University of Chicago professor and author John Mearsheimer has drawn heavy criticism for his analysis of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. His argument that the war in Ukraine was the West’s fault because it supported states that neighboured Russia and expanded Nato has come under fire from many analysts in the Western world and unleashed a fresh wave of criticism of his body of work across traditional and social media. Interestingly, his analysis is respected in India. The Indian administration under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been no different from its predecessors in adopting a realist foreign policy that puts its own economic and political interests over any moral arguments of right and wrong in foreign affairs. The conflict in Ukraine is no exception. India has refrained from voting against Russia at UN Security Council meetings over the Ukraine crisis on multiple occasions and has avoided publicly condemning Russia in any global forum. While Modi has advocated for peace in his phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin, his administration’s primary agenda during the conflict was getting Indian students trapped in Ukraine back home and preventing economic shocks for the domestic economy. India’s position on Russia is not new and is unlikely to change any time soon. This has to do with macroeconomics and its multipolar vision for the world. On the subject of macroeconomics, the challenge arises with India’s import dependency, particularly when it comes to energy and defence equipment. It is the world’s second-largest importer of crude oil and the largest when it comes to defence equipment, shipping in more than 80 per cent of its crude oil and between 60 and 65 per cent of its defence equipment. Given its high level of energy imports, volatility in crude prices has a direct impact on its inflation levels and foreign exchange reserves. With the price of crude touching levels close to US$130 per barrel, it made economic sense when Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said in response to buying Russian oil, “We have received quite a number of barrels, I would think three to four days’ supplies and this will continue” and “India’s overall interest is what is kept in mind”. India is considering different mechanisms for paying for its imports. These include using rouble-rupee payment systems for trade with Russia to circumvent the sanctions imposed in the wake of it invading Ukraine. In addition, around 50 per cent of India’s defence imports are of Russian origin. India’s dependence on Russia for supplying and maintaining its military makes antagonising Moscow out of the question. Brahmos, India’s first indigenously developed supersonic missile, was jointly developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation of India and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyenia. India’s plans of exporting these missiles and becoming an arms-exporting nation could be sabotaged if it agreed to toe the line of the Western alliance. While macroeconomics and trade are two elements shaping India’s Russia policy, they are not the only ones behind New Delhi’s decision to refrain from joining the Western alliance against Russia. After all, Germany and Italy are two of Russia’s biggest clients for natural gas on a continent that is highly dependent on Russian energy, but that has not stopped them or other European nations from publicly condemning and voting against Russia at the UN Security Council. Italy gets around 40 per cent of its natural gas from Russia while India’s imports are a fraction of that amount. With these stark differences in energy dependence, it is clear India’s Russia policy is more than geoeconomics. Will China and India’s stance on Russia harm their standing in Asean? India has feet in both the global south and the Western alliance. It seeks to foster relations with nations such as the United States, France, Japan, Israel and Germany while maintaining its Cold War-era bonhomie with countries such as Russia, Vietnam and Iran. This is a product of India’s Cold War-era policy of non-alignment and its more recent, broader ambitions of getting a seat at the high table in the multipolar world it envisions without kowtowing to any hegemonic power. India’s dilemma is evident in its participation in groupings such as the Quad, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS bloc and more. Officials in the Indian government would call these issue-based coalitions and a multi-alignment strategy over a state of incertitude. On issues such as climate change, vaccinating the global south and trade disputes at the World Trade Organization, India has found company with the likes of South Africa and Russia, while on security issues and the Indo-Pacific it is largely in line with the Western world. India’s Cold War-era relationships could become a concern for Western countries as they try to grow their relationship with India. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the limits of India’s foreign policy strategy. Nevertheless, seeking more buy-in from India cannot be done through coercion. This has happened on multiple occasions, such as a senior US official saying India could face significant costs if it continued its trading relationship with Russia. The best the US can offer are alternatives to Russian supplies, and other Western nations could also supply India with defence equipment, as shown by the rise in France’s arms exports to India. However, while these measures can reduce India’s reliance on Russia, India’s aspirations of having a seat at the highest table are here to stay. Those aspirations are what will prevent it from taking sides in global conflicts that involve Russia and the West or Western-allied nations. Akhil Ramesh is a Fellow at the Pacific Forum. Twitter: @akhil_oldsoul