Why nations seeking to hedge between US and China should look to Vietnam, not the Philippines
Unlike its Southeast Asian neighbours, Manila has too eagerly embraced Washington and now appears to be back-pedalling to avoid retaliation from Beijing
Vietnam, on the other hand, provides a textbook example of successful hedging, balancing relations with both superpowers, and Russia, without angering any of them
China and the United States are ratcheting up their pressure on Southeast Asian countries to choose between them in their struggle for regional hegemony. Some have already done so while others continue to hedge – some successfully, some not so much.
In international relations, hedging is defined as insurance-seeking behaviour in which a state tries not to take sides, pursues opposite, mutually counteracting measures, and cultivates a fallback position. However, states hedge in different forms and to different degrees for a variety of reasons. One major factor is the preferences of the elite class.
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar appear to have already chosen China. Thailand is a US treaty ally, but its recent actions suggest it might also lean towards China. The Thai government asked the US to remove all its combat forces in 1975, but it still allows the US to use the U-Tapao airbase and recently hosted a port visit by the US Nimitz carrier strike group.
Singapore is officially neutral between China and the US and tries to demonstrate that by undertaking military exercises with China to improve security in the strategic Malacca Strait. However, its defence cooperation with the US and hosting rotating US military forces suggest its leanings. This probably puts it in the US camp as far as China is concerned.
Singapore and Malaysia are members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements alongside Australia, New Zealand and Britain. Malaysia also hosts Australian units at its Butterworth airbase, but is nevertheless still trying to hedge between the superpowers. Indonesia has been able to maintain neutrality between the US and China, rejecting a 2020 US request to allow its surveillance planes to land and refuel there.
09:10
Between two superpowers: Indonesia’s position in the US-China rivalry
Between two superpowers: Indonesia’s position in the US-China rivalry
Meanwhile, the models for the best and worst approaches to hedging are Vietnam and the Philippines respectively.
Anti-China hawks among the Philippine elite appear to have convinced President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jnr’s administration to abandon his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte’s policy of moving towards China.
In addition to the five bases the US military has access to under the EDCA, it has added four more. Several of the nine have ready access to the South China Sea and three of the additions are in northern Luzon, near Taiwan. China has said it is concerned they could be used for intelligence collection.
In an apparent attempt to head off Chinese anger, the Philippines has qualified the arrangement. Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo told a Senate hearing that the US would not be allowed to stockpile weapons at sites in the Philippines for use in operations in Taiwan. Meanwhile, Marcos said the US could not use its access to Philippine bases for “offensive actions” against any country.
05:37
Marcos says US bases in Philippines not for ‘offensive action’ as Taiwan tensions simmer
Marcos says US bases in Philippines not for ‘offensive action’ as Taiwan tensions simmer
It will be difficult to tell if any weapons are intended to be used in the defence of Taiwan. However, the prohibition on refuelling, repairing and reloading at bases provided under the EDCA undermines their strategic usefulness for the US and could be lifted on a case-by-case basis.
On the heels of China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang visiting Manila, Marcos travelled to Washington to meet US President Joe Biden and discuss the need to “tone down the rhetoric”. This attempt to restore balance could be an indication that the Philippines miscalculated in its eagerness to embrace the US.
Leaning towards the US could bring serious negative consequences. Beijing could step up its aggressive behaviour towards Manila to make it an example for others that might displease Beijing. It could also increase the pressure on other countries attempting to hedge, to compensate for the fate of the Philippines.
China could also retaliate economically, something the Philippines cannot afford. Divisions within Marcos’ administration could grow between pro-US and pro-China factions, creating internal political turmoil. The example of the Philippines could lead other Southeast Asian countries to better understand the potential negative consequences of choosing the US and thus strengthen their hedging efforts. They do not want to get dragged into a no-win conflict.
The remaining hedgers could also learn from Vietnam’s success. Hanoi has skilfully managed to keep a balance between China and the US without overtly angering or siding with either. This could be based on its history of suffering at the hands of great powers.
The Vietnamese civil war was partly a result of a great power ideological struggle. The US viewed Vietnam as a domino in its theory that China’s communist revolution would spread to Southeast Asia, and small countries would subsequently fall like dominoes.
Vietnam is an ally of Russia, a comprehensive strategic partner of China and has made some moves towards security cooperation with the US. It has stood up to China’s attempts to intimidate it over its maritime claims. It has maintained a “four-nos” policy – no military alliances, no siding with one country to counteract the other, no foreign military bases, and no force or threat of the use of force in international relations. This has proved to be a foundation of its hedging and a way to keep it from getting dragged into a military conflict between major powers.
The political arena in Southeast Asia has become a testing ground of experiences in hedging and will continue to provide many lessons for other countries in the region and beyond. If others learn from the experiences of the Philippines and Vietnam, they could yet be spared involvement in a catastrophic war from which they could only lose.
Mark J. Valencia is a non-resident senior research fellow at the Huayang Institute for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance
