Russia’s narrative of a Great Patriotic War in Ukraine must be buried

Originally used to describe the Soviet victory over Nazi German invaders, the narrative is being used to push the Russian war effort in Ukraine
But no national narrative justifies the invasion of a sovereign country

James V. Wertsch

Published: 3:30am, 4 Mar 2023

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During the past year, an interesting booklet has appeared in Russia titled I Live, I Fight, I Win: Rules of Life in War. Approved by the Russian authorities, its intended audience is soldiers swept up in the Ukraine invasion. It includes sections titled “What a Special Military Operation Is” and “In Ukraine We Are Defending Russia”.

But perhaps the most eye-catching chapter is “The Great Patriotic War 2.0”, which reflects a vision of today’s war as an updated version, or even continuation, of the 1941-1945 conflict.

The chapter starts with a list of countries including Germany, Poland and Norway that have imposed sanctions on Russia, and asserts: “Now in Ukraine they are taking their revenge on Russia for our Great Victory. It means the continuation of the Great Patriotic War for us. And we must win, as our grandfathers did in 1945.”

The chapter includes misleading claims such as that Norway and Russia were on opposing sides of that war, but on one point it is clear: Russian troops are to not only exalt the official narrative of the Great Patriotic War but relive it.

It’s a message the Kremlin repeats at every opportunity. Last month, Vladimir Putin travelled to the site of the battle of Stalingrad to honour the more than one million Soviet soldiers and civilians who sacrificed their lives there in 1942-1943.

The battle is widely viewed as a turning point of the war; the Soviet heroism and victory there deserve the highest respect. But for Putin, it was an opportunity to conflate the Great Patriotic War with today’s Ukraine war.

In his words: “We are seeing that unfortunately, the ideology of Nazism – this time in its modern guise – is again creating direct threats to our national security, and we are, time and again, forced to resist the aggression of the collective West. […] we are again being threatened with German Leopard tanks with crosses on them”.

Other Russian leaders have also invoked the Great Patriotic War when talking about Ukraine. Last year, Alexander Beglov, the governor of St Petersburg (formerly Leningrad), alleged that Ukraine and its allies were using the same brutal tactics the Germans did in the 1941-44 Siege of Leningrad, including destroying Russian monuments and desecrating the graves of Russian soldiers.

Beglov said: “Our armed forces are fighting today with the same enemy, with the same Nazis, as the Soviet Army during the Great Patriotic War. And the result will be the same – we will win!”

Like any modern state, Russia devotes major resources to promulgating its national narrative. Schools and the media are tasked with providing a story aimed at telling Russians who they are and what they should do, especially in a crisis. But some aspects of the Russian effort differ from those of others.

For starters, it concentrates on a single event, the 1941-1945 Great Patriotic War, which occupies such a central role in national memory it sometimes seems the only thing that happened in the 20th century.

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The Kremlin has also given the story of the Great Patriotic War a special function. It has morphed from something to be remembered to something to be relived. This narrative fusion can provide a sense of meaning and purpose for Russian soldiers as they channel heroic episodes in the Great Patriotic War.

But it also reinforces a sense that ordinary people do not control their future – which does not exist in the first place – and makes them susceptible to appeals by “strong men” who see the real picture and must be given complete control over institutions to bring order and safety to society.

Attempts to challenge the Kremlin’s fusion of the Great Patriotic War with its invasion of Ukraine will require more than haggling over facts. To engage Putin on his own terms is to operate at a disadvantage. His is a narrative territory that has existed for centuries.

West must understand Putin’s world view to avoid more surprises

Catherine the Great may have articulated it best back in the 18th century. Asked about her relentless expansion of the Russian empire, she replied: “I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.”

But extending Russian borders has come at the expense of other nations, and their counter-narratives can be effective weapons too.

Putin often speaks of how Russia “liberated” Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Ukrainians and Georgians, but these nations all have their narratives of brutal invasion and occupation. Ukraine’s Museum of Soviet Occupation is just one of several institutions in the region that tell of Soviet and Russian atrocities, and forced annexation. That such museums evoke such ire in Russia suggests narrative challenges can have an impact.

The first priority is to reassert that no national narrative justifies the invasion of a sovereign country. This applies to everyone, including the United States with our own dark chapters in Vietnam, Iraq, the Caribbean and elsewhere. But in the midst of the largest land war in Europe since 1945 and the possibility of a massive conflagration, the focus is on Russia.

Putin’s incessant use of the Great Patriotic War narrative, and insistence that Russians must relive it, continue to guide his actions even in the face of mounting losses and international condemnation. This is a narrative campaign that deserves to be called out and opposed.

James V. Wertsch is David R. Francis distinguished professor and director emeritus of the McDonnell International Scholars Academy at Washington University in St Louis