Why Beijing is struggling with its mission to ‘tell China’s story well’
- President Xi Jinping wants officials and media to make China’s voice heard over the Western narrative
- Millions have been spent, but there is frustration that the campaign is doing little to sway international opinion
The objective was to make China’s voice heard over the Western narrative, as part of an “international discursive power” strategy.
That strategy – promoted by officials in recent years and known as guoji huayuquan in Chinese – calls for the right to speak, and the capacity to counter the Western narrative in the hope of shaping international opinion.
Officials have been told to have confidence in their own culture, history, ideology and political system so that an international audience can be told that China’s approach is better than the West’s on many issues.
This policy goal explains the increasingly assertive and sometimes confrontational rhetoric from Chinese officials and state media in recent years. Assertiveness and not backing down in the face of Western pressure is seen as the way to get “the right to speak”.
But, in public and in private, officials and state media executives have expressed frustration that the Chinese narrative is doing little to sway international public opinion.
Beijing has poured millions of dollars into this propaganda drive, including to set up media outlets overseas, hire former television anchors from places like CNN for its official English-language channel CGTN, and for electronic billboards in New York’s Times Square.
For Chinese officials and state media, if the campaign is not effective it is because of the bias and dominance of Western media, academics and the public.
At the same time, officials and analysts in China have taken a look at the language being used, to see if these messages can be communicated better. Officials have also sought to do this by expanding their social media presence abroad.
However, these efforts fail to address some of the fundamental flaws of China’s international propaganda push.
One of them is that, in the Chinese system, once an official line or narrative is formed it is propagated by state media – and there is no room for any dissenting voice.
It is a different story in the West, where many narratives and arguments are presented from different sources – including voices that challenge the official line – and people are free to have their own views.
In China’s political culture, even well-intentioned criticism from sympathisers can be seen as a challenge or as animosity by Beijing. So the call to “tell China’s story well” is often interpreted as “tell a story about the good side of China”.
Criticism – well-intentioned or not – is not welcome in Beijing. And even if Chinese officials or state media are telling the truth, they are often perceived by outsiders as whitewashing.
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Another factor is how officialdom works in China, in terms of propaganda. The performance of officials is typically measured by how well they appeal to the domestic audience and if they get approval from their supervisors – not how well they manage to convince the international audience.
That means officials are likely to care more about what they say to the media outlets that the domestic audience can access, and how their words are received by their bosses.
Apart from this push to make China’s stand known on contentious international issues, Beijing is also keen to expand its soft power through culture.
That is less of a challenge, given that China’s cultural heritage has always drawn interest from people around the world.
People-to-people exchanges might also be an easier sell for Beijing, but it will have to refrain from imposing its views on visitors. Instead of telling China’s story, it might be best to let people explore and find out for themselves.
