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China’s top diplomat Wang Yi speaks during a Security Council meeting last September 22 at the UN headquarters. At the latest meeting earlier this month, Wang called for developing countries to be given a greater say in the council. Photo: AP
Opinion
Macroscope
by Gu Bin
Macroscope
by Gu Bin

China is pushing for a better, more representative form of multilateralism, not seeking to replace it

  • Reform of global economic governance has been slow amid US hegemony and industrial subsidies
  • China is now forging a better path with new banks and initiatives that secure the voices of the majority
When there was “taxation without representation”, there was a revolution. That is the story of the American Revolution in the 18th century. Today, in international relations, there is similar dismay over “contribution without representation” among China and other emerging economies: they have long represented the bulk of global economic growth, but lack a comparable position in global governance. Luckily, such a disparity is bringing evolution, rather than revolution.
The reforms of global economic governance have been trying to catch up for decades, but American hegemony is delaying the process, frustrating emerging powers. Specifically, the World Trade Organization has largely been paralysed, both in terms of negotiation and dispute settlement, the World Bank has been wrangling with capital inadequacy issues, and the International Monetary Fund lacks a credible quota formula for its members to reflect the changed landscape.
With reforms of those old institutions proving difficult, China has decided to open up a new path of multilateralism by establishing institutions that secure the voices of the majority and cater to their needs. These include the Belt and Road Initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank and, most recently, the Multilateral Cooperation Centre for Development Finance.

They all focus on one sector, infrastructure, revealing China’s commitment to share its story of success – “roads and dams lead to prosperity”, as a household saying in China puts it.

Luckily, the new institutions unequivocally uphold international best practices. For example, the 2019 Belt and Road Summit vowed zero tolerance for corruption and promulgated a debt sustainability analysis framework devoted to the initiative, drawing on IMF and World Bank practice while avoiding their anti-investment bias.
The Chinese government officially prohibited overseas investments in new coal power, starting last year. The AIIB recently revised its energy policy, explicitly banning coal mining and coal power investment; in fact, it has not invested a cent in coal since day one. The China-led institutions are all determined to be clean and green.
The Belt and Road Initiative embraces the promotion of high standards despite criticism about environmental deterioration, human rights violations and debt trap diplomacy. The Export-Import Bank of China, one of the leading banks in belt and road investments, upgraded its environmental and social standards last year, to be fully consistent with those of international financial institutions. In other words, every cent the Chinese bank invests thereafter should adhere to international best practices.

Top diplomat Wang Yi said in 2016: “China is not building a rival system. On the contrary, we are seeking to play a bigger role in the existing international order and system.”

The truth has revealed itself over the years – Chinese multilateralism is built on American multilateralism, inheriting the pros (a rules-based system and the upholding of best practices) and dropping its cons (being too bureaucratic and one-size-fits-all, neglecting local conditions).

Multilateralism isn’t dying – just the version led by the US

Will Chinese multilateralism lead to Chinese hegemony, as was the case for Britain and the US? The United States started to surpass Britain in the 1940s and, since the end of WWII, has never hesitated to kick away the ladder when Japan and now China, as newcomers, try to climb it.

But power and hegemony are different, and one does not necessarily lead to the other. As a historical world power, China expanded not by conquest but by osmosis. It now engenders respect and admiration so that others come to it. As Confucius said, if people from afar do not submit, influence them to do so by means of virtue and civil culture.

The Christian missionary culture, in contrast, aims to convert, to impose one’s will on another; when it comes to international relations, it tends to intervene and even overthrow foreign governments by force.

These days, the US behaves in a manner detrimental to multilateralism. Both the Chips and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, in giving out subsidies contingent on the local manufacturing of semiconductors and electric vehicles, serve the American version of forced technology transfer – as showcased in the EV battery deal between China’s Contemporary Amperex Technology Co (CATL) and Ford.

Such behaviour tramples on the law and spirit of free and fair trade. It is American unilateralism, practised consistently by the Trump and Biden administrations, that is defeating the multilateralism built by America’s forefathers.

Gu Bin is an associate professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University, and a China Forum expert

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