New Zealand has a great relationship with China. But for how much longer as US pressure grows?
- New Zealand’s independent and indigenous foreign policy means it has a mature relationship with China unique in the Anglosphere
- But as great power rivalry grows in the Indo-Pacific, New Zealand is under intensifying pressure to join the resistance against China
This is the 50th year of diplomatic relations between New Zealand and the People’s Republic of China. What began as a modest relationship has, particularly in the last decade, become one of New Zealand’s most important, especially as China is by far its largest trading partner.
But this anniversary comes as relations are shrouded in uncertainty and questions, particularly with the destabilisation of the Indo-Pacific amid the fracturing Sino-American relationship.
This has been amplified by the increasing influence of tikanga Māori (Māori customary practices and behaviours) on New Zealand’s foreign policy in recent years. In outlining the approach, Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta identified four key tikanga: manaaki – kindness or the reciprocity of goodwill; whanaunga – our connectedness or shared sense of humanity; mahi tahi and kotahitanga – collective benefits and shared aspiration; and, kaitiaki – protectors and stewards of our intergenerational well-being.
Although much of the focus of New Zealand’s indigenous foreign policy turn, concerns re-engaging with the Pacific, its relationship with China also comes under this framework.
Last year, Mahuta likened the relationship to one between a taniwha and dragon, mythical creatures from Māori and Chinese folklore. These metaphors were used to highlight “the strength of our particular customs, traditions and values, that aren’t always the same, but need to be maintained and respected”.
Indeed, China is often characterised as a relational power in international politics and a constant rebuke from Beijing is that Western countries do not understand their “relational” way of doing foreign policy. New Zealand’s seeming embrace of a relational view of foreign policy may help explain why the Sino-New Zealand relationship has developed atypically compared to China’s relations with other Anglosphere countries.
As former Chinese consul general Ruan Ping said last year: “China and New Zealand have developed into comprehensive strategic partners with close cultural exchanges, and the level of development and cooperation is ahead of China and other developed countries in many areas”.
Strategically, adopting an indigenous foreign policy is also a way for New Zealand to differentiate itself from other Anglosphere countries that have adopted a much more critical stance towards China in recent years.
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Such statements tease out the potential relationality of New Zealand’s indigenous foreign policy turn, which sees the Indo-Pacific as a series of relationships rather than a setting destined for great power competition.
But how long can New Zealand keep this up before it is forced to abandon its desire to maintain good relationships on all sides and adopt a more conventional strategy à la Australia’s siding with the US?
The room for independent foreign policymaking is rapidly shrinking in the Indo-Pacific. Next year will be an intriguing litmus test of whether New Zealand can continue to use an indigenous foreign policy to etch out a middle-ground position.
Nicholas Ross Smith is an adjunct fellow at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand
Bonnie Holster is a master of international trade student at Te Herenga Waka - Victoria University of Wellington