possible to create a prosperous and stable world while remaining realistic about the nature of great-power competition. But whether we can achieve such an arrangement depends on how countries pursue their national security goals, and on how they view themselves and their adversaries. The central conceptual framework that informs realist thinkers is the “security dilemma”. The idea explains why a system in which major powers emphasise their national security can be fundamentally fragile. Because it is impossible to distinguish defensive from offensive measures, attempts by each side to become more secure simply add to the insecurity of the other, triggering countermeasures that sustain the vicious cycle. Realists would argue that the security dilemma was at play in the run-up to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Ukraine perceived its incorporation into a Western economic sphere and possibly a Western military alliance as bolstering its economy and security. Russian President Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, saw these moves as inimical to Russia’s security interests. If this seems outlandish, consider how the US would react if, say, Mexico were to contemplate a military alliance with Russia. But a lot about this explanation hinges on how countries think about their national security goals, and the effectiveness of alternative mechanisms for achieving them. China is right to call for Globalisation 2.0 A country that invested all its resources in military capabilities and neglected to build its economy and strengthen its institutions would not be very secure in the long run. South Korea provides an instructive example. In the aftermath of the Korean war, the country focused on its military build-up against North Korea. But in the 1960s, it changed course, calculating that economic strength would provide a better bulwark against a potentially belligerent northern neighbour. Likewise, it is not at all clear that Russia will be more secure if it achieves its immediate military goals in Ukraine but emerges from the conflict as an economic weakling cut off from Western technology and markets. Equally important are the stories great powers tell themselves about their intentions, and how others perceive them. US and European policymakers view themselves in the international arena as well-intentioned benign actors. But when they talk about a “rules-based international order”, they forget how that order has been constructed to suit their own countries’ interests, and overlook their transgressions of it. They are puzzled by the fact that ordinary people in many non-Western countries regard Western powers as opportunistic, hypocritical and selfish. This sense of exceptionalism exacerbates the security dilemma, because it leaves little room for other powers’ legitimate security concerns when Western countries expand their military and economic influence. While nothing might have guarded against Putin’s military adventurism, he feeds on many Russians’ hostile views of the West. Similarly, US attempts to exclude Chinese firms such as Huawei from global markets, ostensibly on national security grounds, fuel China’s concerns that America wants to undermine its economy. West must learn from China, not try to change or destroy it The security dilemma comes into its own when a great power seeks hegemony rather than accommodation. When countries like Putin’s Russia question the legitimacy of another country’s existence, it becomes difficult to imagine a path to compromise. But there is no reason the security dilemma cannot be tamed. It is possible for great powers to have national security goals that are not overtly offensive. It is also possible for them to communicate their intentions and concerns better, thereby reducing misunderstanding and achieving a degree of cooperation. There is a lot of wiggle room to escape from the realists’ cruel world. Dani Rodrik, professor of international political economy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, is president of the International Economic Association and the author of Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World Economy. Copyright: Project Syndicate