Ukraine war: how far can US, Nato push Putin before he uses nuclear weapons?

Western leaders must understand the Russian president’s thinking and ensure they don’t give him reason to launch nuclear weapons
Putin would only really feel threatened if the main forces of the Russian army were wiped out and Ukrainian or Nato troops pushed into Russian territory

Ni Lexiong

Published: 1:30am, 1 Jun 2022

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Before its “special military operation” against Ukraine, Russia conducted a strategic nuclear exercise. President Vladimir Putin clearly intended this to be a deterrent against direct military intervention by the Nato security alliance.

So far, President Joe Biden has said the United States will not directly engage the Russian military. Washington’s support to Ukraine has been limited to providing arms and intelligence, with fighter jets and now long-range rockets capable of reaching Russia seemingly off the menu. It might look like Putin’s nuclear deterrent is working, but beneath his seemingly tough talk lie weakness and cowardice.

When two nuclear-armed powers are engaged in a conventional military conflict, the underdog usually threatens to use the nuclear option first to make up for its strategic inadequacies. During the Korean war, for example, Chinese troops pushed back the US-led UN forces early in the conflict, leading US president Harry Truman to raise the prospect of using nuclear weapons to counter China’s push.

Similarly, in May 2002’s military conflict between India and Pakistan, the UN representative of Pakistan solemnly stated that it was difficult to guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used when it faced serious setbacks in conventional warfare.

North Korea’s Kim Jong-un has also on many occasions shown off his nuclear-capable weapons, with missile launches and military parades, in a warning to the US, Japan and South Korea.

The example of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons also shows that a small number of nuclear warheads and the basic ability to launch them can not only offset the advantage a major nuclear power has in conventional forces, but also the intimidation that thousands of nuclear warheads can inspire, achieving good leverage.

Thus, it seems logical to conclude that Putin issued his nuclear warning before invading Ukraine precisely because he knew that Russia’s conventional military power would be no match for the US and Nato and he was worried about their potential direct military intervention.

02:22

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un threatens nuclear strike while showing off newest ICBM missiles

In conventional warfare, there is the chance that the benefits of war will outweigh the costs. In nuclear war, however, any potential benefit from triggering conflict must be weighed against the potential destruction of one’s own country. Such rational thinking has meant the world managed to avoid many potential nuclear conflicts during the Cold War.

But under what conditions would Putin use nuclear weapons? The conflict in Ukraine has taken dramatic turns, and Ukrainian troops have in large part turned back the Russian army’s offensive. Russian forces could suffer further serious setbacks as the US and its allies continue to provide advanced weapons, satellite communications, surveillance and real-time transmission of battlefield information to the Ukrainian military.

Putin needs to make a judgment call about whether Nato’s assistance to Ukraine counts as participating in the conflict. He must decide against whom he would launch a nuclear strike – it is worth remembering that Putin issued his nuclear threat to the transatlantic alliance rather than Ukraine.

The Russian army is facing setbacks on the battlefield and has launched the second phase of its offensive, so this level of pain seems bearable for now. But if the Ukrainian army were to drive the Russians out of the country, recapturing Luhansk, Donetsk and Crimea, would that be considered too much to bear? Feasibly, it might not amount to a major loss to Putin, given that it was all previously Ukrainian territory.

Evidence shows that nuclear powers generally do not use nuclear weapons when they are defeated following an invasion of other countries. Consider the outcomes of the Soviet Union’s defeat in Afghanistan and those of the US in Vietnam and Afghanistan. While their invasion plans failed, neither superpower used nuclear weapons to “save face”.

Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has drawn a red line for Putin – a Russian attack on a Nato convoy on the Ukrainian supply line would be regarded as an act of war against Nato. So far, Putin has not dared to attack Nato convoys even amid heavy Russian losses.

Putin would only feel real pain if the main forces of the Russian army were wiped out and Ukrainian or Nato troops pushed into Russian territory, marching towards Moscow. At that point, he would certainly believe that he and his country were in danger and would thus seriously consider using nuclear weapons.

Putin also has a family, luxurious villas at home and abroad, and huge wealth. Would he have Hitler’s courage to launch a scorched earth order after his failures? I doubt it.

The US and Nato leaders must understand what Putin meant when he said, “Why do we need the world if Russia is not in it?”. Could he have actually meant, “Why do we need the world if Putin is not in it?”

If they accept the former interpretation, the US and Nato should look to remove Putin from power. But if he didn’t mean it literally, targeting him could be the reason he needs to launch his nuclear weapons.

Therefore, whether nuclear weapons are used depends on how Putin’s opponents define their victory. In this nuclear age, the answer would seem to be: avoid seeking a complete victory. If Putin’s enemies do win the war, they must not push too far and limit their military advancement, to avoid mutually assured destruction. A good point to stop could well be after Ukraine has regained all its territory.

Ni Lexiong is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law. This article was translated from Chinese by William Zheng