Scaling up exports of phenomenally effective US vaccines, dispatching experts to badly hit areas, working with local civic groups and more effectively countering Chinese misinformation are ways that Washington can bolster its soft power and showcase democracy and American technology, analysts said – with a particular eye to Southeast Asia, where US-Chinese competition for influence is greatest.

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Global Covid caseload exceeds 356 million as infections climb in areas with low vaccination rates

Global Covid caseload exceeds 356 million as infections climb in areas with low vaccination rates

But taking full advantage of that opportunity also requires the US to do something far more difficult than flooding foreign countries with vaccine doses. To effectively burnish its dented global reputation, damaged by flip-flop policies and former president Donald Trump’s America-first approach, it needs to overcome deep political divisions and anti-vaccine forces at home before effectively countering China’s Covid diplomacy abroad, analysts said.

“The US has messed up so badly with its own response, it’s not going to get a good reputation now,” said Ronald Waldman, a global health expert and professor emeritus at George Washington University. “It can’t even get its own population vaccinated.”

Washington also needs to do better showcasing its efforts, something China often excels at. Although the US contributes nine times more to the World Health Organization’s budget than China, Beijing often garners more leverage and positive publicity. This was accentuated by Trump’s decision to withdraw from the WHO in July 2020, a move quickly reversed by the incoming Biden administration.

“The US does a lot but fails to publicise [it], which translates with soft power,” said Huang. “They don’t have strong returns even with their huge investment.”

China’s global reputation has waxed and waned during the crisis. It took a big hit in early 2020 as the virus erupted in Wuhan and spread overseas even as Chinese officials denied, deflected and waffled over its origin and virulence.

Beijing soon turned this around by tightening internal controls, stemming Covid-19’s spread, sending vaccines abroad and rebooting its economy, in marked contrast to the chaotic US response. This, Huang said, allowed it to bolster its international agenda: to establish China at the centre of global issues, standard-setting and institutions, including the United Nations.

But things started wobbling again last year. Many vaccine diplomacy efforts were revealed as blatant propaganda ploys or otherwise backfired, including price gouging involving “humanitarian” exports of defective masks.

This coincided with growing questions over the effectiveness of Chinese vaccines and the more repressive elements of its zero-Covid policy, seen when desperate Xian residents went hungry, spotlighted by the approaching Beijing Winter Olympics that began this week.

Risks inherent in China’s zero-Covid approach have also become more evident. As other strict countries like Australia and New Zealand increasingly resign themselves to living with the virus and developing herd immunity, China’s dogged adherence leaves its population vulnerable.

“Highly transmissible variants are challenging China’s draconian pandemic response and casting doubt on the efficacy,” Huang said. “Because most of the population is vulnerable to the Omicron variant, even a small opening could trigger a large breakout that eventually engulfs the entire country.”

This is a worst-case scenario, however, Huang added, and the Chinese system is more resilient than sometimes appreciated.

Another question experts are considering is how the authoritarian state winds down its no-tolerance policy.

“What does the off-ramp of a zero-Covid strategy looks like in a world where we’re going to have variants bouncing around for years?” asked Sarah Kreps, a Cornell University professor and former US intelligence analyst. “Can the government keep up with the lockdowns for three to five years?”

Given Beijing’s tight grip on the media, it could declare victory and hide subsequent outbreaks, although widespread hospitalisation risks social unrest, analysts said. Otherwise, a protracted lockdown would take a further toll on the global supply chains, China’s economy and diplomatic standing if President Xi Jinping and other top officials continue to balk at overseas travel.

“If you claim 90 to 95 per cent efficiency rate, but it doesn’t work against the variants, it doesn’t make much sense,” said Huang.

Health experts also say ideally the US needs to recognise that effective global health leadership – and the accompanying geopolitical benefits – depends on its working with Russia, China and other rivals, not just allies.

And, some say, Washington needs to stop framing global health and other policies solely in opposition to Beijing and think about sharing technology and know-how involving new antiviral drugs, for instance, with China. But most acknowledge this is unlikely But most acknowledge this is unlikely given political hardliners and deep distrust on both sides.

“For me, it’s not a game with a winner and loser,” said Waldman. “The point is that a lot of countries in Africa and Southeast Asia need to get their people vaccinated with an effective vaccine, period.”

China continues to pursue a flawed zero-Covid strategy and resist a proper investigation into the virus’s origin – essential to prevent a reoccurrence – even as millions of Americans resist an effective therapy in the name of “freedom”, he added.

“Winning is not in the equation for either of them. It is lose-lose,” Waldman said. “Or maybe lose less badly. I don’t see either of them coming out of this well.”