India sets its foreign policy sights on China in shift away from Pakistan: ‘we are ready to join with others to curb you’
- India’s old nonaligned stance, rooted in Cold War-era rivalries, has come to an end as its policymakers increasingly turn their focus to Beijing
- A former Indian diplomat said New Delhi recognised the need to curb Beijing’s ‘ambitions’ – after decades of believing China was not a military threat
That relentless competition made Pakistan always the focus of New Delhi’s foreign policy.
India’s ever-growing economy, which is now vastly larger than Pakistan’s, combined with Beijing’s increasingly assertive push for influence across Asia, mean that “New Delhi has increasingly grown Beijing-centric,” said Lieutenant General D.S. Hooda, who from 2014 to 2016 headed Indian military’s Northern Command, which controls the part of Kashmir that India administers, including Ladakh.
Kashmir has suffered insurgencies, lockdowns and political subterfuge since India and Pakistan gained independence from British colonial rule in 1947, and has been at the heart of two of the four wars India has fought with Pakistan and China. The three countries’ tense borders meet at the disputed territory, in the world’s only three-way nuclear confrontation.
Starting in the 1960s, India was an active member of the Non-Aligned Movement, a grouping of over 100 countries that theoretically did not align with any major power during the Cold War. Despite disputes with neighbouring Pakistan and China, India’s nonaligned stance remained a bedrock of its foreign policy, with its diplomats focused mainly on upending Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir.
‘No one is safe’: editor’s arrest keeps Kashmir journalists on tenterhooks
“Kashmir was in a way central to our foreign policy concerns,” said Kanwal Sibal, a career diplomat who was India’s foreign secretary in 2002-2003.
But the current military stand-off between India and China over their disputed border in Ladakh set off a grave escalation in tensions between the two Asian giants. Despite 17 rounds of diplomatic and military talks, the tense stand-off continues.
For decades, India believed China did not represent a military threat, said Hooda, the former military commander. But that calculus changed in mid-2020 when a clash high in the Karakoram mountains in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley set off the military tensions.
“Galwan represents a strategic inflection point,” said Constantino Xavier, a fellow at the Centre for Social and Economic Progress, a Delhi-based policy group. It “helped create a new Indian consensus about the need to reset the entire relationship with China, and not just solve the boundary issue”.
Soldiers from the two sides fought a medieval-style battle with stones, fists and clubs, leaving at least 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers dead.
The government also split the Muslim-majority region into two federally administered territories – Ladakh and Jammu-Kashmir – and ended inherited protections on land and jobs.
The government insisted the moves involved only administrative changes, part of a long-held Hindu nationalist pledge to assimilate overwhelmingly Muslim Kashmir into the country.
What are India’s options as rivals Pakistan and China grow closer?
Pakistan reacted with fury to India’s changes, asserting that Kashmir was an international dispute and any unilateral change in its status was a violation of international law and UN resolutions on the region.
But the main diplomatic challenge to Delhi’s moves in Kashmir came from an unexpected rival: China.
India’s line of argument remained consistent: To the international community it insisted that Kashmir was a bilateral issue with Pakistan. To Pakistan it reiterated that Kashmir was an Indian internal affair. And to critics on the ground, it stubbornly asserted that Kashmir was an issue of terrorism and law and order.
Initially, Delhi had faced a largely peaceful anti-India movement in the portion of Kashmir it held. However, a crackdown on dissent led to a full-blown armed rebellion against Indian control in 1989. A protracted conflict since then has led to tens of thousands of deaths in the region.
Kashmir turned into a potential nuclear flashpoint as India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed states in 1998. Their stand-off attracted global attention, with then-US President Bill Clinton describing Kashmir as “the most dangerous place in the world”.
Many Indian foreign policy experts believe Delhi was successful over the decades in blocking foreign pressure for change in Kashmir, despite deep sentiment against Indian rule in the region.
Now, Delhi policymakers face the fundamental challenge of a China that is exerting more power in Asia and supporting Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir.
Pakistan “now operates in a more complicated political role as a partner of Chinese power”, said Paul Staniland, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “This gives it some clout and influence.”
With geopolitical rivalries deepening in the extended region, Kashmiris have been largely silenced, with their civil liberties curbed, as India has displayed zero tolerance for any form of dissent.
India’s old nonaligned stance, rooted in the Cold War era when rivalries were playing out thousands of miles from its borders, has come to an end. The entire region has become a focus of geostrategic competition and great power rivalry close to India’s borders.
India takes on China and Russia in a Great Game for Central Asia
“We recognise the need to hedge against China to curb its ambitions by making it known that there is a new line of security that is being built against any aggressiveness by China, which is at the core of the Quad,” said Sibal, the former diplomat.
With the Quad now central to discussions among India’s strategic thinkers, Delhi has massively ramped up infrastructure along its long, treacherous and undemarcated border with China. Beijing views the Quad as an attempt to contain its economic growth and influence.
“This is how we are sending a signal to China that we are ready to join with others to curb you,” Sibal said.