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US President Joe Biden at the inaugural I2U2 summit in Jerusalem with the leaders of Israel, India and the United Arab Emirates on July 14. The I2U2 was established last year to boost economic and technological cooperation between the four countries. Photo: AP
Opinion
Imran Khalid
Imran Khalid

I2U2: why US efforts to fan the flames of anti-China sentiment in West Asia, Middle East are failing

  • The lack of take-up for the latest US attempts to contain China lays bare its obsolete policy as the world moves towards greater collaboration
  • The dilemma for Washington is that the US is perceived as a security provider in the region, albeit an unreliable one, while China is increasingly seen as a reliable trading partner

The idea for the I2U2 partnership, which derives its name from members India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States, is said to have been born last October at the Washington residence of the UAE ambassador during a casual diplomatic get-together.

Nobody anticipated at the time that a simple dinner-table conversation would end up producing a new diplomatic tool for Washington’s efforts to counter China’s influence in the Middle East and West Asia.

But, within just a few months, the I2U2 has taken the shape of a major club. For American diplomacy, the strategic importance of this grouping – purposely flaunted as a West Asian “Quad” – can be gauged from US President Joe Biden’s allocation of a special slot for its inaugural session during his recent Middle East trip.

The first meeting was not held all in-person. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan joined via video conference for the session, which was conducted in Jerusalem where Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid were.

A very different kind of experiment is being conducted by the US to ostensibly encourage joint investment in six mutually identified areas – water, energy, transport, space, health and food security.

But even a cursory glance at the proceedings and scope of the I2U2 would reveal that the Biden administration is deliberately pushing hard and investing in this club to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the region.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (right) welcomes US President Joe Biden to Al-Salam Palace in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on July 15. Photo: Saudi royal palace via AP

The new grouping, in which none of the members share geographical borders, was ostensibly created to tackle the growing global economic and political risks. But the reality is that the Biden administration now has a new diplomatic plank in its strategy to contain China.

For American policymakers, the dilemma is that in both the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East, the US is perceived as the provider – albeit a somewhat unreliable one – of a “security umbrella”, with its massive weapons industry that nurtures simmering hotspots around the globe, while China is increasingly being recognised as a reliable trading partner.

This is perhaps the major difference between Washington and Beijing’s long-term global outlook, and their brand image.

US policymakers have long relied on military assistance and protection as the unique selling point of American diplomacy, while China has been pursuing infrastructural development and financial capacity-building as the main instrument of its foreign policy, to increase its global influence.

00:55

China-built clean coal-fired power plant in Dubai completed

China-built clean coal-fired power plant in Dubai completed

However, no previous US administration appears to have learned any lesson from this. Belatedly, Biden now appears to be attempting to integrate geoeconomics into US strategy in the Middle East and West Asia, through the I2U2, to emulate the Chinese policy of investment in infrastructure development.

The Biden administration has probably also taken inspiration from the European Union’s recent plan to invest massively in infrastructure outside the bloc, in an attempt to counter the impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Without doubt, Biden’s main pivot during his visit to the Middle East was to rally support for the US against Beijing.

Writing in The Washington Post on July 9, Biden revealed the underlying motives behind his Middle East trip, insisting that Washington had to reposition itself to “outcompete China, and work for greater stability in a consequential region of the world”.

Middle East does not need alliance rivalry

So it comes as no surprise to see the “China factor” taking high priority in his sojourn. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have close – and deepening – trade ties with China, received much of Biden’s attention.

However, for all his intentions, Biden has clearly neglected to consider the emerging geopolitical and geoeconomic realities in the region. He probably hoped that, like most of his White House predecessors, he could generate robust momentum for an anti-China club.

Unfortunately for him, his hosts in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi showed no interest in any such alliance, and Biden was forced to return home having failed to win any commitments on security, or more oil. He faced a similarly lukewarm response to his anti-Iran rhetoric.

02:09

Iran unveils naval drone division as Biden seeks stronger ties in Middle East

Iran unveils naval drone division as Biden seeks stronger ties in Middle East

The Biden administration seems oblivious to the growing fatigue among nations in both the Indo-Pacific and Middle East for any kind of new cold war against China.

At the same time, it also highlights his administration’s edginess over its China containment policy. At the Nato summit in Madrid last month, China was identified for the first time as a “systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security” in Nato’s strategic concept, a key document that sets the alliance’s strategy for the next 10 years.

Policymakers in Washington, rather than seeking a more constructive approach, are sticking to the threadbare policy of China containment. This fossilised thinking is no longer viable in the current global power structure.

Across the world, there is a growing aversion to greater polarisation. Since the end of the Cold War, the dynamics of the global power structure have changed drastically. Biden needs to accept the new realities of power equilibrium, which is based more on collaboration and development rather than perpetual confrontation.

Dr Imran Khalid is a freelance contributor based in Karachi, Pakistan

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