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Ukrainian service members shop for groceries in Kramatorsk, Ukraine, on September 1. Ukraine’s military might be succeeding on the ground, but the country’s economy is struggling with high inflation and donors dallying in providing aid. Photo: Reuters
Opinion
Anders Åslund
Anders Åslund

How Europe’s dithering leaves Ukraine fighting Russia and high inflation

  • While Ukraine’s military is succeeding on the battlefield, its economy is struggling as the financial support flowing to Kyiv is well short of what was promised
  • Europe has been the biggest laggard in making good on its pledges, forcing Ukraine’s government to print money to stay afloat
Thanks to Western arms deliveries, Ukrainian forces are celebrating one battlefield victory after another. But Ukraine faces another serious threat: high inflation. It therefore needs not only arms but also more financial support.
Russia’s war has inflicted enormous damage, with the Ukrainian government and the Kyiv School of Economics putting the tally of recorded material losses at US$120 billion. The country’s GDP is set to fall by 35 to 40 per cent this year, and government revenues by even more.

Earlier this year, the International Monetary Fund determined the Ukrainian government would need US$5 billion per month in external support to finance government salaries, pensions, healthcare, schools and some social benefits. These are basic expenditures to keep the government functioning.

Unfortunately, only half of the necessary funds have been made available. According to Ukrainian brokerage Dragon Capital, US$35 billion was pledged to Ukraine as of September 30 but only US$20 billion was disbursed.

The dominant donor is the United States, which has already provided US$8.5 billion with commitments for another US$1.5 billion per month for the rest of 2022.

The biggest disappointment is Europe, which has contributed only about half what the US has. Though the European Union committed €9 billion (US$8.7 billion) in macro-financial assistance in May, only €1 billion of that has been disbursed – a pace that is simply unacceptable for this moment of crisis. Now, five months after it made its commitment, one hopes that the EU can free up at least €5 billion more.
People shelter inside a subway station during a Russian missile attack in Kyiv, Ukraine on October 11. The Ukrainian government needs an estimated US$5 billion per month in external support to finance government salaries, pensions, healthcare, schools and some social benefits, but so far only half of the necessary funds have been available. Photo: Reuters

In the absence of external financing, the Ukrainian government has no choice but to turn to printing money, which inevitably drives up inflation. Ukraine’s inflation rate reached 24.4 per cent in September and most likely will continue to rise because the government received only US$2.5 billion – half of what it needed – in September. Obviously, this is not sustainable.

As historian Niall Ferguson notes in a recent Bloomberg commentary, Ukraine’s army might be winning, but its economy is losing, owing largely to the EU’s failure to provide sufficient financial support. Ferguson is worried about hyperinflation – when inflation is at least 50 per cent per month – and so am I.

Ukraine makes gains as thousands of mobilised Russians sent home

Hyperinflation is all too common during or after wars or other massive structural shifts. At the end of the Cold War, most of the formerly communist countries were hit by hyperinflation, which cannot fail to undermine public trust in the state. The result is usually authoritarian rule, as one finds across the former Soviet Union.
For his part, Russian President Vladimir Putin no longer claims to be waging war against only Ukraine. Instead, he now says he is confronting “the collective West”. We Westerners should take him at his word and recognise we have a common duty to keep the Ukrainian state afloat during the war.

In the short term, greater Western contributions to the Ukrainian budget are the only way to meet this objective. While it is reasonable to anticipate the need for other reforms and alternative financial mechanisms, that work needs to wait until the war has ended.

02:47

Russia bombs Kyiv and several other cities across Ukraine, killing civilians

Russia bombs Kyiv and several other cities across Ukraine, killing civilians

Moreover, with Ukraine’s public debt skyrocketing – from 50 per cent of GDP at the end of 2020 to an estimated 85 per cent of GDP by the end of this year – it is vital that Ukraine receives grants rather than credits. While the US seems to understand this, the EU clearly does not. Its macro-financial assistance comprises only credits, though most EU members’ bilateral assistance has primarily taken the form of grants.

This must change. We cannot allow Ukraine to fail financially through no fault of its own, simply because the EU is too preoccupied with its own bureaucratic rules. The best solution is to confiscate the roughly US$400 billion of frozen Russian reserves held across seven Western countries and send them to Ukraine as reparations. Canada has already adopted a law allowing for this, though it has not yet seized any Russian funds.

The EU offered substantial grants to support its members’ economies during the Covid-19 pandemic, and there is no good reason it cannot muster the much smaller sums needed to assist Ukraine. If need be, it should consider demanding compulsory subscriptions from its members, as it did in 2016 to finance its migration agreement with Türkiye. If there is a will, there are many ways to boost Ukraine’s finances.
Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum. His most recent book is Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy. Copyright: Project Syndicate
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