The so-called China challenge was expected to occupy a good chunk of the agenda at the recently concluded Nato summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. But the blunt language used to describe China in the final communique was still a surprise, and left no room for doubt that the US and its allies are trying to engage China in a new cold war.
“The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values,” said the transatlantic security alliance. “The PRC’s malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target allies and harm alliance security.” It even accused China of “coercive tactics and efforts to divide the alliance”.
In an immediate rebuttal, the Chinese mission to the European Union vehemently criticised the communique, denouncing it as replete with “repetitive rhetoric echoing the Cold War mentality and ideological bias”, saying it “deliberately smears China”. “As a product of the Cold War, Nato has a bad track record in history,” it said, adding: “We firmly oppose Nato’s eastward movement into the Asia-Pacific region.”
A faction within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, influenced by Washington, has been trying to intensify anti-China sentiment for quite some time. This clique has since put up an ostentatious display of radicalism, anxiety, aggression and impulsive meddling in the affairs of the Asia-Pacific.
The leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, designated “partners across the globe” by Nato, were invited to the summit for a second consecutive year, sending a clear message of the military bloc’s intention to expand its footprint into the Asia-Pacific. As part of efforts that appear to further encircle China, Nato signed an “individually tailored partnership programme” with Japan and hosted a leaders’ session with the “Asia-Pacific 4” – Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand – on the second and final day of the Vilnius summit.
It would come as no surprise that the target of such moves is China. However, the intricate strategic manoeuvring being planned by Nato and the United States in this expansive game of chess is fraught with inherent risks and uncertainties.
Back in December 2019, Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg had expressed with certainty that Nato would not venture into the South China Sea, acknowledging, however, that China’s increasing presence near Nato areas required attention. Fast forward three-and-a-half years, and the transatlantic security alliance finds itself in a different position, no longer ignoring the Asia-Pacific. The reverberations of the Ukraine war have given Nato’s leadership an excuse to explore deeper links between the Indo-Pacific and European security domains.
The Vilnius summit reflects Nato’s evolving perspective and approach towards China. For years, China was, if anything, a distant concern, not even garnering a mention in Nato’s 2010 strategic concept paper. But the Trump administration’s incessant lobbying appears to have caused a gradual shift in perspective among some European allies, and China eventually appeared on Nato’s radar.
In December 2019, China was acknowledged in a Nato communique for the first time, marking a major shift in the military alliance’s recognition of China’s strategic significance. This was the initial step in Nato’s official evolving stance on China, and subsequent months saw a progressive increase in its references to China, which were accompanied by a more assertive tone.
At the 2021 summit in Brussels, the Nato communique explicitly sounded the alarm, cautioning that China’s “stated ambitions and assertive conduct” posed systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas directly affecting the security of the alliance.
Before the eruption of the Ukraine conflict in February last year, Nato had maintained a limited focus on China, primarily addressing its involvement in Europe. Consequently, discussions surrounding a role for Nato in the Indo-Pacific were scarce. But the escalating significance of China prompted a notable shift in Nato’s 2022 strategic concept paper, which dedicated more attention to China than before.
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Nato leaders slam China over Russia ties and Taiwan threats in bloc’s strongest rebuke yet
Nato leaders slam China over Russia ties and Taiwan threats in bloc’s strongest rebuke yet
Despite Stoltenberg’s earlier assertion that Nato would not venture into the South China Sea, recent actions indicate a different emerging reality. Nato has had frequent and sustained dialogues with its key partners in the Indo-Pacific, including Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. It even discussed plans to establish an office in Japan, although France has vetoed the move.
While there remains no discourse on integrating these partners into Nato’s military plans, the conflict in Ukraine is being used to draw the alliance deeper into the Indo-Pacific sphere.
China’s “systemic challenges” were initially acknowledged in Nato’s 2022 strategic concept paper. The Vilnius summit communique has not only maintained the use of this term but also talks about the specific threats China poses to Nato, and the bloc’s preparedness to address them. Clearly, Nato’s perception of China and its relationship with Beijing have undergone substantial changes over the past year, and the attitude looks increasingly confrontational.
This inclination is evident not just in official statements but also in Nato’s actions, such as its heightened focus on the Asia-Pacific.
While Nato’s attempt to establish a liaison office in Tokyo have not materialised, Nato might well pursue alternative approaches to assert its presence in the Asia-Pacific, including fostering substantial bilateral relations with its designated regional partners and even, potentially engaging in joint military operations. Such actions would only escalate tensions in the Asia-Pacific.
Dr Imran Khalid is a freelance contributor based in Karachi, Pakistan
