Russian President Vladimir Putin’s world view is heavily shaped by a few basic national narratives, and he has toggled back and forth among them as he has become more desperate to convince Russians – and perhaps himself – that the war in Ukraine is worth fighting. If the West had understood this, it might not have been repeatedly surprised by his decisions. Initially, it was hard to believe that he would invade – until he did. Then, after Russia’s embarrassing military setbacks , it seemed he would look for a way to draw down his campaign. Instead, he doubled down with a massive military mobilisation . While the consensus is that Putin will not use tactical nuclear weapons, will the West be surprised again? What I have in mind are three key narratives: the threat of invasion by alien enemies, the mission to recreate a unique Russian world (“ Russkii Mir ”) that includes Ukraine, and the mission of defending traditional values and pure Christianity in global struggle with the “satanic” West. The existential threat of alien enemies has long been a mainstay of Russia’s world view . Multiple stories tell of invaders that had to be crushed and of the great suffering and heroism involved. Russia has had plenty of practice at this. Alien invasions of Russia include the Teutonic knights and the Mongols in the 13th century, the Poles in the 17th century, the Swedes in the 18th century, the French during the Napoleonic Wars of the 19th century and the Germans of the 20th century. The narrative habits around these past existential threats are now being applied to Nato and the West. But when these habits are used to justify the Russian invasion of a sovereign nation like Ukraine, they have run amok and are counter to international norms and laws Russia itself has proclaimed. The second narrative that guides Putin is about the Russkii Mir . This is a story of how Russian civilisation evolved during the past millennium to encompass other Slavic populations, especially Ukrainians. It was the focus of Putin’s 2021 article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, which might not be serious historical scholarship but is serious memory politics. There he argued Ukraine has always been a part of “the same historical and spiritual space” as Russia and that the two peoples, cultures and languages are essentially the same. The implication is that Ukraine should revert to its natural historical role as part of “the single whole” of Russia and accept the fact that Russia “was robbed” of part of its organic estate and is just getting back what has always belonged to it. Putin relied on this narrative in the early, relatively peaceful stages of his efforts to reincorporate Ukraine and became increasingly shrill in insisting that “facts” about the Russkii Mir must be obvious to everyone. Those who disagree are either Western enemies or brainwashed. But it soon became apparent this effort was not having the impact Putin had hoped for in Ukraine, the West and even Russia . ‘God put you in power’, Russian Orthodox leader tells Putin This failure led an increasingly anxious Putin to move on to another, more ominous national narrative, in this case about the mission of Russia as a global champion of traditional values and pure Christianity. This third storyline portrays a Russia called upon to defend traditional conservative values against the “satanic” West with its corrosive ideas about liberal democracy. National leaders elsewhere, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Chinese President Xi Jinping, are members of a loose club advocating similar narratives of this sort, but Putin sees Russia as taking a leadership role in this noble mission. Like the other narratives that guide Putin, this one has deep historical roots, such as those reflected in the story of “Moscow as the Third Rome”. In this account, the corruption and decay in Rome led the church to move to Constantinople and eventually to Moscow, where Russian Orthodoxy now represents the only pure form of Christianity . It is a story that stems from the 16th century, when the monk Philotheus proclaimed that “two Romes have fallen, the third stands and there will be no fourth. No one shall replace your Christian Tsardom”. Appreciating the power of these three Russian national narratives tells us several things. First, any likely successor of Putin will probably adhere to the same core beliefs. The narratives at work are bigger than any individual. Second, as is the case for other nations, Russia’s national narratives are largely impervious to challenge from facts and rational argument. What is needed instead are efforts to control the narrative and move it in a new direction. This is a daunting struggle in Putin’s Russia, where many opposition figures are in prison or in exile. But one of the most important of these figures, Alexei Navalny , has continued to envision a Russia that includes some sort of parliamentary governance. The aspirational narrative in this case would probably be about “parliamentary governance with Russian characteristics”, but it would allow the nation to tame the worst instincts of its current dictatorship. This vision has occasionally surfaced in Russian reality and narratives in the past. It might be the best hope for Russia, its neighbours and the world at large. James V. Wertsch is David R. Francis distinguished professor and director emeritus of the McDonnell International Scholars Academy at Washington University in St Louis, where he teaches courses in anthropology and global studies