On April 26, a female suicide bomber from the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) Majeed Brigade targeted a bus of Chinese nationals in front of the University of Karachi’s Confucius Institute. The attack killed four people , including three Chinese, and left another four injured. This is the first attack against Chinese interests in Pakistan this year. The participation of a Baloch female suicide bomber adds a new twist to an already complex and volatile conflict. While claiming responsibility for the attack, the BLA called the Confucius Institute the symbol of Chinese economic, cultural and political expansion in Pakistan and warned of harsher attacks in the future. In recent years, the Majeed Brigade has targeted Chinese nationals and projects in different parts of Pakistan. In August 2018, it hit a bus of Chinese engineers in Dalbandin, Balochistan. Three months later, suicide bombers from the group struck the Chinese consulate in Karachi. It targeted Gwadar’s Pearl Continental Hotel , frequented by Chinese nationals, in May 2019, the Pakistan Stock Exchange in June 2020 and a Chinese engineer in Gwadar in August 2021. The recent spate of Baloch separatist attacks in Pakistan, including against China, shows that the insurgency has come of age. It has evolved from a hit-and-run guerilla struggle to a sophisticated urban insurgent movement capable of high-profile attacks. The centre of gravity in this new phase has moved from the tribal leadership to the educated, urban middle class. The suicide bomber in the April 26 attack, Shari Baloch, had Masters degrees in zoology and education and taught at a government-run secondary school in Balochistan. Growing urbanisation in Balochistan, coupled with social media penetration, has allowed local Baloch youth to interact with their diasporic counterparts, creating a new consciousness about their political alienation and socio-economic marginalisation. The educated middle-class leaders of Baloch separatism find the Europe-based tribal insurgent leaders out of touch with the reality in Balochistan. The new Baloch insurgent leadership says the tribal leaders ran their groups like personal fiefdoms to retain feudal influence and used them as profit-making entities instead of advancing the Baloch cause. The arrogance of tribal insurgent leaders towards non-tribal commanders and fighters was another reason educated, middle-class leaders went their own way. The new generation of Baloch separatists considers China a neocolonial power that, in unison with the Pakistani military establishment, deprives them of the ownership of their resources and furthers their pre-existing disadvantages. The exclusionary model of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has strengthened these apprehensions as the living conditions of Balochistan’s local communities have gone from bad to worse. A case in point is Gwadar, where the local community has no access to clean drinking water, basic health facilities, schools or electricity. Over and above these issues, the mainstay of Gwadar’s living was fisheries. Under the Gwadar Lease Agreement, locals have been deprived of fishing in Gwadar’s waters, resulting in widespread protests . Such a sorry situation strengthens the Baloch separatists’ narrative against China and pushes the angry Baloch youth towards insurgency. Why China’s investment in Pakistan is the No 1 target for Balochistan separatists The new Baloch separatist leaders believe it is essential to take the fight against the state to major cities such as Karachi and Lahore to highlight their struggle. In their thinking, it is not sufficient to only fight against the state in Balochistan. One high-profile attack in a major Pakistani city gets more media attention than 10 in the far-flung areas of Balochistan. The adoption of suicide attacks is part of that strategy. Compared to conventional terrorist attacks, suicide attacks are more lethal and attention-grabbing. Hence, attacks against Chinese targets in major cities get them instant media attention and put pressure on the Pakistani state alongside exposing its failure to improve the living conditions of Baloch people through the CPEC. Furthermore, the latest suicide attack points to a new, disturbing reality: women are assuming combat roles in the Baloch conflict. In traditional religious societies where gender segregation is the norm, women can pass through security checks without being properly frisked. It is also easier for them to hide suicide vests under their clothing. The Pakistani state will need a new lens to understand, let alone resolve, the latest phase of the Baloch conflict. Primarily, it is a political problem that has been mishandled by over-securitised state responses. Simply put, there cannot be a security solution to a political issue. Instead of reinforcing failed security strategies, Balochistan needs a healing touch grounded in an empathetic humanist and political approach. Abdul Basit is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. Twitter @basitresearcher