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New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern speaks to the press outside of the West Wing after a meeting with US President Joe Biden at the White House in Washington on May 31. Photo: AFP
Opinion
Nicholas Ross Smith and Bonnie Holster
Nicholas Ross Smith and Bonnie Holster

New Zealand has a great relationship with China. But for how much longer as US pressure grows?

  • New Zealand’s independent and indigenous foreign policy means it has a mature relationship with China unique in the Anglosphere
  • But as great power rivalry grows in the Indo-Pacific, New Zealand is under intensifying pressure to join the resistance against China

This is the 50th year of diplomatic relations between New Zealand and the People’s Republic of China. What began as a modest relationship has, particularly in the last decade, become one of New Zealand’s most important, especially as China is by far its largest trading partner.

But this anniversary comes as relations are shrouded in uncertainty and questions, particularly with the destabilisation of the Indo-Pacific amid the fracturing Sino-American relationship.

Australia, one of New Zealand’s oldest and closest friends, chose to side with the United States, joining security initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Aukus alliance (with Britain). New Zealand has resisted this, preferring to chart a middle-ground path of good relationships with all.
Leaders and officials from New Zealand and China speak of mature ties, where disagreements or differences of opinion do not detract from the robustness of the relationship. No other Anglosphere country can be said to have such a relationship with China, making New Zealand unique.

This has been amplified by the increasing influence of tikanga Māori (Māori customary practices and behaviours) on New Zealand’s foreign policy in recent years. In outlining the approach, Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta identified four key tikanga: manaaki – kindness or the reciprocity of goodwill; whanaunga – our connectedness or shared sense of humanity; mahi tahi and kotahitanga – collective benefits and shared aspiration; and, kaitiaki – protectors and stewards of our intergenerational well-being.

Mahuta argues that an indigenous foreign policy means New Zealand would “stand for what we believe is in our interest, unafraid to hold our course when the tide turns to navigate towards our destination”. In many ways, this continues the independent spirit of New Zealand’s foreign policy that has been in place since the 1980s.
New Zealand Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta in her office on November 25, 2020, in Wellington. She is the first indigenous Maori woman to be appointed as foreign minister in the country and has promised to bring a new perspective to the role. Photo: AP

Although much of the focus of New Zealand’s indigenous foreign policy turn, concerns re-engaging with the Pacific, its relationship with China also comes under this framework.

Last year, Mahuta likened the relationship to one between a taniwha and dragon, mythical creatures from Māori and Chinese folklore. These metaphors were used to highlight “the strength of our particular customs, traditions and values, that aren’t always the same, but need to be maintained and respected”.

At a philosophical level, Te Ao Māori (the Māori world view) is also built off a strongly relational understanding of reality which closely aligns with the similarly relational underpinnings of the Confucian and Taoist philosophies said to be at the heart of China’s foreign policy.

Indeed, China is often characterised as a relational power in international politics and a constant rebuke from Beijing is that Western countries do not understand their “relational” way of doing foreign policy. New Zealand’s seeming embrace of a relational view of foreign policy may help explain why the Sino-New Zealand relationship has developed atypically compared to China’s relations with other Anglosphere countries.

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As former Chinese consul general Ruan Ping said last year: “China and New Zealand have developed into comprehensive strategic partners with close cultural exchanges, and the level of development and cooperation is ahead of China and other developed countries in many areas”.

China’s state-run media typically applauds New Zealand for maintaining an independent stance and often presents it as a model for other countries to learn from. New Zealand is not immune from strong rebukes by Chinese officials or media, but generally, it has etched out a position of privilege with China relative to other Western countries.

Strategically, adopting an indigenous foreign policy is also a way for New Zealand to differentiate itself from other Anglosphere countries that have adopted a much more critical stance towards China in recent years.

As the situation in the Indo-Pacific worsened, New Zealand has come under significant pressure to join a collective resistance against China. The furore that erupted in the Pacific earlier this year after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit shows the difficult tightrope New Zealand walks in trying to maintain good relations with all its key strategic partners.

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While Australia undertook a proactive “counterbalancing” role by immediately re-engaging with the Pacific through high-level diplomatic trips, New Zealand faced some criticism, as Mahuta did not undertake any emergency Pacific trips.
But as New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern explained a few weeks later at the Pacific Islands Forum, the increasing assertiveness of superpowers meant the Pacific should adopt a “family-based approach [where] we try and iron out where we have differences” through “talanoa”, the Pacific concept of conversation leading to consensus-building and decision-making.

What’s New Zealand’s plan as superpower rivalry escalates in the Pacific?

Later, on a visit to Australia, Ardern said there needed to be an opportunity for their Pacific neighbours to speak for themselves on China.

Such statements tease out the potential relationality of New Zealand’s indigenous foreign policy turn, which sees the Indo-Pacific as a series of relationships rather than a setting destined for great power competition.

But how long can New Zealand keep this up before it is forced to abandon its desire to maintain good relationships on all sides and adopt a more conventional strategy à la Australia’s siding with the US?

The room for independent foreign policymaking is rapidly shrinking in the Indo-Pacific. Next year will be an intriguing litmus test of whether New Zealand can continue to use an indigenous foreign policy to etch out a middle-ground position.

Nicholas Ross Smith is an adjunct fellow at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand

Bonnie Holster is a master of international trade student at Te Herenga Waka - Victoria University of Wellington

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