“Putin’s war has killed China’s Eurasian railway dreams”, ran the headline last month in Foreign Policy. Meanwhile, Nathan Hudson at the University of North Texas was even firmer in a widely circulated Eurasianet report: “Not only is the war starting to cost Beijing lost trade revenue, it is also turning infrastructure investments into white elephants.” Let me respond with the famous misquote of Mark Twain: “The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.” And I would go further: such reports are just wrong. For sure, the Eurasian rail link, which China is confident will play a critical role in opening up the long-ignored Central Asian economies on China’s Western borders, has seen traffic disrupted. For sure also, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has inflicted massive economic harm worldwide, cutting GDP forecasts and even putting globalisation in jeopardy . China and the Central Asian economies along the Silk Road will be among the many victims. But singling out the Belt and Road Initiative is naive and inaccurate. Indeed, the invasion probably provides vindication of President Xi Jinping’s ambitious 2013 initiative to develop stronger infrastructure links with China’s economic partners around the world. This network may provide important stability as we face a suddenly unsafe world. The first error is to think of any belt and road project in terms of a year or two, or as a self-standing investment. The Belt and Road Initiative is a 100-year vision for China’s relations with the world, in particular across the Eurasian land mass and into Africa. It sits at the heart of a world-view that is both defensive (securing relations with the 14 countries that share its 22,800km of land borders) and driven by shared economic interests. It is born out of a conviction that China’s own success over the past five decades has been underpinned by massive infrastructure development, and that the developing economies with which it seeks to build stronger links also need stronger infrastructure – whether it be roads, railways, ports, power plants or telecoms networks – if they are to become economically strong and worthwhile trading partners. The Eurasian railway has been a striking success (if you ignore the fact that Beijing still provides substantial subsidies). An estimated 1.5 million containers were moved between China and 130 cities in 23 European countries last year, accounting for 5-8 per cent of trade between China and Europe at a time when the pandemic has disrupted sea and air transport. The Ukraine invasion will undoubtedly disrupt traffic, but in the long view, it is preposterous to think this will be consequential. It is important to remember that, for Beijing, the Eurasian railway is but one of multiple projects intended to diversify China’s trading access to world markets, reducing reliance on the Malacca Strait and the Suez Canal, and securing long-term access to commodities that are in chronic short supply at home. It already includes 2,631 projects worldwide, with a combined value of US$3.7 trillion, according to research group Refinitiv’s BRI database. This strategy includes rail lines down through Myanmar and Laos into Southeast Asia, through Pakistan down to Gwadar port close to oil and gas in the Gulf, projects across Africa, and even along the Polar Silk Road to northern Europe. For China, the projects spread across economies such as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also have profound strategic importance. They aim to ensure stability in a long-neglected region seen as a historic hotbed of Islamic radicalism and violence – a buffer insulating the Uygur-dominated Xinjiang region from radical contagion from the West. It was no accident that as Russian and Ukranian negotiators met this past week in Istanbul, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was hosting a meeting of Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbours in Tunxi, in Anhui province. The week before, he had been a guest of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, meeting in Pakistan. Nor was it an accident that the Anhui meeting was joined by Sergei Lavrov , the Russian foreign minister – a reminder of the delicate dance between China and Russia in Central Asia, a region historically part of Russia’s imperial domain. It is a reminder too of the precarious balancing act being performed by China as it is, on one side, being pressed to condemn Vladimir Putin and impose sanctions, and on the other, to tend fences with Russia along their 3,600km border. While Europe’s Nato partners were wrestling with the need to strengthen security fences against a volatile and untrustworthy Putin, Beijing was equally preoccupied with the task of tending its rising power across Central Asia without provoking Putin to their west. As Harvard’s Jeanne Wilson wrote last year in a thoughtful paper on Sino-Russian rivalry in Central Asia: “Russia and China appear to act more as autonomous actors in Central Asia than as cooperative partners...”. She noted that as China’s economy has become larger and globally more significant than Russia’s, so Beijing “has begun to ignore Russia … while showing Russia less respect”, especially in Central Asia: “A central problem for Russia is that it needs China more than China needs Russia.” Unlike Europe, China may not fear invasion. But Putin’s militaristic tendencies jeopardise the international stability and global economic cooperation that are crucial for China’s long-term growth plans. Putin may be untroubled by the prospect of economic decoupling, but China has too much at stake to share that view. From this vantage point, the belt and road network provides a critically important bulwark in an unstable world. The short-term loss of some container traffic on the Eurasian railway will not keep Beijing leaders awake at night. David Dodwell researches and writes about global, regional and Hong Kong challenges from a Hong Kong point of view