Strategically located in South Asia, Pakistan has played an important role in global geopolitics since gaining independence from Britain in 1947. Yet, having been predominantly ruled by the military, which has been involved in toppling three civilian governments, Pakistan has never had the best of luck with its prime ministers – not one has finished their entire term of office. This time has been no different. Imran Khan lost a no-confidence vote earlier this month, put in motion by an opposition led by the Pakistan People’s Party – co-chaired by ex-president Asif Ali Zardari and his son Bilawal Bhutto Zardari – and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, chaired by former premier Nawaz Sharif. The official reason for initiating the process to end Khan’s four-year term was an accusation of economic mismanagement . Hit hard by the pandemic, Pakistan faces one of the highest levels of inflation in Asia at over 10 per cent, while the rupee is trading at a record low against the US dollar, and the country lacks sufficient foreign currency reserves to cover imports in the coming months. Although these are valid points, it is crucial to look beyond the hype to other equally valid factors contributing to the political instability, as well the broader impact of the current situation. Khan came to power in 2018 with visions of a country free from corruption, prosperous and respected around the world. As a result, he gained tremendous support among young and well-educated people who, like Khan, wanted to turn Pakistan from a country with a “small group of wealthy and a sea of poor” into an “example for a humane system, a just system, for the world, of what an Islamic welfare state is”. Breaking with the dynastic nepotism of the past, Khan’s government made appointments based on merit. It became more citizen-friendly; plans to implement universal healthcare started with a pilot programme in one province that was to be expanded nationally. Further, Khan decided to diversify the country’s traditionally close relations with the US and reduce its reliance on International Monetary Fund bailouts by fostering closer ties with China and Russia. However, this new and progressive foreign policy which aimed to meet the challenges of the emerging multipolar world did not meet with broad acceptance among the old establishment and the army – both openly preferring the status quo of the past. Notably, Pakistan’s parliament decided the best way forward was to hand power to Shehbaz Sharif, the younger brother of three-time prime minister Nawaz Sharif. The elder Sharif was barred for life from holding public office by the Supreme Court in 2017 after being sentenced to 10 years in prison and fined US$10.6 million on corruption charges for concealing assets related to the 2016 Panama Papers revelations. Even though political author Zahid Hussain declared “the end of the Sharif political dynasty” in 2018, it is fair to say that fate can be fickle. With Shehbaz Sharif’s recent instalment (despite facing multiple money laundering and corruption charges), it’s clear the old political dynasties are very reluctant to leave the stage. According to Michael Kugleman, a senior associate for South Asia at the Washington-based Wilson Center, Shehbaz Sharif seems to have a cosy relationship with the military, which still plays an outsized role in determining Pakistan’s politics, security and foreign policy, but most importantly holds control over crucial economic institutions. Moreover, it has suspiciously broad claims to land and is a shareholder in many of the country’s largest corporations. Interestingly, the ousting of Khan coincided with his worsening ties with army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa, particularly over military promotions. The army had also become dissatisfied with the Khan government’s increasing reliance on Chinese arms, longing for a return to closer relations with its former top weapons supplier, the US. “We have a history of long and excellent strategic relationship with the US, which remains our largest export market,” General Bajwa said in a speech at a forum in Islamabad this month, expressing a shared sentiment among the army and the political dynasties of wanting to deepen ties with Washington. This contrasts significantly with the “anti-US” foreign policy of Khan, who upset Washington with his two-day visit to Moscow in February that resulted in new bilateral agreements on the import of about 2 million tonnes of wheat and the purchase of natural gas from Russia, as well as a desire to speed up the long-delayed construction of the Pakistan Stream gas pipeline between the two countries. Given Khan’s claim that his ousting was inspired by the US, and the fact huge crowds of young Pakistanis gathering on the streets to support the former prime minister – plus the unprecedented resignation of over 100 lawmakers from Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party – there is enormous pressure to hold early elections. What Pakistan’s political turmoil means for neighbours like China, India Given these circumstances, China would be well advised to reduce engagement with its “iron clad” partner to avoid being seen as straying from its policy of non-interference, and follow President Xi Jinping’s advice to “avoid dangerous and chaotic places”. The following months will be crucial for Pakistan’s future, and it is unclear whether the new prime minister can successfully navigate the major political and economic hurdles, most notably, securing the US$3 billion remaining from its 23rd bailout from the IMF. After all, who would pour money into a sinking ship? Adriel Kasonta is a London-based political risk consultant and lawyer, and a graduate of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)