Why Philippines will struggle to forge South China Sea alliance with Vietnam
Despite a similar outlook on maritime disputes with Beijing and past collaboration, a US-wary Hanoi, increasingly dependent on China, is likely to resist military cooperation with Manila
Just before Indonesia’s chairmanship of Asean ended, it mobilised the region’s foreign ministers for an unusual diplomatic act. On December 30, they issued a stand-alone statement on the South China Sea, amid escalating tensions, particularly between the Philippines and China.
Expressing “concern”, the statement by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations called on rival claimant states to “exercise self-restraint” and “avoid actions that may further complicate the situation”.
Crucially, the grouping’s chief diplomats referred to “our maritime sphere” and reaffirmed the “unity and solidarity” among members – which include the Philippines, a founding Asean state that has been involved in several run-ins with Chinese maritime forces around the hotly disputed Second Thomas Shoal in the past few months alone.
Few in Manila, however, were consoled. After all, Asean has neither criticised China, a major trading partner, nor provided any concrete help beyond reiterating a commitment to the seemingly never-ending negotiations with China for a code of conduct in the South China Sea.
If anything, some Asean leaders seem subtly critical of the Philippines’ more assertive stance in the disputed waters.
With little hope of tangible Asean support, the Philippines appears to be banking on strategic alliances with like-minded neighbours, in particular Vietnam. President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr is scheduled to visit Hanoi this month, and by all indications, will want to explore a potentially consequential alliance.
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Marcos Jnr says China showing interest in South China Sea atolls that lie close to the Philippines
Marcos Jnr says China showing interest in South China Sea atolls that lie close to the Philippines
Yet, while the Philippines is likely to gain some economic and diplomatic benefits from warmer ties with Vietnam, it will struggle to forge any robust military cooperation in the South China Sea.
Philippine-Vietnam relations have come a long way. At the height of the Cold War, the Philippines was a major logistical base for US military operations against Vietnam’s communist forces. In one of the darkest periods of Asean history, the Philippines and other states aligned with the West backed the ousted Khmer Rouge regime after Cambodia was invaded by Vietnam.
Up until the 1980s, a major concern for Asean’s founding members was the potential rise of Vietnam as an aggressive hegemonic force. But the collapse of the Soviet Union, a key ally of Vietnam, dramatically altered the geopolitical landscape. The Philippines not only came to be a major proponent of Vietnam joining Asean, it has also come to see the communist nation as an unlikely ally in the face of a rising China.
In 1995, when China took over Mischief Reef, the Philippines and Vietnam, which both also claim the reef, pushed for an Asean response. The upshot was the 2002 non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. In 2005, the Philippines and Vietnam took relations to another level when they teamed up to negotiate an oil exploration deal with China in the disputed waters.
Chinese buildings can be seen on the man-made island at Mischief Reef in the Spratlys, in the South China Sea, on March 20, 2022. China has fully militarised at least three of several islands it built in the disputed South China Sea, in an aggressive move that threatens all nations operating nearby, a top US military commander has said. Photo: AP
By the early 2010s, prospects for a full-blown alliance were emerging as Vietnam and the Philippines welcomed the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia. They quietly coordinated their legal warfare strategy against China, while Vietnam began to deploy warships to Manila and conduct joint exercises with Filipino troops on South China Sea disputed islands.
The election of Beijing-friendly Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, however, effectively ended any hopes of a robust alliance. If anything, pro-Duterte elements in Manila began portraying Vietnam, which occupies the most land features in the Spratlys of all the claimants, as the primary threat in the South China Sea.
Now, amid rising tensions with China, Marcos Jnr seems determined to rekindle strategic ties with Vietnam, which is also the Philippines’ top rice supplier. Philippine foreign secretary Enrique Manalo billed Marcos Jnr’s visit to Vietnam as a major step towards raising “bilateral ties to even greater heights”. Realistically, however, Marcos Jnr should temper his expectations.
Vietnam’s communist leadership is likely to resist any fully fledged alliance. Ideologically, Hanoi is not only wary of alliances but also deeply sceptical of Western influence, and will aim to keep a healthy distance from US-allied liberal democracies such as the Philippines.
Vietnam’s military, meanwhile, is largely dependent on Soviet-Russian systems. This complicates prospects for any major defence technology cooperation with the largely US-armed and trained Philippine military, which also happens to be generally wary of communist regimes.
Perhaps most crucially, Vietnam has become increasingly dependent on Chinese technology, capital and inputs for its booming export industries. As a result, Hanoi is currently more interested in keeping relations with Beijing on an even keel than provoking its powerful, fellow communist neighbour.
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Xi Jinping says Vietnam is a ‘diplomatic priority’ as Chinese leader seeks closer bilateral ties
Xi Jinping says Vietnam is a ‘diplomatic priority’ as Chinese leader seeks closer bilateral ties
Nevertheless, there is significant room for mid-level strategic cooperation. On the economic front, Marcos Jnr is expected to seek Vietnam’s help in ensuring the Philippines’ food security with agreements to develop its agricultural sector. He is also likely to seek advice on developing the Philippines’ manufacturing sector, especially in attracting high-quality investments through legislation and infrastructure development.
On the South China Sea, the Philippines and Vietnam share a very similar outlook, most notably their advocacy for a legally binding Asean-China code of conduct in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Accordingly, Marcos Jnr may push for greater strategic solidarity during his visit, and even explore a maritime agreement.
This is likely to involve delimiting overlapping claims to facilitate joint energy exploration deals in the Spratlys, regular joint naval drills and intelligence-sharing in the disputed areas, and help in coordinating potential South China Sea arbitration cases based on the 2016 arbitral tribunal award.
Overall, however, Marcos Jnr’s trip to Vietnam is likely to be heavier in strategic symbolism than substance.
Richard Heydarian is a Manila-based academic and author of Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China and the Struggle for Western Pacific, and the forthcoming Duterte’s Rise
