In a multipolar world, the US must craft a better grand strategy beyond ‘shared values’
With the US withdrawal from world affairs in past years and growing weaponisation of the dollar, more countries are choosing to prioritise their own needs
Washington must take the cue and develop its own multi-alignment strategy to serve US interests in different parts of the world, particularly the Global South
At the risk of sounding sardonic, the United States has had a bitter awakening over the past month to the multipolar realities of the new world order, shaped by strategic interests on arbitrary values. Interestingly, it was not just the actions of nations in the Global South that alerted Washington to this new reality, but the sudden shift in gear by its transatlantic partners, such as Germany and France, vis-à-vis China.
From the thawing of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia – mediated by China – and US Vice-President Kamala Harris’ Africa trip – where she found resistance among leaders to join the bandwagon on China – to French President Emmanuel Macron calling for reduced interdependence with the US while pushing for increasing trade with China, several developments have pulled the proverbial rug from under Washington’s feet.
The past two years have brought into question America’s hegemonic status in world affairs and its ability to influence the foreign and trade policies of nations, both friendly and not.
Analysts diverge on the origins of this descent, from the rise of populism in America to the US response to the Covid-19 pandemic – with a few scholars even dating it back to the 2008 global financial crisis.
But the descent has certainly accelerated over the past two years, and is only getting worse with America’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the bifurcation of the world into democracies and autocracies. This withdrawal and disconnect from world affairs has invited new global and regional players to take on leadership roles.
After damaging accusations that the US restricted vaccine raw material exports during the pandemic, countries in the Global South stepped up to fill the void. China, India and Russia – characterised as authoritarian by many Western analysts – delivered vaccines, oxygen cylinders, personal protection equipment and even sent medical teams before the Biden administration woke up to the importance of vaccine diplomacy.
Thomas Shannon, a former US undersecretary of state for political affairs, described Washington’s decision to withdraw from its role as a first responder for global health crises as a “chilling and worrisome message to many countries that find themselves at a very vulnerable moment”. He said that “the world will realise we’re not a reliable partner, and that would be dangerous for us”, warning that it “will be remembered”.
Then last year, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US unleashed sanctions on Moscow, causing surging prices of energy, fertiliser and wheat around the world, and inflation to shoot up across sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia.
When the United Nations called for a condemnation of Russia’s invasion, most nations that abstained from voting or rejected it were from the Global South. To them, the broader ideological undercurrents have narrowed into a conflict between two nations.
South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor summed up the sentiment when she said: “You can’t say because Ukraine has been invaded that suddenly sovereignty is important, but it was never important for Palestine [ …] If you believe in international law truly, then wherever sovereignty is infringed, it must apply.”
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China-funded infrastructure across Africa force difficult decisions for its leaders
China-funded infrastructure across Africa force difficult decisions for its leaders
Interestingly, this non-alignment policy extends to Africa’s position on China. During her visit, US Vice-President Harris was keen on getting African leaders’ buy-in for the administration’s tussle with China, but her counterparts in Africa did not budge.
In referencing US President Joe Biden’s second democracy summit last month, Zambia’s President Hakainde Hichilema, in his Washington Post op-ed, emphasised basic needs such as public health and the economy over democracy.
Moreover, the sanctions on Russia have reminded nations of the US ability to weaponise its currency, adding urgency to calls to “de-dollarise” or diversify reserve currencies. China has started to internationalise its yuan through currency swaps and bilateral agreements, such as with Brazil and Russia.
With major oil producers expressing interest in joining the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and Saudi Arabia’s decision to become a dialogue partner at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the calls to move away from the dollar will only strengthen. Even Macron has spoken of the “extraterritoriality of the US dollar” and called for increased strategic autonomy.
Furthermore, in a recent meeting with local officials, Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo suggested promoting Indonesian alternatives to Visa and Mastercard. In this, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is way ahead, having long promoted the government-run RuPay digital payment system.
Washington should take cues from these developments and craft a grand strategy that prioritises its strategic interests in different regions of the world, instead of simply counting on “shared values” among its post-war allies. If Macron’s words and the actions of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz are any indication, the European Union’s two largest economies will not blindly follow US policy on China or Russia.
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French and EU leaders visit China to discuss trade and the Russia-Ukraine war
French and EU leaders visit China to discuss trade and the Russia-Ukraine war
Washington should consider partnering more closely with Eastern European nations instead, such as Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, as well as Scandinavian nations such as Finland, to arrest Russia’s aggression in Europe.
In the Indo-Pacific theatre, the US should also consider closer ties with those that already have disputes with China, such as India and possibly Aukus partner Australia, as well as Japan and Taiwan, over the Southeast Asian nations that have historically hedged between China and the US. A similar approach should be adopted in Africa and Latin America.
Such a multi-alignment strategy would serve US interests in different parts of the world, particularly the Global South, while avoiding undue diplomatic pressure on otherwise efficient regional partners.
