The conflict in Ukraine has served to highlight the significance of both Russia and Ukraine in the global food and natural resource supply chain. In 2020, Russia produced about 11 per cent of the global supply of oil, 45 per cent of palladium and 15 per cent of coal. In 2019, Russia and Ukraine jointly produced about a third of the world’s supply of wheat, 18 per cent of its corn, and half of its sunflower oil. The top three purchasers of Russian wheat at the time were Egypt, Turkey and Bangladesh (followed by Nigeria, Yemen, Azerbaijan, Sudan, the UAE, Senegal and Vietnam). The top three purchasers of Ukraine’s wheat were Egypt, Indonesia and Bangladesh (followed by the Turkey, Tunisia, Yemen, Morocco, the Philippines, Thailand and Libya). Russia and Ukraine’s failure to provide a reliable supply of wheat to these nations could lead to profound social unrest, and potentially, political violence. Many of the governments of these countries have consistently struggled to meet the basic needs of their citizens and had already been hit hard by the Covid-19 pandemic. It would not take much additional strain on systems to see individuals who are already marginalised turn violent in the wake of experiencing food shortages. This occurred in 2008 in the build-up to the Arab awakening throughout Africa and the Middle East, and again in 2011. Around 90 per cent of Africa’s imports from Russia in 2021 were wheat, so its continued supply to the continent is crucial. In March, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) released a report saying that global cereal production was forecast to increase a fraction of one per cent in 2022. But, despite the plentiful supply, demand has also risen. In 2021, the FAO’s food price index rose to its highest level since the food riots of 2011, with rising food costs exacerbating spiralling inflation. In addition, the rising cost of natural gas (which rose to its highest level since 2014 in 2021) has contributed to soaring fertiliser costs (Russia is the largest exporter of fertiliser in the world). As of mid-March, Ukraine had already ceased exports of grain and Russia had stopped exporting fertiliser. Numerous countries have, in response, begun to ration wheat. As a result of the economic sanctions imposed on Russia in recent weeks, commodity prices are continuing to rise and Moscow continues to limit exports of food staples to meet the needs of its own population. Governments throughout the world are similarly banning exports of food staples to preserve their ability to feed their own people. This raises the prospect of food insecurity for a large proportion of the world, especially those in vulnerable developing countries. The World Food Programme estimates that Ukraine’s grain supply feeds some 400 million people. Yemen, for example, relies on Ukraine for nearly a third of its wheat supply. Egypt derives 85 per cent of its wheat and 73 per cent of its sunflower oil from Russia and Ukraine. Prices for these products have rocketed by as much as a 44 per cent in a matter of days. Such supply constraints and price inflation are clearly unsustainable. Although it has been a decade since food riots spread throughout the developing world, that prospect is once again a real possibility. Therefore, it is incumbent on the world’s multilateral institutions to provide additional financial assistance to governments without delay so they can feed their people. In addition, the range of available food suppliers needs to be expanded, while enhancing the means of food distribution. Drums of war drown out cries of hunger As tragic as the Ukraine conflict has been for so many people in such a short period of time, it provides us with an opportunity to recalibrate our focus and redouble efforts to minimise the impact of food insecurity. While so much aid is now being directed to Ukraine, we must not forget the plight of hundreds of millions of hungry people throughout the world who continue to suffer from food insecurity, and the prospect of political violence that could result. Daniel Wagner is senior investment officer for syndications and guarantees at the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in Beijing. This article is published in Mr Wagner’s personal capacity and does not represent the views or policies of the AIIB