Previously, ISD had provided some details on these plots, stating in a 2003 White Paper presented to Parliament that JI had “at least six plans”.

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“In making these plans, JI relied heavily on video reconnaissance of the targets, usually making recordings over several visits and making a final composite video for final preparations and planning,” ISD said then, though it had waited until now to release the video footage.

The terrorist organisation gained notoriety after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US by the al Qaeda terrorist group, which had strong links to JI. Several prominent JI members trained with al Qaeda in Afghanistan, which had also given instructions and support to JI operatives in Singapore.

However, JI’s earliest plans to carry out attacks in Singapore date back to the mid-1990s, long before the events of 9/11, ISD said.

Attacking buses carrying US troops

One of JI’s earliest known plans in Singapore was to attack bus services taking American military personnel and their families in the Sembawang area to Yishun MRT Station.

A Singapore JI member hatched this plan in 1997. Then, other members began drawing up maps of the MRT station and used a video camera to survey the station and its surroundings.

Special attention was given to areas where explosives could be placed, ISD disclosed.

A three-minute video taken by a JI member includes a man describing the vulnerabilities at Yishun MRT Station, while regular Singaporeans go about their day around him.

It shows the buses and the drop-off points for the US personnel, bicycle parking lots and drainage areas where bombs could be hidden, and a nearby temple car park where “it would not be suspicious if there was a bicycle or motorcycle parked there”, the male voice says.

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One detainee, known as Jameel, later told ISD that the initial plan was to pack explosives in either a stolen motorcycle or using a dustbin, detonating it when the US personnel got on or off the bus.

The group had also considered using a suicide bomber or rigging an unattended bus with explosives.

A copy of the videotape was also discovered by US forces in Afghanistan, along with notes written in Arabic, such as a detailed map of the MRT station, the route taken by the shuttle bus as well as the frequency of the bus and Singapore’s traffic system.

This indicated that al Qaeda, which was present in Afghanistan at the time, was briefed on the attack plans.

Provoke war with Malaysia

He wanted to conduct attacks in Singapore that would implicate Malaysia, causing animosity and provoking war, ISD said.

“He believed that JI could then take advantage of the instability to overthrow the secular governments of Singapore and Malaysia and establish an Islamic state.”

Reconnaissance photographs released by ISD on Saturday showed the PUB Woodlands booster station, Bukit Panjang service reservoir along Fajar Road and the water pipeline at Bukit Timah Nature Reserve. The 2003 White Paper had also named the water pipelines at the causeway and the PUB Bukit Timah Water Works opposite KK Women’s and Children’s Hospital as targets.

Four JI members, including Mohammad Aslam Yar Ali Khan who is still being detained today, posed as joggers and filmed these locations.

A JI detainee who had filmed the water pipelines told the authorities that the purpose of “casing” the pipelines was to blow them up to cut the water supply between Singapore and Malaysia, and was aimed at causing chaos in both countries.

Bombing US, British embassies

One plot that gained significant traction following the 9/11 attacks came at the urging of al Qaeda operative “Sammy”, whose real name is Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a Canadian.

It involved the use of truck bombs to attack the US and Israeli embassies, the Australian and British high commissions, and commercial buildings that housed American firms, ISD said.

The attacks were scheduled as soon as December 2001, three months after the US attacks.

By the time of their arrests, Singapore JI members had already taken steps to procure 17 tonnes of fertiliser intended to make the truck bombs.

This was done on the instructions of a foreign JI bomb maker identified as Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, who was known by his alias Mike. Both Mike and Sammy were arrested overseas with the aid of the information provided by ISD.

Targeting Changi Airport

JI wanted to attack Singapore’s economy by targeting Changi Airport and the radar station on Biggin Hill, which is now the Changi Airport’s Air Traffic Control Centre.

These locations had been surveyed on several occasions between 1999 and 2001, with JI “relying on members with insider access to facilitate its terror plans”.

Two JI members, who were working for the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) and an international courier company, were assigned to carry out the reconnaissance.

They managed to survey the secure areas within the airport where they could plant bombs, including at the control tower of the airport.

JI was also able to obtain a map of the airport’s cargo complex, which had markings where the aviation fuel tanks were.

One JI detainee said to officers: “Although [another member] did not get into specifics, I was fully aware that foreigners would carry out the sabotage attacks … I was aware that the recce that was conducted by us was important, as it provided details of the premises [and] the detailed layout of target areas.”

Other strategic targets included the Singapore American School, the MRT system including its operations control centre, and Jurong Island.

Angered by the ISD operation on December 8, 2001 against JI members, the terrorist organisation sought to launch retaliatory attacks against Singapore.

Hambali urged Singapore JI members to persist with the earlier plan on the various foreign missions in retaliation.

However, the plan was foiled after ISD shared information on JI bomb maker Mike that led to his arrest in the Philippines. Explosives meant to be used in the Singapore attack were discovered during his capture.

Mas Selamat Kastari, a JI leader who had fled to Johor in Malaysia at the time, also planned to hijack a plane from Bangkok in Thailand and crash it into the control tower of Changi Airport in response to the ISD arrests.

He bought five business-class tickets for the flight from Thailand, but was forced to abort after ISD learned of the planned hijacking from two detainees.

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A detainee, given the pseudonym Johan, later told ISD of Mas Selamat’s plan: “Once we have hijacked the aeroplane, we were going to crash [it] into the control tower of Changi Airport. If we could not … we would crash the aeroplane anyway because we did not want to get caught.”

Days after the 9/11 attacks, an alert member of the public tipped off ISD on a man who had claimed to know al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. The department began watching the man, Mohammad Aslam Yar Ali Khan, who left for Afghanistan on October 4, 2001.

After Aslam’s detention in Afghanistan was reported in the media on December 3, ISD began its operations against Aslam’s associates on December 8.

It picked up 23 people for questioning during its first wave of arrests, 13 of whom were found to be active JI members and were detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA).

Another 21 people were arrested in the second wave in August 2002, of whom 17 were JI members and one was a member of another terrorist organisation Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

“Without the ISA, we would likely only have been able to arrest and charge the JI members after they had conducted their attacks,” ISD said.

The ISD’s operations did not stop after the JI network in Singapore was crippled, as it turned its attention to JI fugitives who fled the country, according to new information provided.

Through cooperation with regional security agencies and the investigative leads that came from ISD’s interviews with JI detainees, many were caught overseas and deported to Singapore.

“For some of the JI fugitives, ISD worked with their families and other helpful parties wherever possible, to persuade these individuals to return to Singapore,” the department said.

At least four JI members returned to Singapore after speaking to their families. ISD said that it had secured the return of more than 20 Singaporeans who had fled the country in the wake of the arrests, except for one who is still imprisoned in Indonesia for terrorism offences.