On July 8, former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe was assassinated while giving a public speech in Nara. The following day, President Xi Jinping delivered a message expressing deep sadness over Abe’s death and offering condolences to Abe’s family. Xi also said Abe had made great contributions to the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations. That last statement caught me by surprise. As far as I can remember, the later years of Abe’s tenure were saturated with criticism of him by the Chinese media . The issues ranged from a refusal to acknowledge past war crimes and efforts at militarisation, to Abe’s cosy relationship with US president Donald Trump. I think it’s fair to say Abe was thoroughly demonised in the Chinese media at that time. Thus, it was not a surprise that huge numbers of nationalist netizens came out to cheer after Abe’s death . It was also clear to me that such comments could cause people from other countries to view China in a worse light. The nationalists say they were exercising free speech, and why shouldn’t they be proud of it? However, on this issue, they are wrong because their speech reflects badly on the country. China purports to control online content, meaning it censors what it believes to be harmful content, and anything not censored is seen as being implicitly condoned by the government. In other words, the government owns the messaging because it controls it. So, when the internet exploded with antagonising comments about Abe’s death, running counter to Xi’s official statement of condolence, what were people to think? A reasonable person could reach one of two conclusions. First, maybe the nationalists were stating the government’s real position. They were expressing what the government thought but could not say out loud. If true, this would be terrible for China’s national image . Alternatively, perhaps China’s internet censorship is not actually very efficient. Maybe it is carried out by scattered actors who lack coherent guidance and do not necessarily know what is politically correct. Maybe the central government would stamp out these messages if it could, but it lacks the means to do so. I happen to believe the second theory. However, it is not what most people believe, and it is certainly not how the government wants to portray itself. Both Chinese and Western narratives are committed to an image of a strong, centralised and all-powerful Chinese government. Therefore, the government is forced to assume responsibility even for random statements on the internet. Xi clearly understands the downsides here. He has repeatedly stressed that even the smallest problems, such as wrongdoing by minor government employees, can have existential consequences for the entire government apparatus. Similarly, he has said that Communist Party members must hold themselves to high moral standards because their actions are perceived as the party’s actions. ‘Communist Party’s crackdown on discipline is great ... it keeps my husband at home’ On the other side of the coin, Xi has said that when the central government moves to enforce discipline , it must achieve results or the effect would be worse than not trying at all. That is one reason governing China is so difficult at this moment. In the past, China could get away with a lot by pleading that it was still a developing country so things were not perfect. Now, it is trying to occupy a different space as a great power with an inherently superior form of government. While this inspires many people to aim higher, it also raises expectations and leaves little room for excuses when subordinates misbehave. This problem is powerfully illustrated by the recent crisis in the banking sector, where local governments have been misusing health codes and employing gangsters to attack depositors . Part of the response from the central government has been to distance itself from the local governments. The message is that the bad actors are at the local level, whereas the central government is always trying to guide them with high standards. But there is something unmistakably strange about this message. Shouldn’t the central government control its local components directly instead of trying to guide them through persuasion? China has reached a point where it needs to reconcile the theory and reality of its governance. The story of the unitary and all-powerful government worked in the past, but it is failing to keep up with the complex realities. Such an oversimplified message undermines people’s confidence when times are tough, and it provides a convenient tool to make unjustified criticism about China. Reality is undoubtedly far more nuanced, but China does not have a new story to describe it. I think it is absolutely necessary to come up with one. Shenglan Chen is a PhD graduate of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and a former lecturer at Peking University. She was a Fulbright Scholar at Indiana University Bloomington in 2019, researching the legal and economic development of China