What will shape Philippines’ foreign policy post Duterte, and should China be concerned?

Strategic calculus and domestic political considerations, rather than populist antics, are most likely to shape the next president’s foreign policy
Both front runners are established mainstream figures with international ties and, unlike their predecessor, lack long-standing grudges against the West

Richard Heydarian

Published: 10:15am, 30 Apr 2022

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“The two sides’ proper handling of the South China Sea issue has provided an important foundation for the China-Philippines friendly cooperation,” President Xi Jinping told his counterpart in Manila ahead of next month’s Philippine presidential election.

During his online summit with Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, Xi emphasised how the status quo had benefited both countries and “effectively safeguarded regional peace and stability”.

Weeks earlier, Foreign Minister Wang Yi publicly warned his Filipino counterpart Teodoro Locsin Jnr against any “disturbances” in bilateral relations amid the impending transition in the Philippine political system. Wang underscored the importance of “continuity and stability” to preserve the foundations of bilateral relations.

During the past decade, elections from Sri Lanka to Malaysia and the Philippines have produced maverick leaders who have overseen radical policy shifts. Thus, Beijing has ample reason to be concerned about the foreign policy implications of the latest presidential election in the Philippines.

Depending on which of the top two candidates emerges victorious, the highly polarised election could produce radically different outcomes for the country’s besieged democracy. On foreign policy, however, there is likely to be more continuity than change regardless of who succeeds Duterte.

Recent Philippine history is replete with wild swings in the country’s foreign policy. Former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo oversaw a “golden age” of bilateral relations with China to lessen strategic dependence on the United States.

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But her successor, the late president Benigno Aquino III, moved in the opposite direction during his tenure, seeking greater US military assistance against a resurgent China, especially following the 2012 naval stand-off in the Scarborough Shoal.

Throughout his presidential campaign in 2016, Duterte signalled a paradigm shift in Philippine foreign policy. Unlike his predecessors, he has harboured decades of personal resentment against the West, especially over the US military presence in his home island of Mindanao.

In a clear break from a long tradition of US-friendly presidencies, Duterte expressed no sentimental attachment to the Philippines’ former colonial master. Fresh into power, he even openly threatened to end the Philippines’ century-old alliance with the US while pursuing alternative agreements with the likes of China and Russia.

Throughout his term in office, Duterte has made it clear that any cooperation with America would be transactional and based on actual benefits and strategic deliverables. In this sense, his presidency represented a major rupture in Philippine foreign policy with few precedents.

Nevertheless, Duterte has not been able to sever long-standing strategic ties with the US – with the two allies recently conducting their largest-ever war games – or consolidate defence ties with China or Russia.

To date, the Philippines has yet to finalise a single major defence deal with America’s rivals, while China’s pledges of big-ticket investments have proven largely illusory. The upshot is a strategic interregnum, which portends an indeterminate future for Philippine foreign policy.

On the surface, presidential front runners Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jnr and Leni Robredo have radically different foreign policy agendas. While the former has indicated his preference for warmer ties with China, the latter has underscored the importance of cooperation with traditional Western allies.

Upon closer examination, however, it is clear that whoever becomes Duterte’s successor will face similar structural constraints on three levels. To begin with, public opinion and the position of the Philippine defence establishment, extending from key members of the military to veteran diplomats, will prove crucial.

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Bongbong Marcos Jnr leads in polls in final weeks of Philippine presidential election campaigning

So far, surveys suggest that most Filipinos, including the military elite, prefer a tough stance on the South China Sea. Rising maritime tensions with China and the absence of major investments by Beijing have fuelled anti-China sentiment.

In 2019, for instance, China’s net trust rating reached minus 33 per cent, compared to high public trust levels of 72 per cent towards the US. Aware of public scepticism towards Duterte’s China policy, even Marcos has publicly announced his willingness to deploy warships to defend the Philippines’ sovereign rights in the South China Sea.

At the same time, studies show most Filipinos, and the defence establishment, welcome pragmatic engagement with China. Recognising the Philippines’ limited defensive capabilities and with lingering doubts over US reliability as an ally, up to 67 per cent of Filipinos preferred closer economic ties rather than military confrontation with China, according to a 2017 Pew Research survey.

A T-shirt in a print shop in downtown Manila shows Philippine presidential candidate Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jnr and running mate Sara Duterte on April 12. The Philippine presidential and general elections will be held on May 9. Photo: Bloomberg

In a joint study with colleagues at the National Defence College of the Philippines, I discovered a similar trend among emerging leaders in the Philippine military. Even the top opposition candidate in this year’s elections has expressed a similar stance. Robredo has made it clear she is committed to avoiding direct conflict with China while welcoming mutually beneficial economic cooperation.

This brings us to the final crucial element, which is the predisposition of major powers such as the US and China as well as other key regional players, namely Japan, towards the next Filipino president. Unlike the outgoing president, neither Marcos nor Robredo have deep-seated personal grievances against the West.

Both candidates are also well-established, mainstream figures who have had extensive relations with a host of international players throughout the years, in contrast to Duterte.

The strategic predisposition of his successor is more likely to be driven by how foreign powers treat the next Philippine administration and what tangible strategic benefits they offer to the country.

In short, careful strategic calculus and domestic political considerations, rather than personal sentiments and populist antics, are most likely to shape the foreign policy of Duterte’s successor.

Richard Heydarian is a Manila-based academic and author of “Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China and the Struggle for Western Pacific” and the forthcoming “Duterte’s Rise”

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