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Illustration: Craig Stephens
Opinion
Elizabeth Wishnick
Elizabeth Wishnick

The China- Russia ‘no limits’ partnership is still going strong, with regime security as top priority

  • Those who believe Xi has broken with Putin over Ukraine misunderstand the partnership – both view regime security as their main priority and are determined to shape the international order so authoritarian states can be rule-makers
  • As long as both sides continue to agree to disagree on the issues that divide them, in spite of sanctions pressure, they will remain bound together

This month’s meeting between the Chinese and Russian presidents on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Uzbekistan has led to renewed scrutiny of the scope and depth of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership.

Xi Jinping referred to Vladimir Putin as his “dear and old friend” but Putin admitted Xi had raised “ questions and concerns” about Ukraine, though the Russian president also praised China’s “balanced position” on the conflict.

Many observers jumped to the conclusion that Xi has finally broken with Putin over Ukraine. This reflects a misunderstanding of what the “no limits” partnership between Russia and China really means.

Despite their many conflicts of interest in Ukraine and elsewhere, Russia and China continue to be bound together. Typically we focus on geopolitical factors such as perceived threats from the US and its allies, the need for security along their lengthy border and their growing energy partnership.

But, under Xi and Putin, the normative dimension has also been significant – both view regime security as their main priority and are determined to shape the international order in such a way that authoritarian states can be rule-makers.

Just 20 days before Russia invaded Ukraine in February, Putin and Xi signed a statement proclaiming there were “ no limits to Sino-Russian cooperation … no forbidden zones”. This does not mean the partnership has no parameters.

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Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin speak in person for first time since Russia invaded Ukraine

Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin speak in person for first time since Russia invaded Ukraine

The “no limits” formulation suited the desire of both countries to avoid a formal alliance in the short term, leaving open the possibility of one in the long term, thereby increasing uncertainty for their opponents.

Regarding Russia’s war on Ukraine, Chinese support clearly has had limits. China supports Russia most strongly rhetorically. Chinese officials and state media blame the United States and Nato for “fuelling the fire” of war by arming Ukraine. Despite the claim by China’s ambassador to the US Qin Gang that Beijing’s bottom line for supporting Russia was the UN Charter, Chinese officials have not called Russia out for obvious violations of its terms.
On September 21, after Putin announced his decision to increase Russian forces in Ukraine through a partial mobilisation, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin urged a ceasefire and dialogue but also reiterated Beijing’s oft-stated position that the legitimate security interests of all parties need to be accommodated.

02:55

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi says Beijing’s position on Ukraine is ‘consistent and clear’

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi says Beijing’s position on Ukraine is ‘consistent and clear’
Xi sounded upbeat about deepening economic cooperation when he met Putin on September 15 in Samarkand and spoke of moving forward in areas such as trade, agriculture and connectivity. Indeed, Sino-Russian trade in the first seven months of the year increased by 29 per cent year on year, leading Chinese and Russian officials to predict that this year’s volume of bilateral trade would surpass US$146.87 billion – the all-time high reached last year.
China’s purchases of Russian oil and gas have surged as Chinese energy companies take advantage of lower prices. Although Gazprom claims to have pumped 60 per cent more gas through the Power of Siberia pipeline in the first seven months of this year, due to increased Chinese demand, Beijing’s energy giants have avoided signing any new long-term contracts.

Notably, Xi said not a word in public in Samarkand about Power of Siberia 2 – a proposed second gas pipeline to China, transiting Mongolia – although Putin intimated in a September 7 speech that an agreement was near and Xi, Putin and Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh discussed the project in Samarkand.

02:22

China and Russia turn on gas pipeline ‘Power of Siberia’ as they forge stronger energy ties

China and Russia turn on gas pipeline ‘Power of Siberia’ as they forge stronger energy ties

Thus far, the Biden administration has accused five Chinese firms of violating sanctions and aiding Russia’s military-industrial complex. Despite Russia’s need for military equipment, Sino-Russian military cooperation has been confined to regular military exercises and patrols directed against US alliances in the Indo-Pacific.

Just after the SCO summit, the head of the Russian Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, met Yang Jiechi, China’s top diplomat, in Beijing and they both expressed interest in continuing military cooperation. Yang noted that, under Putin and Xi, Sino-Russian relations “have always maintained a momentum of vigorous development”.

Despite the imposition of unprecedented sanctions on Russia, the Sino-Russian partnership has shown resilience.

02:33

Chinese troops in Russia as multinational military drills open in far east

Chinese troops in Russia as multinational military drills open in far east

There is little evidence of Xi’s distancing from Putin, so what questions and concerns might Xi have raised with Putin in Samarkand?

Xi may have been concerned that Putin could escalate in a way that would force China to respond – by using tactical nuclear weapons, for example.

But what Xi would probably have been most concerned about is Russia’s domestic stability in light of setbacks on the battlefield. Regime security is a top concern for Xi, as he noted in his speech at the SCO summit – his priority task for the organisation was to guard against “ colour revolutions”.

Why China is best placed to help negotiate end to Ukraine war

As Xi awaits the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party next month, he is unlikely to distance himself from Putin as he has invested so much personal capital in the relationship and in China’s Russia policy more generally. The Samarkand summit was their 39th meeting and any questions or concerns Xi may have voiced would probably have been to make sure there would be a 40th.

Hopes in the US for greater daylight emerging between Russia and China will continue to go unfulfilled as long as the leaders of the two countries persist in prioritising regime security and agree to disagree over the issues that divide them, not just in Ukraine but in the Arctic, Central Asia and Southeast Asia.

A more promising avenue for the US would be to concentrate on Russia’s increasingly nervous neighbours in Central Asia and develop a meaningful strategy to engage them.

Elizabeth Wishnick is a senior research scientist at CNA and a professor of political science at Montclair State University. This is an edited version of an article that first appeared on the Russia Matters website with the headline “Still ‘No Limits’? The China-Russia Partnership After Samarkand”
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