A debate is under way within US President Joe Biden’s administration over its policy toward China given the risk that Beijing will help Russia weather the economic and financial sanctions imposed after its invasion of Ukraine, according to sources with ties to the administration. At issue is whether there is enough daylight between Beijing and Moscow to secure some measure of Chinese cooperation in enforcing sanctions and convincing Russia to de-escalate, they say. “There’s definitely a big debate. There are two schools of thought. One is that China is not going to play ball on this,” said one source with close ties to US security agencies. “The other is that, maybe they won’t, but you might as well try and that this is a good test on whether you can find any ground on US-China relations.” Those in the hard-line camp point to efforts over the past 14 months to find areas of cooperation, particularly on global health and climate change, that were rebuffed by Chinese leaders keen to see progress on easing punitive tariffs and other major irritants. This side believes China is dug in, inflexible and that any time spent on changing its mind takes away from addressing inflation, the upcoming US midterm elections and intense alliance-building efforts. This more hawkish side argues that nascent Beijing-Moscow differences are not enough to overcome China’s deep distrust of the US, driven by a view that Washington is laser focused on preventing its global rise. They also believe Beijing will find it difficult to back away from a 5,300-word statement of “no limits” partnership with Russia jointly issued on February 4. Those leaning more toward engagement argue that this is an opportunity to put a floor under free-falling US-China relations as China’s stability-obsessed leadership bridles under the collateral damage President Vladimir Putin’s invasion has unleashed. The crisis comes as Beijing juggles this week’s National People’s Congress, a rising virus outbreak amid its zero-Covid strategy and preparations for President Xi Jinping’s expected third term. Those inclined toward engagement also argue that such efforts carry relatively little downside and would blunt charges by Chinese officials that they were never consulted. Furthermore, Beijing’s position may evolve despite initial rejections, this camp argues, with even partial cooperation on sanctions promising to increase their effectiveness. China’s links to Russia leave it exposed as Ukraine attack backfires, experts say The outlines of the debate were confirmed by four sources with ties to the US State Department, Defence Department and National Security Council. Policy prescriptions do not appear to break along clear agency lines, they said. The NSC and Defence Department did not comment. A senior State Department official said: “There is no debate. Nations that side with Vladimir Putin will inevitably find themselves on the wrong side of history.” Behind the arguments are different interpretations of when, how much and how fully China knew about the invasion. According to a timeline first reported by The New York Times on March 2, a Western intelligence agency concluded that Russia told China on February 4 of a planned Ukraine “military operation” as Putin met with Xi in Beijing. Beijing reportedly did not express support or opposition but requested a delay until after the Winter Olympics; the invasion started four days after the closing ceremony. Beijing has sidestepped questions on how much it knew and when, decrying Western media reports as “blameshifting”. An added variable, analysts say, is whether Russia shared the full picture with China or underplayed the risks and complexity of its plans to win Beijing’s support. China did not warn its roughly 6,000 citizens in Ukraine to leave – advising them initially to attach Chinese flags to their vehicles for protection – even as its embassy was caught relatively unaware, sources said, circumstantial evidence that it may have been duped or fallen victim to Putin’s wishful thinking for a fast, decisive strike. Other factors were more universally unknown, they added, including the Russian military’s early stumbles, fierce resistance behind Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and how quickly Europe would unify in outrage. Complicating the US calculus, said the source with ties to US security agencies citing conversations with Chinese officials, is Beijing’s perception that the administration leaked information designed to make it look bad. The New York Times reported on February 25 that Washington had passed confidential intelligence on the imminent Russian invasion to China, hoping it would use its influence to stop the military action, only to see Beijing share the information with Moscow. Chinese return home from Ukraine as Beijing urged to rein in Moscow Ultimately, said two sources and several analysts, a likely scenario is that China will avoid outright defiance of the tough Western sanctions and export restrictions on Russian banks, oligarchs and trade to avoid secondary sanctions against itself, but will help Moscow in less detectable ways. They cite the North Korean model. In February 2016, after Pyongyang claimed it tested a hydrogen bomb, Beijing went along with UN sanctions. Subsequently, it has been criticised for weakening them by, for instance, allowing trade through obscure companies or transfers of goods aboard ships at sea to mask their origin. Analysts said it would be surprising if the White House was not re-evaluating its options toward China given the enormous geopolitical implications of Russia’s invasion. “There’s no question the administration is looking for diplomatic advantage in the clear gap between Russia and China,” said Kevin Nealer, former member of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board. “It would be malpractice not to.” Eurasia Group analyst Michael Hirson noted that Biden’s State of the Union speech last week only briefly mentioned China in the context of US economic competitiveness, apparently to leave US options open. Some analysts say they see little chance of Washington convincing Beijing to get on board soon. “They are not going to act against their own interests, and we cannot change their perception of their interests with just words,” said Ivan Kanapathy, who served on the National Security Council under Biden and ex-president Donald Trump. “It would be naive to believe we can talk them into anything without some sort of leverage.” Potential points of leverage include China’s hunger for political stability, its fear of secondary sanctions as its economy wobbles and a desire to avoid being cast with Russia as a global pariah, undercutting its quest for global respectability. Beijing will pay if it helps Russia evade sanctions, US official warns In an interview last week, State Department counsellor Derek Chollet warned of unspecified “consequences” if China helps Russia evade sanctions, though he deflected questions about any internal administration debate over China policy. China, meanwhile, finds itself in a bind. While Xi shares Putin’s world view about authoritarian rule and the need to push back at democracies, Beijing resents the unintended consequences from Putin’s violent power grab. The global spotlight has fuelled unfavourable comparisons between Ukraine and Taiwan. And it has spotlighted the contradiction between the invasion of Ukraine and China’s long-stated belief in the inviolability of national sovereignty. Nealer, a partner in the Scowcroft Group consultancy, said this China-Russian difference was seen in Putin’s early career working as a Russian spy in East Germany, as American intelligence learned later from the Stasi, the state security agency. “He was not promoted to full colonel because he ‘took unjustified risks’,” said Nealer. “In the Chinese system – where 60 per cent of your evaluation as a Communist Party member, at least, is how you’ve promoted stability – Putin would not do well on that employee evaluation form.” Palaces, yachts, Swiss accounts. How rich is Putin and can sanctions hurt? As increasingly bright lines are drawn between democracy and authoritarianism, some see little chance pragmatism will prevail. “There’s still an attempt to try to have constructive relationships where there’s truly overlapping interests,” said Jacob Stokes, who advised Biden on national security when he was US vice-president and is now a Centre for a New American Security fellow. But that’s coming up against a Chinese foreign policy deeply threatened by the US global order that, according to Stokes, “very explicitly looks more like Putin’s view of the world than the US’s”.