China’s subtle change of stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine should not go unnoticed

While China remains committed to the Sino-Russian partnership, recent diplomatic efforts show it is also concerned about protecting its global image
Beijing’s calls to respect sovereignty and opposition to the use of nuclear weapons suggest a quiet disapproval of Moscow’s military actions

Tiong Wei JieandLi Mingjiang

Published: 3:30am, 2 Jan 2023

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Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, China has been walking a diplomatic tightrope. On one hand, it does not want to be seen as siding with Russia for fear of alienating itself from the international community, especially the West. Nor does it want its international image tarnished by the perception of it as supporting an aggressor.

On the other, China has deep strategic and security interests in strengthening relations with Russia. For many years, Beijing has regarded Moscow as the most helpful partner in withstanding US-led strategic and political pressures. In addition, Russia has traditionally served as an important source for China’s energy security.

Given these considerations, China’s official rhetoric on the war includes two dimensions. On its causal factors, Beijing has almost completely aligned with Moscow’s justifications. They centred on the claim that Nato’s eastward expansion was the chief culprit in stoking tensions.

On the act of war itself, however, China has been less supportive of Russia. Its stance could even be viewed as an implicit disapproval of Moscow’s military actions, with China consistently advocating respect for sovereignty and conflict resolution through peaceful means. Beijing is careful not to be so openly against the war because doing so would be seen by Moscow as walking back on their strategic partnership.

In essence, “pro-Russian neutrality” appears to quite accurately capture China’s position. This stance has been frequently criticised by political elites and opinion leaders in many Western countries. Some even highlighted China’s role as a key supporter of Russia’s war efforts.

There is much validity to these opinions, especially when one looks at the persistent substantiveness of China-Russia relations after the breakout of war. That said, this ongoing debate misses some subtle shifts in China’s stance.

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China’s incoming foreign minister Qin Gang, for one, has made considerable attempts to strike a more conciliatory tone with the West. In his March opinion piece in The Washington Post, written in his capacity as China’s ambassador to the US, he claimed that if China had known about Putin’s invasion plan, Beijing would have tried its best to prevent it. His April article published in the National Interest started off by highlighting his empathy for the Ukrainians.

On several other occasions, Qin also attempted to clear up the West’s misunderstanding of the “no limits” rhetoric on China-Russia partnership, stressing that China and Russia are not an alliance and there are bottom lines in their relations.

Notably, at the recent G20 summit, the final leaders’ declaration deplored in the strongest terms the aggression by Russia against Ukraine. Certainly, the document mentioned that only “most members” strongly condemned it, and China reportedly had opposed using the word “war” to describe Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

That said, given that the G20 works on the basis of consensus, China’s decision to not stand in the way of the strong critical words against Russia suggests an interesting shift in Beijing’s stance. It can be better understood when compared to China’s opposition to censuring Russia at the UN Security Council and other multilateral institutions earlier in the year.

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In a meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in early November, President Xi Jinping sent a clear message opposing both the use and threat of nuclear weapons. This came after Vladimir Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling in late September. Though Putin had toned down his threats by late October, it is still reasonable to conclude that Xi’s strong “no-nuclear” message was directed at him.

Before that, potential fault lines had already emerged as Putin openly acknowledged Xi’s “questions and concerns” about the war, which could be viewed as a first public admission of differences between China and Russia on the protracted conflict.

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These subtle shifts, which are more noticeable in recent months, should not be misconstrued as China significantly moving away from its pro-Russia position. Rather, they should be viewed as an acknowledgement by Chinese leaders that relations with the West remain vital in its march towards becoming a “great modern socialist country”. During the recent 20th Communist Party congress, Xi shed light on these imperatives by underlining China’s commitment to opening up to the outside world.

True to word, he had since met more than 25 top political leaders including many from the West, notably US President Joe Biden and a number of European leaders. In these meetings, trade relations featured as an important theme.

A view of the Yangpu international container terminal in the Yangpu Economic Development Zone, south China’s Hainan province is seen on November 5. With domestic consumption expected to remain subdued, China’s best bet is to deepen or at least maintain stable trade relations with the West. Photo: Xinhua

According to Chinese customs statistics, the EU and US were China’s second and third largest trade partners from January to April 2022. Meanwhile, US sanctions in the hi-tech industry also pose unprecedented challenges to China’s goal of technological self-sufficiency.

Domestically, China’s economic recovery remains far from certain in the face of rising Covid-19 cases since its dramatic turn away from its zero-Covid policy. With domestic consumption expected to remain subdued, China’s best bet is to deepen or at least maintain stable trade relations with the West despite differing views on the war and other geopolitical and ideological differences.

Tiong Wei Jie recently graduated from the Master of Social Sciences in China and Global Governance at Nanyang Technological University (NTU), and is an incoming PhD student at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU

Li Mingjiang is an associate professor at RSIS, NTU