Andrews said he made clear the MOU was for trade reasons in the hope that further engagement with China would create more jobs and secure Victoria’s economic longevity, a move the state was allowed to make on its own.

Morrison first publicly rebuked Andrews in 2018 for not consulting him and for getting involved in foreign policy, and while the MOU does not legally bind Victoria to any particular project or commitment, it raised concerns of Beijing’s growing influence in Australia.

Andrews then signed a subsequent framework agreement in late 2019 mapping out how Victoria and China would work together on projects in key areas such as infrastructure, biotechnology, agriculture and food, and aged care in the spirit of the initiative.

02:35

Belt and Road Initiative explained

Belt and Road Initiative explained

Australia's Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton also called the belt and road plan a “propaganda exercise”, prompting Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian to point out the “groundless accusations made by some Australian politicians” were “totally untenable”.

Last week, the Victorian government held its fifth conference call with the Chinese Development and Reform Commission to discuss plans under the MOU as well as more investments in tourism and education post Covid-19.

A senior lawyer at the China desk of a firm in Melbourne, who did not want to be named, said he had seen more interest from Chinese investors in Victorian infrastructure and energy, particularly renewable energy projects, since the MOU was signed, although they were not large multimillion dollar deals.

“Certainly [the investors] were energised by the MOU and many were considered under the auspices of the belt and road but none of them were traditional belt and road projects,” he said.

“Many of these deals were instigated by private Chinese enterprises purely on a commercial basis, for example those wanting to capitalise on their solar energy technology.”

Belt and road trade adviser, Overtures: Co’s Oscar Fong, said the MOU had certainly accelerated Australian interests in projects in Victoria, and even in other states, however even without the MOU, there was plenty of commercial interests between the two countries.

More questions were raised about the effectiveness of the MOU after the latest data on state trading performances for 2018-19 showed that there was no change in Victoria’s trade with China, while New South Wales and Queensland posted 8.1 and 27.4 per cent increases respectively.

Fong added that discussions were under way over several trade deals, such as the export of machinery permitted under the trade pillar of the initiative, but none had been concluded.

The MOU, according to Fong, paved an easier pathway for those seeking to do bigger deals that require Victorian government support such as licenses or expansions, but for smaller deals, it would not make a substantial difference.

The lack of support from both Andrews’ Labour Party colleagues and the federal government has also brought to light the seriousness of the current great divide across the Australian population on geopolitical lines, and the possible influence of the United States on Australia’s position with China manifested in domestic political scuffles, experts said.

Australia’s stance on the belt and road strategy had been positive to begin with, but weakened over time to its lowest point at the time when the US put out its strategic approach to China last month describing the Chinese government’s intentions, including the initiative, as “malign”, Australian Centre on China in the World director, professor Jane Golley, said.

“It is clearly problematic for the federal government for one of its states to adopt a position that doesn’t align with its own. But the question is who is making the decision that is genuinely in Australia’s best interests at this time?” Golley said.

“Is the federal government possibly being paranoid and doing the bidding of the US which clearly sees the belt and road initiative as a ‘malign’ policy?

Golley said it was an odd stance especially considering Australia had been welcoming Chinese investments for many years.

“Victoria has decided the economic outcome is significant enough [to sign the MOU] and that they trust the government enough to deal with any security concerns that may arise,” she said.

Michael Clarke, associate professor at the Australian National University’s National Security College, agreed accusations pointed at Victoria were evidence of how the “China issue” had become a political football in Australia.

“The whole episode … for what it is, both the federal and Victorian governments haven’t handled it well. But when Victoria entered into talks with China there was no settled [federal] policy on what the approach to the belt and road should be,” he said.

“For the federal government to point a finger at Victoria is a bit hard to swallow.”

While there is no obvious evidence there has been American involvement in Australian politics, the US has placed pressure on its allies to follow with its preferences in economic and strategic decoupling from China, Clarke said.

But he warned it would be potentially damaging for middle states like Australia or Japan to choose between the US or China, and instead it would be better for them to band together to pursue their own interests, taking into consideration treaties already agreed with the US.

“Certainly with the Trump administration … quite a lot of people are sceptical with the US foreign policy,” he said.

“There is an opportunity for lesser states to strike pragmatic bargains between the two … playing off the tensions to their own advantage is one way to look at it.”

Additional reporting from Orange Wang