Some are concerned that the rules created by the 2020 national security law will diminish Hong Kong’s system of rule of law . They, for example, point out that under the current system, when there is disagreement with the pre-2020 Basic Law, the national security law will dominate. Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal acknowledged this last year when it said it would not review “any alleged incompatibility as between the NSL [national security law] and the Basic Law or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) as applied to Hong Kong”. This, then, cleared the path for the national security law to specify (under Article 43) new bodies, such as the Committee for Safeguarding National Security that would create rules that allowed Hong Kong police to engage in searches, asset seizures and surveillance with fewer procedural safeguards and minimised judicial oversight. As a consequence, authorities have jailed scores of pro-democracy leaders. Amid police raids, accusations of sedition and confiscated assets, media organisations (such as the Apple Daily , Stand News , Mad Dog Daily and Citizen News ) shut down. After vigorous warnings against violating the new rules, large-scale protests have ended. Still other rights specified in the pre-2020 Basic Law, like the right to a jury trial and bail were also weakened by the national security law. Previously, defendants would usually be granted bail – rather than languishing for months in jail before a trial determined their guilt or innocence. As it says in Article 5(3) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, “[it] shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial”. Under Article 42 of the national security law, however, bail is not granted unless a judge (before guilt has been determined by a trial) has sufficient grounds to believe that a “defendant will not continue to commit acts endangering national security”. But the rule of law is arguably less about applying a particular level of liberalism and more about the transparent, independent and impartial ways in which laws are applied when put to the test. Under the rule of law, if the prevailing laws are liberal, then that form of law will rule. If, however, the prevailing laws are in some ways repressive, then that form of law will govern. In other countries, the rule of law goes hand in hand with applying some of the most politically liberalised laws in the world, as in Scandinavian states. But this is not the same for all polities. The United States, for example, is considered a system that has been ruled by law from its beginnings – even as it historically engaged in nefarious policies under the law, like slavery, native-American genocide and localised Jim Crow policies. Historians see Hong Kong as first showing the primacy of legal rules in the 19th century. During that period (much like other Victorian-era British colonies), the judiciary looked the other way amid rampant racial bigotry and segregation. Constables roamed the streets with whips in hand. And women could not own property. Coexisting with such conditions under the rule of law is, however, a starkly paradoxical reality. When the rule of law actually functions and when all are equal before the law, it can oil the wheels of commerce, provide perceptions of fairness, help eradicate corruption and deliver stability. Interestingly, even while Hong Kong’s rankings on rights and freedom have declined since 2019, its rule of law scores have remained relatively high. For example, according to the World Justice Project’s 2021 index, Hong Kong’s rule of law ranking was 19th highest in the world (eight places higher than the US, four higher than France, two places below Singapore, and three below the United Kingdom). Confidence in the presence of the rule of law in Hong Kong is an assessment shared by others. Some of Hong Kong’s justices (from common law courts around the world) at first contemplated resigning from their positions after the enactment of the national security law, but then changed their minds. For example, last August, Lord Justice Robert Reed (who serves as the Chief Justice of the UK Supreme Court as well as a non-permanent judge on Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal) said: “I have been closely monitoring and assessing developments in Hong Kong, in discussion with the [UK] foreign secretary and the lord chancellor.” He said that “our shared assessment is that the judiciary in Hong Kong continues to act largely independently of government and their decisions continue to be consistent with the rule of law”. Judges in national security cases remain true to their judicial oath Maintaining the rule of law has helped to make Hong Kong the nerve centre of China’s finances, its most important service hub and its focal point for international trade. And this may have been Beijing’s intention after 2019: to reformulate Hong Kong’s institutions so that the rule of law can be used as a tool to control and silence political dissent even as the judiciary continues with some of its traditional roles, such as fighting corruption, enforcing pre-existing rules and holding citizens and leaders to account. David A. Rezvani teaches Asian politics, international relations and writing at Dartmouth College and is the author of Surpassing the Sovereign State: The Wealth, Self-Rule, and Security Advantages of Partially Independent Territories