Philippines’ South China Sea gambit is high on effort, low on results

Manila should take note of how Malaysia and Vietnam have managed to make the most of their maritime resources while navigating their territorial disputes with China, and rethink its own approach

Zhihua Zheng

Published: 5:30am, 15 Feb 2024

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The Philippines is Asean’s most vocal and seemingly assertive challenger to China’s claims in the South China Sea. Public opinion supports taking military action, and Manila is actively seeking international support, strengthening its alliance with the US and building up its coastguard presence.

But despite these efforts, tangible gains remain elusive. Compared to Vietnam and Malaysia, the Philippines appears to be lagging behind in both resource exploitation and physical control of disputed areas.

Vietnam has undertaken significant land reclamation in the Spratlys since December 2022, adding an estimated 134 hectares (330 acres) to its existing land holdings in the Spratlys. This expansion is second only to China’s in size.

In stark contrast, the Philippines has seen its presence in the region decline. It lost its presence on Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and continues to face Chinese interference in its attempts to consolidate its position on Second Thomas Shoal. Although Manila has legal backing from the South China Sea arbitration ruling and the support of allies, its control over Second Thomas Shoal looks increasingly fragile.

In terms of oil and gas development, Malaysia’s oil and gas industry plays a crucial role in its economy, accounting for around 20 per cent of GDP. The South China Sea is a major contributor to this sector, but many explored blocks overlap with areas claimed by China, particularly north of Sarawak. Despite these challenges, Malaysia’s exploration has been relatively stable compared to the Philippines’ efforts in the Reed Bank, which have seen limited progress.

Why does China tolerate such extensive reclamation by Vietnam, while not allowing the Philippines to fortify its tiny presence aboard the BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal? Why has Malaysia been able to manage large-scale oil and gas development in the South China Sea while the Philippines faces significant challenges in developing its resources?

A Philippine flag flutters in March 2014 from BRP Sierra Madre, a dilapidated Philippine Navy ship that has been aground since 1999 and became a Philippine military detachment on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, part of the Spratly Islands, in the South China Sea. Photo: Reuters

Why have Vietnam and Malaysia been able to assert their maritime rights while maintaining stable diplomatic relations with China, yet the Philippines has had constant friction with Beijing, and their relations have continued to deteriorate?

Several factors may contribute to this disparity. First, the Philippines relies heavily on the US alliance. However, despite the mutual defence treaty, the US commitment to direct military involvement remains ambiguous, leaving the Philippines potentially exposed in the event of escalation.

Although the US seeks to contain China and undermine Beijing’s international standing, it appears to have no intention of engaging in direct armed conflict over a few tiny and insignificant disputed reefs such as Second Thomas Shoal. This is why the US has not categorised ship-ramming and the firing of water cannons and laser lights as clear-cut armed attacks, instead accepting them as so-called grey-zone tactics.

Manila might have thought that by cooperating with Washington in its efforts to contain Beijing, even on the Taiwan issue, it would gain the full support of the US in the South China Sea. However, such unrealistic expectations could lead to significant strategic miscalculations by the Philippines.

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Second, some within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations may perceive the Philippines’ approach towards China as a departure from its core values of neutrality and centrality, as reflected in the bloc’s negotiations with Beijing on a code of conduct in the South China Sea.

However, recent developments suggest that Manila may be moving towards a more deterrence-based strategy. There are concerns that the expansion of the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement between Manila and Washington could further militarise the region, with potentially unforeseen consequences.

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Third, the Philippines’ attempt to garner international support to pressure China into backing off may well backfire, as such a strategy could fuel Chinese nationalism and hinder constructive dialogue and diplomatic solutions.

In a recent commentary, maritime expert Wu Shicun argued that peace and stability in the South China Sea cannot be achieved by China’s restraint and forbearance alone, and urged Beijing to take firm action and “show our swords when necessary”.

Given the importance of saving face in Chinese diplomacy, it is implausible that China would back down as a result of any accusations, regardless of their veracity. The Chinese believe respect begets respect, and see tit-for-tat diplomacy as fair play. Yet, the Philippines does not seem to understand this logic of Chinese diplomacy.

Finally, Manila’s approach to the South China Sea dispute is shaped not only by external factors but also by complex internal dynamics. The country’s political landscape is characterised by political dynasties, competing factions and, according to some critics, widespread corruption. These internal factors may significantly shape the government’s approach to territorial and maritime disputes.

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Many Filipino politicians prioritise their personal interests and those of their families, often to the detriment of the nation. Exploiting the “China threat” for personal political gain diverts resources and attention away from critical investments in maritime capabilities and infrastructure.

The South China Sea dispute is a multifaceted and evolving challenge for the Philippines. Recognising its current limitations and adapting its approach could be key to more effectively navigating this complex situation and securing its long-term interests. Learning from the experiences of other regional actors, such as Vietnam and Malaysia, could be a valuable step in this direction.

Zhihua Zheng is an associate professor and head of the East Asia Marine Policy Project at the Centre for Japanese Studies, Shanghai Jiao Tong University