
US’ Indo-Pacific economic bloc irks China but it may not be all bad for the region
- The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework signals the start of competition within global institutions between the US and China
- While this could have destructive effects, it also has the potential to inspire institutional reform and for great powers to provide more public goods
The IPEF is also an economic branch of the US Indo-Pacific strategy against China, which previously focused on security issues through the Quad. Similar to the TPP and the Quad, the IPEF is an exclusive institutional balancing strategy that the US has adopted to counteract China’s economic clout in the region.
Exclusive institutional balancing can be defined as a strategy aiming to exclude a target state from an institutional grouping so the cohesion and unity of the institution will undermine the influence and power of the target state. In contrast, inclusive institutional balancing includes the target state in an institutional setting. In this case, the target state will be constrained, shaped and socialised by the rules and norms of the institution.
Following the 2008 global financial crisis, the US and China led a new wave of multilateralism. China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) touched a sensitive nerve in Washington as it was considered a challenge to US global financial governance through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
In a similar fashion, China’s Belt and Road Initiative was seen as a Chinese economic hub-and-spoke system challenging US leadership.
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Biden’s IPEF aims to recover the loss of US reputation and leadership in the region. However, it will not be an easy job because the IPEF has already been described as a deal of “all pain, no gain” for Asian countries without any offer of US market access.
Facing the exclusive institutional balancing from the US, what are Beijing’s policy options? It has no choice but to counter US pressure with similar institutional balancing strategies.
The IPEF is the beginning of the institutional competition between the US and China. Given nuclear deterrence, a conventional war between the two nations is unlikely.
Institutional competition in the form of institutional balancing will become the new game in town. Intense institutional balancing between the two giants will extend to all areas, followed by diplomatic stand-offs, political divisions and even strategic rivalries.
Even so, two positive, unintended consequences will result from the US-China institutional competition. First, such competition can encourage reforms inside existing institutions and retain the dynamics of multilateralism in the region. For instance, the AIIB’s establishment could prompt reforms in infrastructure finance in the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.
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Competition is not always destructive to regional peace if it is confined within the institutional domain. The real danger is to conflate institutional competition with ideological antagonism, which will lead to a new cold war in the region.
Middle powers such as Asean should not stay on the sidelines during this new wave of multilateralism. They can play a more active and leading role in managing the institutional competition between the US and China. Asean led the first wave of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold-War era, and it is time for it to stand tall again and initiate a new round of institutional peace in the region.
Kai He is professor of international relations and director of the Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University
